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Prior studies have established an extensive literature on accounting 
comparability, largely with the focus on its economic consequences. However, the 
current literature is characterised by at least two limitations. First, the prior studies on 
earnings comparability document evidence exclusively for GAAP earnings despite the 
fact that non-GAAP earnings are widely used by market participants. Second, while 
research has examined the economic consequences of comparability, limited attention 
has been given to the underlying mechanism that produces more comparable (or 
incomparable) earnings. My thesis, composed of two related studies, aims to contribute 
to these two gaps. Chapter 4 seeks to fill the first gap by bridging the literatures on 
accounting comparability and non-GAAP earnings. Specifically, I find that non-GAAP 
adjustments are associated with significant comparability benefits. Chapter 5 aims to 
close the second gap regarding the underlying mechanism that produces comparable (or 
incomparable) earnings. The main finding suggests that earnings comparability is 
partially driven by firms’ accrual components. These findings combined contribute to 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
As an important qualitative characteristic of accounting information, 
comparability is believed to enhance the quality of financial information. Practically, 
accounting comparability calls for like things being reported alike, and unlike things 
being reported differently (AICPA 1971: 59). Standard setters (FASB 2010) believe 
that greater comparability helps users to better identify and understand similarities in, 
and differences among, financial items. The perceived benefits of comparability are 
built on the grounds that many important economic decisions involve the evaluation of 
alternative opportunities and thus require comparable financial information as a key 
input to the decision making equation. Examples include investors choosing among 
potential investment projects, lenders making lending decisions, and companies 
evaluating potential acquisition targets.  
The importance of comparability is also well appreciated by academics. There 
has been a fast-growing body of literature on accounting comparability, largely with the 
focus on its economic consequences. In particular, a wide range of studies examines the 
benefits of financial information with greater comparability: for instance, lower 
uncertainty to equity investors (Bradshaw et al. 2009, De Franco et al. 2011), better 
valuation outcomes (Young and Zeng, 2015), lower stock crash risk (Kim et al. 2016), 
improved acquisition performance (Chen et al. 2016), and lower credit risk to debt 
investors (Kim et al. 2013). However, the current literature is characterised by at least 
two limitations. First, the prior studies on earnings comparability document evidence 
exclusively for GAAP earnings despite the fact that non-GAAP earnings are widely 
used by market participants (Bradshaw and Sloan 2002). Second, while research has 
examined the economic consequences of comparability, limited attention has been 
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given to the underlying mechanism that produces more comparable (or incomparable) 
earnings. My thesis, composed of two related studies, aims to contribute to these two 
gaps in prior work. 
Chapter 4 seeks to fill the first gap by bridging the literatures on accounting 
comparability and non-GAAP earnings. The chapter is centred on the following 
research question: do non-GAAP earnings adjustments deliver comparability benefits? 
Prior studies find that non-GAAP earnings are more value relevant than GAAP earnings 
((Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Brown and Sivakumar 2003; Bhattacharya et al. 2003; 
Lougee and Marquardt 2004). However, comparability serves as a dimension distinct 
from relevance insofar as it is concerned with the quality of information that enables 
users to identify similarities and differences between two sets of economic events. For 
example, comparability is found to render economic effects incremental to other within-
firm accounting quality (Imhof et al. 2017). It can also be differentiated from other 
qualitative characteristics in that comparability does not relate to a single entity. Rather, 
it requires comparisons between two or more entities. Therefore, my thesis examines 
comparability as an independent dimension of non-GAAP earnings quality. 
There exists a broader debate on the comparability of non-GAAP earnings in 
professional and financial media circles concerning the usefulness to investors and other 
users of non-GAAP earnings (Francis and Linebaugh 2015; PwC 2016; The Center for 
Audit Quality 2016; International Organization of Securities Commissions 2016). On 
the one hand, preparers and certain user groups such as financial analysts claim (among 
other benefits) that non-GAAP earnings adjustments are typically made to facilitate 
comparison of performance. Practically, they contend that non-GAAP earnings could 
better reflect firms’ underlying performance and thus help information users identify 
the similarities and differences between firms (Kim et al. 2013; Standard & Poor’s 2008; 
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Moody’s 2010). As a result, non-GAAP earnings are perceived as a set of information 
that improves the comparability of financial statements. On the other hand, however, 
non-GAAP earnings adjustments could be motivated for opportunistic reasons. In the 
absence of consensus reporting standards, the opportunistic non-GAAP adjustments 
could cause the resulting earnings metric to deviate from the underlying economics, 
thereby concealing similarities in and differences between firms. In this situation, rather 
than facilitating performance comparisons, the distorted non-GAAP earnings metric is 
likely to reduce earnings comparability. 
Compared to GAAP earnings, non-GAAP earnings possess features that have 
the potential to improve comparability. First, non-GAAP earnings exclude non-
recurring items such as restructuring charges, gains and losses on mark-to-market 
securities, and impairments. To the extent these non-recurring items are not part of firms’ 
core and continuing operations (Dechow et al. 1994; Barth et al. 2001; Riedl 2004; Gu 
and Lev 2011; Barker 2004; Dhaliwal et al. 1999), their inclusion in earnings is likely 
to distort reported performance and make earnings deviate from underlying economic 
reality. In contrast, excluding these items makes earnings more aligned with the 
underlying economics, which in turn facilitates cross-sectional comparisons of 
performance. Second, non-GAAP earnings are found to be less conditionally 
conservative than GAAP earnings (Heflin et al. 2015). This feature of non-GAAP 
earnings may provide comparability benefits by narrowing the earnings difference 
caused by differing levels of conservatism. 
However, a number of reasons also exist why non-GAAP adjustments could 
reduce earnings comparability, with the most predominant one being lack of a 
standardized definition of non-GAAP earnings. While choice over exclusions allows 
management flexibility to accommodate varying circumstances across firms, it also 
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leaves non-GAAP reporting subject to the risk of inconsistency (Gu and Chen 2004; 
Black et al. 2009). Second, firms’ GAAP earnings are subject to classification shifting 
where recurring expenses are misclassified as non-recurring items (Cready et al. 2010; 
Riedl and Srinivasan 2010; Johnson et al. 2011). Consequently, users such as equity 
analysts who work on firms’ disclosure to construct non-GAAP earnings could be 
misled into excluding items inappropriately. Collectively, the comparability of non-
GAAP earnings versus GAAP earnings therefore remains an empirical question that 
chapter 4 seeks to address. 
My study concerns general non-GAAP adjustments in the US made by various 
parties not limited to management. IBES actual earnings are used as a proxy for generic 
non-GAAP earnings in the empirical tests. Employing De Franco et al. (2011)’s 
approach to measuring comparability, I find that overall non-GAAP earnings 
adjustments improve cross-sectional earnings comparability relative to GAAP earnings. 
Further analysis reveals that non-GAAP comparability benefits stem from exclusion of 
non-recurring items, while aggressive exclusion of recurring items serves to reduce 
earnings comparability. The comparability benefits from non-GAAP adjustments are 
also found to vary across firms with different information environment/different level 
of idiosyncrasy. 
Chapter 4 makes three contributions to the extant research. First, it contributes 
to the literature by bridging the gap between the literature on comparability and the 
literature on non-GAAP earnings. The finding of this chapter contributes to our 
understanding of the properties and benefits of non-GAAP reporting. The documented 
evidence also enriches the fast growing literature on accounting comparability by 
extending the research focus from GAAP earnings to non-GAAP numbers. Second, 
evidence presented in this chapter provides another viable explanation for the increasing 
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popularity of non-GAAP earnings. While prior research largely attributes non-GAAP 
earnings’ popularity to their higher persistence and predictability, the significant 
improvement in the cross-sectional comparability of street earnings provides an 
additional explanation for its broad use by preparers and practitioners. Third, findings 
provide guideline to securities regulators and standard setters who must balance 
between offering sufficient flexibility in financial reporting and imposing uniformity to 
prevent potential exploitation. More specifically, non-GAAP reporting presents a 
setting to examine earnings comparability in the absence of consensus reporting 
standards. The finding of non-GAAP earnings being even more comparable is 
consistent with the view that information usefulness can be enhanced by promoting an 
information-set approach where preparers and external users are allowed to construct 
earnings metrics to reflect their specific needs. This view is in agreement with the 
approach to performance reporting adopted by the UK Accounting Standards Board in 
Financial Reporting Standard 3: Reporting Financial Performance, as well as its 
successor Financial Reporting Standard 102 (FRS 102).   
Chapter 5 aims to close the second gap regarding the underlying mechanism that 
produces comparable (or incomparable) earnings. Because accounting earnings are 
determined by the accrual process, it naturally raises an important but unexplained 
question about the impact of accrual components on the comparability of GAAP 
earnings. I therefore examine how accruals with different properties influence the 
comparability of the resulting earnings metrics. The research question is built on the 
assertion of FASB (2010) that the comparability of reported accounting information is 
associated with the relevance of the information. In the context of reported earnings, 
their comparability is expected to be associated with the relevance of components that 
constitute earnings. Since accruals represent an important component of earnings, the 
6 
 
relevance of accruals is likely related to the comparability of corresponding earnings. 
In my empirical tests, the relevance of accruals is proxyed by the proximity of different 
accruals to firms’ operating activities. I first establish evidence on the association 
between earnings comparability and accrual process. Next, I conduct supplementary 
analysis to examine the moderating effect of accruals on comparability benefits to 
analyst forecast performance. 
An important insight is drawn from the Conceptual Framework for Financial 
Reporting that accruals with high relevance are likely to improve the comparability of 
corresponding earnings. Specifically, the FASB asserts that “[s]ome degree of 
comparability is likely to be attained by satisfying the fundamental qualitative 
characteristics” (SFAC No. 8), suggesting that accruals that enhance the relevance of 
earnings would also enhance the comparability of earnings. Building on this insight, I 
empirically classify the entire accrual items from income statement into three categories 
according to the proximity of different accruals to firms’ core operations. Then I test 
the comparability effect of three accrual categories. I measure earnings comparability 
following De Franco et al.’s (2011) approach where comparability is considered high if 
two firms report similar earnings for similar economic events. Using a US sample of 
non-financial public firms from 2003 to 2015, I find that core accruals enhance cross-
sectional comparability of earnings, whereas non-core accruals reduce earnings 
comparability. The supplementary analyses examine the implications of my main 
finding for previously established evidence on how analysts benefit from greater 
earnings comparability. The finding suggests that the comparability benefits for 
analysts are more concentrated in the firms whose earnings include less core 
accruals/more non-core accruals and therefore are more difficult to predict. By contrast, 
the comparability benefits become significantly less pronounced when the firms’ 
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earnings comprise more core accruals/less non-core accruals and thus are easier to 
predict. The finding is in agreement with prior evidence that comparability is more 
beneficial when the difficulty of processing financial information (and overcome 
information asymmetry) is high (Fan et al. 2016; Chen et al. 2016). 
Chapter 5 makes two contributions to the literature. First, it establishes a direct 
link between the comparability of earnings and the relevance of accrual items. While 
the majority of prior studies focus on the economic consequences of comparability, 
there is insufficient research on the underlying mechanism that produces comparability. 
My research highlights a crucial association between accrual components and earnings 
comparability. It suggests that adjusting for accruals with distant proximity to operating 
activities reduces earnings comparability and therefore compromises the usefulness of 
reported earnings. In contrast, adjusting for accruals with close proximity to operating 
activities improves earnings comparability, which in turn enhances the usefulness of 
reported earnings. This knowledge facilitates our understanding of the underlying 
mechanism that drives earnings comparability. Second, the findings about the relation 
between comparability and accruals have important implications for the well-
established evidence on how analysts can benefit from greater earnings comparability. 
While prior research documents evidence that greater earnings comparability improves 
analysts’ forecast accuracy and reduces forecast dispersion (De Franco et al. 2011), my 
analyses suggest that this evidence is mainly driven by firms whose earnings are 
difficult to predict. For those firms with more straightforward/transparent earnings, the 
benefits of comparability become less significant to analysts. Overall, my findings 
suggest a cross-sectional difference in comparability benefits, and thus contribute to the 





1.2 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of the thesis is organized into 6 chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature on accounting comparability. Chapter 3 discusses the empirical measures of 
accounting comparability and introduces the comparability scores used throughout the 
thesis. Chapter 4 speaks to the debate on the comparability of non-GAAP earnings 
through examining the comparability effects of non-GAAP adjustments. Chapter 5 
highlights the underlying mechanism that produces comparability by investigating the 
association between earnings comparability and accrual process. Chapter 6 concludes 
and makes suggestions for future research.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review on Accounting Comparability 
This section provides a literature review on accounting comparability. The 
empirical measurement issues for accounting comparability will be discussed separately 
in chapter 3. The literature review in this chapter is organized into 4 sections. Section 
2.1 discusses the conceptual treatment of accounting comparability in standard setting 
and academic research. Section 2.2 reviews the research on cross-country accounting 
comparability, focusing on the studies on the effect of IFRS adoption on accounting 
comparability. Section 2.3 reviews the studies examining the determinants and 
consequences of accounting comparability. Section 2.4 summarizes the prior findings 
about accounting comparability and identifies the gaps in the literature, for which my 
thesis seeks evidence. While I appreciate comprehensiveness, this section is structured 
to focus on the research that is closely related to my thesis. As a result, it does not 
exhaustively cover all studies in the extant literature. 
 
2.1 Importance of Accounting Comparability 
Accounting comparability is appreciated as an important characteristic of 
financial information whose usefulness represents great value for firms, investors and 
regulators. Comparability is a key characteristic of accounting information. The FASB 
(2010) considers comparability an important enhancing qualitative characteristic of 
accounting information. The concept of cross-sectional comparability is distinguished 
from temporal comparability, with the later one being usually referred to as consistency. 
Comparability is expected to help financial statement users chose between alternatives 
such as selling or holding an investment or investing in one reporting entity or another. 
As a result, information about a reporting entity becomes more useful if it can be 
compared with similar information about other entities. In particular, FASB (2010) 
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emphasizes the important role of accounting comparability in investment decision 
making, by stating that more comparable information better fulfil the need of properly 
evaluating similarities and differences in competing investment opportunities. Greater 
accounting comparability calls for like economic events being reflected in similar 
accounting numbers, and unlike events being accounted by different accounting 
numbers. 
There are two perspectives for achieving accounting comparability. The first 
perspective relates to the mere similarity of the accounting standards and rules and it is 
usually referred to as ‘formal’ harmonization/comparability. The second perspective 
concerns the inherent application of standards and rules, and it is usually referred to as 
‘material’ harmonization/comparability (Tay and Parker 1990; Tas 1992). The 
interaction between two perspectives becomes more relevant in the context of IFRS 
adoption which imposed identical standards to firms that had previously used local 
GAAPs. This is because the perceived comparability benefit of standard harmonization 
could be compounded by national heterogeneity in standard implementation (Daske et 
al. 2013) or the disconnection of change in accounting standards and change in 
accounting choices (Kvaal and Nobes 2012). 
In the pre-IFRS period when various local GAAPs were applied in different 
countries, the research largely focuses on ‘formal’ comparability, examining the effect 
of similarity or dissimilarity of standards and rules on comparability. The ‘material’ 
comparability has become the main subject of research in the post-IFRS period when 
researchers are more interested in the extent to which identical standards are commonly 
applied across countries with different institutional environments. The research on 
‘material’ comparability also concerns the common implementation of accounting 
standards by different entities within the same country (e.g., US). 
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There is also a distinction between comparability and uniformity. While 
accounting standards are enacted to facilitate comparability, standardized reporting 
alone does not necessarily guarantee meaningful comparability, even though two 
numbers appear similar (Beechy 1999). First, applying uniform rules does not always 
result in comparable earnings if these rules distort the measurement of underlying 
business. To deliver meaningful comparability, accounting numbers should be able to 
accurately capture firms’ underlying performance because “valid comparison is 
possible only if the measurements used—the quantities or ratios—reliably represent the 
characteristic that is the subject of comparison” (FASB, 1980). This is consistent with 
the notion that genuine comparability calls for fitting of accounting methods to firm-
specific circumstances, while the one-size-fits-all philosophy only leads to superficial 
comparability (Zeff 2007).  
Despite the importance of accounting comparability, there has been limited 
research on this topic (Schipper 2003) mainly due to the lack of a reliable empirical 
measure of accounting comparability until recently. Conceptually, accounting 
comparability captures the degree to which similar (different) economic events are 
mapped into similar (different) accounting numbers. De Franco et al. (2011) introduces 
an output-based measure of accounting comparability based on the similarity of 
parameters from firm-specific linear regressions of earnings on stock returns for a 
subject firm and its peer firms in the same industry. This measure was broadly embraced 
by researchers and has led to a fast-growing body of research on accounting 
comparability. More detailed discussion on De Franco et al. (2011)’s earnings 
comparability measure and other alternative measures of comparability will be 




2.2 Comparability as a Standard Setting Objective 
 This section is concerned with studies that examine the effect of standard 
harmonization on accounting comparability across different countries. I review studies 
for the period of both pre- and post-IFRS adoption. The pre-IFRS studies observe that 
accounting standards have become increasingly similar across different countries over 
time on a voluntary basis. This observation is then linked to the corresponding increase 
in cross-country accounting comparability. The post-IFRS studies take advantage of the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS, where firms previously reporting under different local 
GAAPs are now confronted with identical accounting standards, and examine its effect 
on accounting comparability. Besides the literature centered around IFRS adoption, 
there are also studies exploring the convergence of IFRS and US GAAP and its 
influences on accounting comparability.  
The trend in comparability prior to IFRS adoption is examined by Land and 
Lang (2002) and Beuselinck et al. (2007). An upwards trend in comparability is 
documented by both studies, with Beuselinck et al. (2007) also identifying firm-specific 
and country-specific factors determining comparability and its variation over time. In 
particular, Land and Lang (2002) document evidence of increasingly similar accounting 
standards across countries over time, and link it to the corresponding increase in 
accounting comparability. In line with Land and Lang (2002), Beuselinck et al. (2007) 
investigate the determinants of cross-country accounting comparability over time in EU 
countries prior to IFRS adoption. Their results indicate a time trend towards a greater 
cross-country comparability in the relation between accruals and cash flows. They also 
investigate the comparability effect of firm-specific and country-specific reporting 
incentives. On the firm level, the accrual-cash flow comparability is significantly 
affected by size, leverage, and labor intensity, while the accrual-cash flow relation is 
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influenced by the development of stock market, the importance of banking industry, 
and union membership on the country level. 
Drawing on the convergence of IFRS and US GAAP after firms from IFRS 
adopting countries adopted IFRS, Barth et al. (2012) predict and find that the 
dissimilarity in accounting systems significantly declined after firms adopted IFRS. 
They also find that the difference in value relevance between IFRS and US GAAP firms 
is narrowed after firms from IFRS adopting countries adopted IFRS. Their findings are 
indicative of an increase in accounting comparability grounded in the adoption of IFRS, 
which is then strengthened by the evidence documented by Barth et al. (2013). Using 
an international sample of 27 different countries, Barth et al. (2013) investigate whether 
the voluntary IFRS adoption makes the firms more comparable with firms that have 
already adopted IFRS, but less comparable with non-adopting firms in the same 
countries. They hypothesize and find that IFRS adoption is associated with voluntary 
adopters reporting more similar accounting numbers to those adopted firms but less 
similar accounting numbers to those non-adopters.  
Yip and Young (2012) extends the literature by separating the inherent 
‘similarity facet’ in comparability from a ‘difference facet’. Accordingly, they argue 
that comparable accounting standards should make ‘[…] similar things look more alike 
without making different things look less different’. They also separate within-country 
comparability from cross-country comparability. Their results suggest an increase in the 
similarity of accounting across countries for those similar firms after IFRS adoption, 
while the results are mixed on the difference facet and within-country comparability. 
Cascino and Gassen (2015) further enrich the literature on accounting comparability by 
investigating the moderating effect of compliance on the association between IFRS 
adoption and accounting comparability. They find that the increase in comparability 
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associated with IFRS adoption is more pronounced for firms with stronger compliance 
incentives. 
Overall, the main findings of the literature suggest a positive association 
between IFRS adoption and accounting comparability. However, this is challenged by 
Lang et al. (2010) who argue against IFRS adoption increasing accounting 
comparability and in turn improving the information environment. The study draws on 
the assumption that comparability may not be desirable if it forces fundamentally 
dissimilar events be reported similarly in accounting numbers. Drawing on a sample 
period around IFRS adoption, their results show a negative association between cross-
country earnings co-movement, a proxy for earnings comparability, and the quality of 
information environment. This finding contradicts the results on earnings co-movement 
documented by De Franco et al. (2011) in a single country setting for the US. 
Jayaraman and Verdi (2014) find that convergence in incentives and accounting 
standards are complements in achieving cross-country accounting comparability. In 
particular, they first document an increase in comparability after the introduction of the 
Euro, which is consistent with the notion that greater economic integration generates 
incentives for more similar reporting in financial statements. However, the increase in 
accounting comparability is identified only after the mandatory IFRS adoption, which 
is in agreement with the view that reporting incentives complement accounting 
standards in achieving greater cross-country comparability. 
 
2.3 Determinants and Consequences of Accounting Comparability 
The determinants and the consequences of accounting comparability represent 
a crucial research objective. The understanding of these factors is not only relevant for 
standard setters but also to financial statement users and preparers. This section groups 
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the prior studies on comparability into two categories: those examining the determinants 
of comparability and those investigating its consequences.  
There are a handful of papers concerning the determinants of accounting 
comparability and the events that lead to a change in comparability. However, most of 
these studies focus on cross-countries comparability (as discussed in the last section), 
with only one paper looking at the cross-sectional comparability within the same 
country. Focusing on cross-sectional earnings comparability for firms in the US, Francis 
et al. (2014) examine the relation between audit style and accounting comparability. In 
particular, they investigate whether companies audited by the same auditor produce 
more comparable financial statements than those audited by different auditors. They 
find that accounting comparability is positively associated with having the same Big 4 
auditor, which is consistent with the view of audit style serving as an important 
determinant for comparability. 
Compared with the research on determinants, there is a significantly larger 
literature regarding the consequences of accounting comparability. The studies along 
these lines largely focus on cross-sectional comparability, with most of them finding 
benefits associated with comparability. In particular, accounting comparability is found 
to be consistently beneficial to both equity and debt markets. There is also a small group 
of studies examining the benefits of cross-country accounting comparability. 
De Franco et al. (2011) document evidence of more comparable financial 
statements increasing the analyst following, improving analysts’ forecast accuracy, and 
reducing analysts’ forecast dispersion. Bhojraj and Lee (2002) find that greater financial 
statement comparability leads to higher stock price valuation accuracy, with Young and 
Zeng (2015) documenting similar results in a cross-country setting around the time of 
IFRS adoption. Still along the line of stock valuation, Chen et al. (2016) examine the 
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beneficial effect of comparability in M&A markets. Viewing comparability as a 
mechanism to facilitate information processing, they find that acquirers can better 
understand the operations of more comparable target firms, which subsequently leads 
to more enhanced post-deal performance. Moreover, the corresponding benefit of the 
intra-industry comparability on acquisition performance only presents when the target 
firm and the acquirer firm do not belong to the same industry. This finding suggests that 
the effect of accounting comparability is likely to be more pronounced under 
circumstances where the relevant financial information is ex ante difficult to be gathered 
or processed, and thus warrants peer firms as an additional information channel. 
Shane et al. (2014) identify a similar association between greater accounting 
comparability and the valuation of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). To the extent that 
higher comparability helps underwriters to better assess the firms issuing secondary 
equity, SEO firms with greater comparability with their peers incur lower costs of 
issuing new equity and therefore experience a less severe underperformance in the five 
years following the SEO. The finding is in agreement with the view that accounting 
comparability delivers benefits through reducing the costs of information processing 
which in turn facilitates enhanced understanding of financial information. Drawing on 
the same logic, Kim et al. (2016) find that comparability enhances firms’ information 
environment and thus reduces stock crash risks. 
Comparability has also been found to be beneficial in debt markets. Fang et al. 
(2016) investigate the role of comparability in loan contracting under the setting of 
private debt market. They find a negative association between comparability and the 
cost of debt, as measured by the loan interest spread, which suggests the benefit of 
comparability in mitigating information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers in 
debt relationships. The negative association between comparability and debt costs 
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becomes weaker when more restrictive terms (e.g., collateral, financial covenants, and 
maturity) are included in the contract. This finding is consistent with the notion that the 
benefit of comparability is likely to be more (less) pronounced when the difficulty of 
processing information (and thus overcome information asymmetries) proves to be high 
(low). 
Kim et al. (2013) document similar results in the setting of public debt. They 
find that Moody’s fulfils the role of information intermediary by adjusting financial 
statements in purpose of “improving the comparability of financial statements” (Kim et 
al. 2013, p.788).  Using a comparability measure based on Moody’s adjustments, they 
examine the role of comparability in determining liquidity, credit spreads, and the 
steepness of the term structure. First, their analyses indicate a positive association 
between comparability and bond liquidity, which provides evidence of comparability 
helping to reduce information asymmetries in debt markets. Second, they identify a 
negative association between comparability and the credit spreads of bonds, indicating 
the implications of comparability for bond pricing. Third, comparability is found to be 
positively associated with the steepness of the term structure. To the extent that the 
steepness of term structure is interpreted as being negatively related to default 
uncertainty, the results lend support to the view that comparability reduces the 
uncertainty for debt investors. 
 Under the setting of cross-country comparability, Barth et al. (2013) find that 
IFRS adopters obtain increased accounting comparability which in turn leads to 
increases in liquidity, share turnover, and stock price synchronicity after IFRS adoption. 
Neel (2017) investigates the joint effect of reporting quality and accounting 
comparability on capital market outcomes. He finds that the market benefits of IFRS 
adoption (e.g., higher firm value and liquidity, lower information asymmetry) are more 
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concentrated in firms with larger improvement in accounting comparability. He 
concludes that accounting comparability has a first-order effect in improving firms’ 
performance in capital markets. 
 
2.4 Summary 
Given the importance of accounting comparability, I have seen a fast-growing 
literature on the topic. There used to be limited research on this topic (Schipper 2003) 
mainly due to the lack of a reliable empirical measure of accounting comparability. The 
introduction of new empirical comparability measures by De Franco et al. (2011) among 
others has led to substantial growth in the literature. One stream of research examines 
cross-country comparability, with the focus on the comparability effect of IFRS 
adoption. Yip and Young (2012), Barth et al. (2013), and Cascino and Gassen (2015) 
find that the IFRS adoption is associated with improved comparability for firms across 
countries. The other stream of literature focuses on cross-sectional comparability within 
a single country (i.e., the US). The studies in the second stream attempt to explore the 
determinants and consequences of cross-sectional accounting comparability. A solid 
literature has been established on the consequences side where prior studies link 
accounting comparability to capital markets and find that accounting comparability 
brings about benefits to participants in both equity and debt markets. In contrast, the 
research on determinants side is sparse. While accounting harmonization has been 
found as a determining factor for cross-country comparability, the determinants of 
cross-sectional comparability within the same country have been rarely examined. One 
exception here is Francis et al. (2014). They investigate the effect of external auditors 
on firms’ earnings comparability and find that firms audited by the same audit firm tend 
to have more comparable earnings. 
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Accordingly, prior studies acknowledge the lack of evidence on the 
determinants of accounting comparability. For example, De Franco et al. (2011) 
acknowledge that their study does not investigate the determinants of financial 
statement comparability and thus cannot speak to a firm's equilibrium level of 
comparability. Their analysis is also silent on what firms could do to improve cross-
sectional comparability. As a result, further research is called for to address two 
unanswered questions: (1) what can be done to improve comparability; (2) which 
factors can determine accounting comparability. As a response, my thesis attempts to 
answer the two research questions. In Chapter 4 I respond to the first question by 
examining the comparability effect of non-GAAP earnings adjustments. Chapter 5 




Chapter 3 Summary of Empirical Comparability Measures 
This chapter discusses the comparability measures that are developed by prior 
studies. Section 3.1 summarizes and compares the input-based and output-based 
comparability measures. Section 3.2 discusses and critiques De Franco et al. (2011)’s 
measure and earnings co-movement measure, two measures used in my thesis. Section 
3.3 details the procedures to construct four alternative comparability scores which will 
be employed in subsequent chapters. 
 
3.1 Input-based vs. Output-based Comparability Measures 
To answer the research questions concerning accounting comparability, prior 
studies have developed a series of empirical measures for accounting comparability. 
These measures can be classified into two groups according to the underlying empirical 
variables they are relying on. The first group includes the measures that are based on 
input variables into accounting system, while the second group consists of measures 
that draw on output variables from accounting system. Section 3.1.1 summarizes the 
input-based comparability measures. Section 3.1.2 reviews the output-based 
comparability measures. The advantages/disadvantages of both measure groups are 
discussed in Section 3.1.3.  
 
3.1.1 Input-based Accounting Comparability Measures 
The first group of accounting comparability measures is largely constructed on 
qualitative input-based definitions of comparability, such as business activities or 
accounting methods. DeFond and Hung (2003) use accounting choice heterogeneity 
(e.g., LIFO vs. FIFO inventory methods) as a proxy for accounting comparability across 
different firms. Bradshaw et al. (2009) also construct a comparability measure based on 
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the commonality of accounting choices. They measure accounting comparability as the 
difference between a firm’s accounting choices and those of its peers in the same sector. 
An alternative comparability measure based on accounting choices is introduced by 
Peterson et al. (2015) who employ a linguistic computing approach that is commonly 
used to conduct comparison of strings of text or documents (Hoberg and Phillips 2010; 
Brown and Tucker 2011). They apply the approach to the notes to the financial 
statements from 10-K filings and measure accounting comparability as the similarity 
across firms in their accounting policy disclosures. 
DeFond et al. (2011) produce another two input-based measures. Their first 
measure is referred to as ‘GAAP heterogeneity measure’ which captures the reduction 
in accounting standard heterogeneity in a given sector. The second measure is ‘GAAP 
peer measure’ which is computed as the ratio of the number of firms in a given sector 
applying IFRS after IFRS adoption to the number of firms in the same sector using local 
GAAP prior to IFRS adoption.  
 
3.1.2 Output-based Accounting Comparability Measures 
In addition to input-based measures, there is another group of accounting 
comparability measures which are drawing on quantitative output-based metrics, with 
earnings being the most commonly used proxy for accounting system. The study by De 
Franco et al. (2011) is arguably the most influential paper in the literature on accounting 
comparability. They contribute to the literature by introducing an output-based 
approach to accounting comparability which can be applied to large sample with 
relatively low costs. Unlike prior studies that largely draw on financial statement inputs, 
De Franco et al. (2011) focus on earnings, the principal output of the financial reporting 
process. Their first comparability measure is based on the premise that ‘[f]or a given set 
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of economic events, two firms have comparable accounting systems if they produce 
similar financial statements’. They measure comparability as the extent to which 
economic events are mapped into accounting numbers for firms in the same sector. They 
use stock returns as a proxy for economic events and earnings as a proxy for the 
financial statement output. In addition to the measure based on the association between 
earnings and stock returns, they also develop an alternative comparability measure 
using the earnings co-movement across firms. The earnings comparability is measured 
as the degree to which a firm’s earnings co-vary with those of its peers in the same 
sector. The firms whose earnings co-move more with those their peers are considered 
to have more comparable earnings. 
Yip and Young (2012) employ other two output-based comparability measures 
in addition to a modified version of De Franco et al.’s (2011) earnings-returns approach. 
Their first alternative measure relates to degree of information transfer. That is, the 
accounting comparability is measured as the association in abnormal returns between 
announcing firms and non-announcing firms in the same sector. Stronger associations 
suggest higher degree of information transfer which in turn implies greater accounting 
comparability. The second alternative measure is constructed on similarity of the 
information content of earnings (ICE) and book value of equity (ICBV), an approach 
based on Ohlson (1995). In their model, firms’ market values are regressed on net 
income, book value of equity, an industry or a country indicator, and the interaction of 
the respective indicator with net income and book value of equity. Firms are considered 
to be comparable (incomparable) if the coefficients on interaction terms are 
insignificant (significant). The focus on the insignificance of the two coefficients builds 
on the notion that an insignificant coefficient would suggest that firms from different 
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groups of countries/industries have the same ICE/ICBV and therefore are considered to 
be of high comparability. 
Bhojraj and Lee (2002) present a method to select comparable firms based on 
valuation theory. The method aims to improve analysts’ and researchers’ selection of 
comparable firms. Their approach to identifying comparable firms is referred to as the 
‘warranted multiples method’. Two widely used reference multiples are considered: the 
price-to-book ratio and the enterprise-value-to-sales ratio. The warranted multiples are 
computed as the fitted values of annual cross-sectional models where two commonly 
used reference multiples (e.g., price-to-book ratio and enterprise-value-to-sales ratio) 
are regressed on nine explanatory variables regarding profitability, growth, and risk. 
The ‘warranted multiples method’ is specifically designed for equity investors and it is 
found to outperform typical matching methods which are largely based on similarity in 
size and industry. While Bhojraj and Lee (2002) apply the method to the US market, 
the method can also be applied to measure cross-country comparability. One example 
is Young and Zeng (2015) who employ the warranted multiples method in international 
setting. They find that higher comparability based on warrant multiples is associated 
with improved selection of international peer firms which in turn leads to more accurate 
valuation. 
In contrast with Bhojraj and Lee’s (2002) warranted multiples which are 
designed for equity valuation, Kim et al. (2013) present alternative measures of 
comparability for debt market participants. Their measures are based on the rating 
agencies’ adjustments to reported earnings. For instance, rating agencies make 
adjustments to financial statements for the purpose of improving the comparability of 
financial statements (Moody’s 2010; Standard & Poor’s 2008). The measures are 
computed as the negative value of the dispersion of Moody’s adjustments for non-
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recurring items and interest-coverage ratio within the same sector peer group. Since the 
dispersion of adjustments is assessed with a quarter-industry group, Kim et al.’s (2013) 
measure is calculated for industry quarters rather firm quarter. Firms in a given peer 
group are considered to be more comparable to their peers if the variability of earnings 
adjustments for each peer firm is lower, while they are considered to be less comparable 
if the variability of adjustments is higher. Therefore, accounting comparability is 
perceived to decrease with the variability of earnings adjustments. 
 
3.1.3 Comparison of Alternative Comparability Measures 
This section discusses the advantages of output-based comparability measures 
over input-based measures. Earlier studies on accounting comparability are largely 
based on qualitative financial reporting inputs, such as accounting rules and accounting 
choices. However, more recent papers in this area turn to focus on quantitative outputs 
of the financial reporting process, with earnings being the most concerned financial 
output. The output-based measures have a number of advantages over input-based 
measures. First, output-based measures account for the variation in firms’ 
implementation of the same accounting choices, while the input-based measures merely 
focus on the inputs themselves (i.e., accounting choices) and do not reflect the fact that 
the same accounting choices can be differently implemented. Second, a measure of 
comparability based on firms’ accounting choices require researchers to make 
challenging and somewhat ad hoc decisions about which accounting choices to use and 
how to weight them. In contrast, out-put based employ the actual weights firms use 
when reporting accounting numbers (i.e., earnings). 
Third, the focus on the outputs makes output-based measures more relevant in 
capturing accounting comparability. Holding the underlying economic events constant, 
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firms that use the same accounting inputs are bound to produce the same output. 
However, it is possible that two firms using different accounting inputs may still get the 
same output (e.g., LIFO vs. FIFO when prices and inventory levels remain unchanged). 
Such a lack of input similarity is not relevant to financial statement users’ demand for 
accounting comparability. Finally, since it is usually hard or costly to collect data on a 
comprehensive set of accounting choices, there are difficulties in applying input-based 
measures to a large sample. In contrast, output-based measures largely draw on 
quantitative financial outcomes which are readily available in established databases, 
and thus can be easily applied to a large sample. 
 
3.2 De Franco et al.’s (2011) Approach on Earnings Comparability 
 This section provides a more detailed discussion about De Franco et al.’s (2011) 
approaches to measuring accounting comparability. Section 3.2.1 presents and 
discusses the comparability measure which is based on earnings-returns association. 
Section 3.2.2 discusses another comparability measure based on earnings co-movement. 
The methodological advantages and inherent limitations of both measures will be 
discussed in each section. 
This thesis follows De Franco et al.’s (2011) approaches to measuring 
accounting comparability. Alternative comparability scores are constructed based on 
earnings-returns association and used for the main tests in the subsequent chapters, 
while the comparability scores based on earnings co-movement are employed in 
robustness check. The construction process of these alternative comparability scores 
will be discussed in the next section. 
 
3.2.1 Earnings-Returns Mapping Based Measure 
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The first accounting comparability measure developed by De Franco et al. (2011) 
is based on the association between earnings and stock returns, and it is labelled as 
CompAcctijt. The approach measures the similarity with which firms’ accounting 
functions map the same underlying economic events into earnings. The principle 
underlying the approach is that given a similar set of economic transactions, as reflected 
in stock returns, firm j’s earnings should be similar to firm i’s when the two firms’ 
accounting systems are comparable. 
Implementing this method involves the following three steps. In the first step, 
earnings are regressed on contemporaneous stock returns, where stock returns capture 
economic events and the earnings is the output of an accounting system. Specifically, 
for each firm-year the following equation is estimated using the 16 previous quarters of 
data (minimum 14 quarters): 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,                              (1) 
where Earnings is a quarterly earnings before extraordinary items, Return is the 
quarterly stock returns. Coefficients 𝛼?̂? and 𝛽?̂? reflect how economic events are captured 
by the earnings metric and therefore represent a summary of the accounting system. The 
accounting function of firm j (𝛼?̂? and 𝛽?̂?), which is in the same 2-digit-SIC industry, is 
estimated similarly. 
In the second step, the similarity of the accounting system for firms i and j is 
estimated. They predict firm i’s and j’s earnings based on the accounting function of 
each firm and firm i’s stock return (Returnit):  
𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡) = ?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡                               (2) 
𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡) = ?̂?𝑗 + ?̂?𝑗𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 ,                              (3) 
where E(Earningsiit) is the expected earnings of firm i given firm i’s accounting function 
and firm i’s return. E(Earningsijt) is the expected earnings of firm j given firm j’s 
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accounting function and also firm i’s return. Firm i’s return is used in both predictions 
so that economic events are held constant for both firms. 
In the third step, the pair-year comparability score between firms i and j 
(CompAcctijt) is defined as the negative value of the average absolute difference 
between the predicted earnings for both firms shown in (2) and (3): 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 = −1/16 × ∑ |𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡) − 𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡)|
𝑡
𝑡−15  ,     (4) 
averaged over the preceding 16 quarters. A less negative pair-year comparability score 
indicates greater accounting comparability between the two firms in a year. 
This measure has been widely used in studies on accounting comparability (Yip 
and Young 2012; Barth et al. 2012; Barth et al. 2013; Kim et al. 2016; Chen et al 2016). 
It has a number of advantages over previous comparability measures. First, the measure 
is based on earnings, one of the most important outputs of accounting system. Focusing 
on an output allow the measure to capture the heterogeneity in implementation of 
identical accounting choice across firms. Second, the measure makes a clear distinction 
between earnings comparability and earnings similarity. While comparable earnings 
can be similar in amount, two earnings numbers carrying similar (or even same) amount 
cannot guarantee their comparability. De Franco et al.’s (2011) measure addresses this 
concern by holding the underlying economic events constant before examining earnings 
numbers. The approach is consistent with the notion that comparability requires ‘like 
things be reported alike, and unlike things be reported differently’. Finally, as a practical 
matter, the measure can be easily applied to a large sample because the required 
variables are readily available in established databases. 
However, some questions have been recently raised about the empirical 
construct and validity of this measure.  The first question is concerned with the output 
variable (e.g., earnings) on which the measure is constructed. While earnings are 
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arguably the most followed summary measure of accounting performance, earnings 
merely reflect one dimension of financial statement (an income statement perspective), 
with important performance metrics from, for example, balance sheet being left 
uncaptured. To the extent that balance sheet numbers are of prime interest to lenders, 
credit rating agencies, and bank regulators, merely focusing on earnings may not 
guarantee a multidimensional measure of accounting comparability. The second 
question relates to the measure’s validity. While the measure aims to capture the 
comparability of accounting systems, there are concerns that it may also capture the 
similarity in underlying economics across firms (Chen et al. 2016). That is, firms having 
similar underlying economics (i.e., similar business model) are more likely to be 
manifested as being comparable regardless of their accounting systems. The third 
question concerns the effect of other financial reporting attributes on the measure. 
Although the comparability is viewed as a distinct dimension of accounting information, 
it is likely correlated with other earnings attributes. Earnings, accruals and cash flows 
are all defined by the accounting system that maps economic events into accounting 
numbers (Dechow et al. 2010). Therefore, firms’ accounting is expected to be more 
comparable if it produces high quality earnings and less comparable when it produces 
low quality earnings.  
 
3.2.2 Earnings Co-Movement Based Measure 
The second measure of comparability is based on the firm-pairwise co-
movement of earnings. It measures comparability as the degree to which firms’ earnings 
co-vary over time and represents a different conceptual idea of comparability. 
Compared with the measure based on the similarity of the mapping between earnings 
and stock returns, the measure based on earnings co-movement likely captures a 
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different characteristic of reported earnings (Lang et al. 2010). While the earnings-
returns mapping based measure aims to assess whether earnings are similarly capturing 
the underlying economics, the earnings co-movement based measure captures anything 
that creates similarity in earnings, irrespective of whether the underlying economics are 
similar or not. The comparability score is computed as the adjusted R-Squared value of 
a time-series regression of one firm’s earnings on another firm’s earnings. The 
following regression is estimated for every firm pair in the same SIC 2-digit industry 
with data from the previous 16 quarters: 
 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑞 = 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝑗𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑗𝑞 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑞 ,                                    (5) 
where Earnings represents earnings before extraordinary items for firm i and firm j in 
quarter q. They are scaled by the average total assets of each firm. The adjusted R-
Squared value of equation (5) is taken as an alternative firm-pairwise comparability 
measure and it is labelled CMV_ERNijt. Higher values of CMV_ERNijt indicate greater 
earnings comparability between firms, while lower values suggest lower earnings 
comparability. 
While the mapping based measure is that it explicitly controls for the underlying 
economic events and thus manages to isolate accounting comparability, one could argue 
that earnings could fulfil a comparability role to investors even when the accounting 
functions per se are not identical.  To the extent that two firms’ earnings co-vary over 
time, information about the earnings of one firm can be informative to investors who 
are interested in forecasting the earnings of another firm. Therefore, earnings co-
movement can manifest accounting comparability from financial statement users’ 
perspective. One advantage of earnings co-movement based measure is it focuses on 
earnings per se and does not require researchers to specify and estimate the accounting 
system which is often a challenging task. 
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The earnings co-movement based measure broadens the definition of accounting 
to incorporate the effect of economic events on earnings, and therefore introduces an 
inherent limitation. That is, it initially lacks a control for economic events, which brings 
about concerns that the comparability score could be driven by differences in the 
economic events rather than how these events are accounted. This limitation can be 
problematic when the comparability score is used as an independent variable to explain 
capital market outcomes that are likely affected by firms’ underlying economics. 
However, this concern can be alleviated by controlling for variables of underlying 
economics in the regression. For example, De Franco et al. (2011) attempt to resolve 
this potential problem by including firm-pairwise cash flow co-movement and stock 
return co-movement measured analogously to ERN_CMVijt. Overall, earnings co-
movement based comparability measure captures a different aspect of comparability 
and can be used as an alternative measure for robustness check. 
 
3.3 Measures of Comparability Used in the Thesis 
The last section discusses two approaches to measuring accounting 
comparability, mapping based approach and earnings co-movement based approach. 
Drawing on the two approaches, I use four alternative comparability scores. They are 
defined and constructed in this section and will be used in the subsequent chapters in 
this thesis. Two alternative comparability scores are constructed based on mapping 
based approach. The first score is constructed at firm-pair-year level and it is labelled 
as CompAcctijt, while the second score is constructed at firm-year level, labelled as 
CompAcctIndit. Another two alternative comparability scores stem from the earnings 
co-movement based approach. The first one is computed a firm-pair-year level and it is 
labelled as CMV_ERNijt. The second one is a score at firm-year level, labelled as 
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CMV_Indit. In the subsequent chapters, CompAcctIndit and CompAcctijt are used as the 
primary measures of comparability in my tests, with the other two alternative scores 
being used for robustness checks. 
The construction of alternative comparability scores is briefly discussed as 
follows. First, CompAcctijt is constructed as demonstrated in equation (4). It is computed 
at firm-pair-year level as the average absolute difference in predicted earnings between 
firm i and firm j over time. Second, I generate a firm-year comparability score 
(CompAcctIndit), as opposed the firm-pair-year comparability score in equation (4). For 
firm i in time t, I compute the firm-year comparability score as the median pair-year 
comparability score over all i-j pairs within a 2-digit SIC industry in a year.1 CompAcctijt 
and CompAcctIndit are constructed to carry negative values. More negative scores 
suggest lower comparability, while less negative scores indicate higher comparability.  
Third, CMV_ERNijt is computed as the adjusted R-Squared value of the 
regression in equation (5). It aims to capture accounting comparability at firm-pair-year 
level. Finally, I construct a corresponding firm-year level score (CMV_Indit) by taking 
the industry median of CMV_ERNijt for all the firm-pairs with firm i in year t. 
CMV_ERNijt and CMV_Indit both carry positive values, with more positive scores for 
higher comparability and less positive scores for lower comparability. 
                                                          
1 Alternatively, I average the four least negative pair-year comparability scores between firm i and firm 
js (in the same industry):𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 1/4 × ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑗∈{4 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠} . Results 
are robust to this method of generating the firm-year comparability score.    
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Chapter 4 Comparability of Non-GAAP Earnings 
4.1 Introduction 
Comparability is attracting increasing attention in the debate about earnings 
quality in general and non-GAAP earnings reporting in particular. As an enhancing 
quality of financial information, comparability involves like things being reported alike, 
and unlike things being reported differently (AICPA 1971: 59). Comparability enables 
users to identify and understand similarities in, and differences among, financial items 
(FASB 2010). This paper undertakes the first empirical investigation of the 
comparability effects of non-GAAP earnings adjustments. 
On the one hand, preparers and certain user groups such as financial analysts 
often claim (among other benefits) that non-GAAP earnings are more comparable than 
GAAP earnings. For example, Kraft Heinz contends that non-GAAP earnings better 
reflect their underlying business, implying the ability of such earnings to capture 
similarities and differences between firms (2016 Third Quarter Earnings Release: 5). 
Similarly, analysts often adjust GAAP “to better reflect the underlying economics of 
transactions and events and to improve the comparability of financial statements” 
(Moody’s 2010: 2). On the other side of the debate, some commentators have raised 
concerns about the potential comparability problems associated with non-GAAP 
earnings. For example, PwC (2014) highlight the inconsistent calculation of non-GAAP 
earnings across firms and over time, which can potentially reduce the comparability of 
non-GAAP earnings. Securities regulators share a similar concern and have taken steps 
to address the issue. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) explicitly targeted the 
objective of enhancing the comparability of non-GAAP reporting, leading the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue Regulation G which requires firms to 
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reconcile non-GAAP earnings with the nearest GAAP number in their earnings press 
releases. 
This paper empirically investigates the comparability of various non-GAAP 
earnings metrics relative to GAAP earnings. While the non-GAAP earnings literature 
provides ample evidence on the value relevance impact of adjusting GAAP earnings 
(Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Lougee and Marquardt 2004; 
Black and Christensen 2009), no research to the best of my knowledge has examined 
the effect on earnings comparability of non-GAAP adjustments. Instead, prior research 
on accounting comparability focuses primarily on GAAP numbers (De Franco et al. 
2011; Kim et al. 2013; Peterson et al. 2015; Young and Zeng 2015; Fang et al. 2016; 
Chen et al. 2016).  
The comparability of non-GAAP earnings numbers constitutes an important part 
of the broader debate in professional and financial media circles regarding the 
usefulness of such measures to investors and other users (Francis and Linebaugh 2015; 
PwC 2016; The Center for Audit Quality 2016; International Organization of Securities 
Commissions 2016). In particular, SEC Chair Mary Jo White calls for enhancing the 
comparability associated with the use of non-GAAP information (White 2016). Many 
important business decisions involve comparing performance across firms or over time. 
Non-GAAP earnings are considered beneficial to users if they facilitate these 
comparisons by removing transitory items from GAAP earnings and providing a better 
measure of sustainable performance. However, no large-sample empirical evidence 
currently exists to support this claim. My study concerns general non-GAAP 
adjustments made by various parties not limited to management. IBES actual earnings 
are used as a proxy for generic non-GAAP earnings in my empirical tests. Bentley et al. 
(2018) show a substantial overlap between the IBES actual earnings and managers’ non-
34 
 
GAAP earnings. They find that non-GAAP metrics in I/B/E/S agree with the managers’ 
non-GAAP metrics 73.3 percent of the time. They also find that IBES earnings often 
excludes managers’ lower quality non-GAAP numbers, and sometimes provides higher 
quality non-GAAP measures when managers do not explicitly disclose a non-GAAP 
earnings. Given this, cautions should be implemented when interpreting the results of 
my study, since using IBES actual earnings to identify managers’ non-GAAP 
disclosures may underestimate the aggressiveness of their reporting choices. 
Relative to GAAP earnings, non-GAAP earnings have the potential to be more 
comparable. Non-recurring items such as restructuring charges, gains and losses on 
mark-to-market securities, and impairments are not generated by firms’ core and 
continuing operations (Dechow et al. 1994; Barth et al. 2001; Riedl 2004; Gu and Lev 
2011; Barker 2004; Dhaliwal et al. 1999). Further, recurring items such as depreciation 
and amortization can be distorted under accounting standards which prioritize 
conservatism (Basu 1997; Ball and Shivakumar 2006). By removing such items from 
GAAP earnings, the resulting non-GAAP metric could better reveal the performance of 
core operations and provide more relevant information to users whose primary decision 
making focus revolves around core operations. Anecdotally, a popular version of non-
GAAP earnings known as street earnings is constructed purposely by analysts to 
facilitate superior cross-firm comparison (Moody’s 2010; Standard & Poor’s 2008). 
Evidence that street earnings are less conditionally conservative than GAAP earnings 
(Heflin et al. 2015) also suggests that the former may provide comparability advantages.  
However, there are a number of reasons why non-GAAP adjustments could 
compromise on earnings comparability. First, there is no standardized definition of non-
GAAP earnings. While this flexibility can be beneficial in accommodating varying 
circumstances across firms, it also opens the possibility of inconsistency. There is 
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evidence that recurring items are sometimes aggressively excluded from earnings 
(either by firms or users), impairing the quality of non-GAAP earnings and impeding 
comparability (Black and Christensen 2009; Whipple 2014). Second, evidence suggests 
that management misclassify recurring expenses as non-recurring (Cready et al. 2010; 
Riedl and Srinivasan 2010; Johnson et al. 2011). Consequently, users such as analysts 
who rely on firms’ disclosure to construct non-GAAP earnings could be misled into 
adjusting incorrect items. Therefore, the relative comparability of non-GAAP earnings 
versus GAAP earnings remains an open empirical question on which this paper seeks 
evidence.  
Using a broad sample of US non-financial firms over the period 2003 through 
2015, the empirical analysis evaluates the incremental comparability of a suite of 
earnings metrics relative to GAAP earnings before extraordinary items (hereinafter 
EB_X): GAAP net income, street earnings (i.e., IBES actual earnings). I use street 
earnings as a generic proxy for earnings metrics that are reported on non-GAAP basis. 
The concept of generic non-GAAP earnings includes management generated non-
GAAP earnings and analysts generated non-GAAP earnings. I also examine a set of 
self-constructed alternative earnings metrics that exclude various combinations of non-
recurring and key recurring items. This analysis allows me to examine the comparability 
effect of specific individual non-GAAP exclusions. Specifically, I identify common 
non-GAAP earnings exclusions in the form of nonrecurring items (i.e., restructuring 
charges, gains and losses on mark-to-market securities, litigation settlement fees, write-
downs, and impairments) and recurring items (i.e., share-based compensation expense 
and depreciation and amortization) (Brown and Sivakumar 2003; Gu and Chen 2004; 
Barth et al. 2012; Whipple 2014; Brown et al. 2015).  
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To quantify comparability, I follow the methodology in De Franco et al. (2011) 
to compute a firm-year comparability score for each earnings metric. Using EB_X as a 
benchmark, I then conduct pair-sample tests of the equality of mean (median) 
comparability scores of an alternative earnings metric and EB_X. An important feature 
of this research design—pairwise comparison of alternative earnings metrics—allows 
firms to serve as their own control and thus minimizes firm-specific confounding factors. 
Findings reveal that street earnings are statistically and economically more 
comparable than EB_X, which supports the view that analysts’ consensus adjustments 
enhance cross-sectional earnings comparability. The self-constructed non-GAAP 
earnings metric that excludes aggregate nonrecurring items is also incrementally more 
comparable than EB_X, although the magnitude of the improvement is less pronounced 
than in the case of street earnings. This is consistent with the view that mechanistic 
adjustments may not always be appropriate for comparisons which are often complex 
and contextual. I find that excluding recurring items associates with deteriorated 
comparability, which casts doubt on claims that excluding persistent components from 
GAAP earnings enhances performance comparability.    
To pinpoint the source of comparability improvements, I examine the impact of 
individual line items by evaluating the incremental comparability of EB_X with that 
particular component excluded. Results show that excluding impairments, write-downs, 
restructuring charges, share-based compensation expense, gains and losses on mark-to-
market securities, s yields incremental earnings comparability benefits (in a declining 
order of magnitude). Conversely, excluding depreciation and amortization significantly 
reduces earnings comparability relative to GAAP earnings, which suggests that 




Supplementary analyses examine how the incremental comparability of non-
GAAP earnings varies with key firm characteristics. I predict that the incremental 
comparability benefits of non-GAAP exclusions are more pronounced where 
information environments are richer and demand for analyst services are stronger. 
Moreover, I expect greater non-GAAP comparability benefits be associated with firms 
having higher idiosyncrasy. Consistent with the predictions, I find that the superior 
comparability of street earnings relative to EB_X is increasing in size, analyst following, 
and return volatility. A similar pattern is also found with idiosyncratic risks and the 
uniqueness of firms’ growth opportunity. 
This paper makes the following three contributions. First, it fills a gap in the 
literature regarding the comparability of non-GAAP earnings. The paper finds evidence 
on the comparability improvement of (certain) non-GAAP earnings over GAAP 
earnings, as well as contextual evidence concerning the conditioning effect of firms’ 
information environment, all of which contributes to our understanding of the properties 
and benefits of non-GAAP reporting. The evidence also enriches the growing literature 
on accounting comparability more generally, which to date has focused on GAAP 
numbers (De Franco et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2013; Peterson et al. 2015; Young and Zeng 
2015; Chen et al. 2016; Fang et al. 2016). Second, the paper presents evidence that 
speaks to the controversy over the increasing popularity of non-GAAP earnings. 
Besides higher persistence and predictability as documented by prior research 
(Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Lougee and Marquardt 2004), the 
significant improvement in comparability of street earnings provides an additional 
reason for its widespread adoption by preparers and practitioners. Third, the findings in 
this paper can also serve as an input to securities regulators and standard setters who 
must balance between offering adequate flexibility in financial reporting and imposing 
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restrictions to prevent potential abuse. One implication is that rather than defining a 
single, universal measure of earnings whose relevance and reliability is hard to 
guarantee in all situations, regulators could promote an information-set approach where 
preparers and external users construct earnings metrics to suit their particular needs. 
This idea is consistent with the approach to performance reporting adopted by the UK 
Accounting Standards Board in Financial Reporting Standard 3: Reporting Financial 
Performance, as well as its successor Financial Reporting Standard 102 (FRS 102).   
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the 
prior literature on accounting comparability and non-GAAP earnings. Section 4.3 
develops predictions on the comparability effect of non-GAAP earnings adjustments. 
Section 4.4 describes the research design, data and summary statistics of key measures. 
Section 4.5 presents the main empirical results, which is followed by the supplementary 
results in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 concludes. 
 
4.2 Prior Literature 
Comparability is a key characteristic of accounting information. The FASB 
(2010) considers comparability an important enhancing qualitative characteristic of 
accounting information. Comparability is expected to help financial statement users 
chose between alternatives such as selling or holding an investment or investing in one 
reporting entity or another. As a result, information about a reporting entity becomes 
more useful if it can be compared with similar information about other entities. 
A fast-growing body of literature examines comparability as a distinct 
dimension of accounting information which allows for better across-firm comparisons 
(De Franco et al. 2011; Chen et al. 2016; Young and Zeng 2015). First, greater 
comparability enhances earnings quality and improves the ability of stock returns to 
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reflect earnings information (Peterson et al. 2015; Choi et al. 2015). Second, greater 
comparability is beneficial to analysts. Bradshaw et al. (2009) and De Franco et al. 
(2011) find that analysts make more accurate and less dispersed earnings forecasts for 
firms that are more comparable with their peers. Kim et al. (2013) also find a reverse 
relation between financial statement comparability and analysts’ over-optimism. Third, 
greater comparability can facilitate more efficient capital allocation decisions, as 
indicated by research on private loan and public debt markets (Fang et al. 2016; Kim et 
al. 2013). In addition, Chen et al. (2016) find greater comparability helps acquirers 
better evaluate target firms. Please refer to Chapter 2 for a more detailed literature 
review on accounting comparability. 
The majority of extant research on financial reporting comparability focuses 
exclusively on GAAP earnings. In contrast, the comparability of non-GAAP earnings 
has received little attention in the academic literature despite the widespread use of non-
GAAP earnings for financial decision making and valuation, and frequent claims that 
such metrics enhance comparability (Frederickson and Miller 2004; Zhang and Zheng 
2011; Huang and Skantz 2016). Prior research does not examine how comparability 
varies across different earnings constructs; instead the focus is on the consequences of 
higher or lower comparability holding the underlying earnings construct (i.e., GAAP 
earnings) constant. The comparability impact of non-GAAP adjustments to net income 
is therefore an open question on which this paper seeks evidence. 
Prior studies on non-GAAP earnings document evidence that non-GAAP 
earnings adjustments lead to higher predictability and persistence (Bradshaw and Sloan 
2002; Brown and Sivakumar 2003; Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Lougee and Marquardt 
2004). However, comparability is distinct from predictability and persistence insofar as 
it is concerned with the quality of information that enables users to identify similarities 
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in and differences between two sets of economic events. Unlike other qualitative 
characteristics, comparability does not relate to a single entity. Rather, it requires 
comparisons between two or more entities. I therefore examine comparability as an 
independent dimension of non-GAAP earnings quality. 
A recent paper by Black et al. (2017b) is closely related to this chapter. They 
address the market participants’ concerns about non-GAAP reporting by examining 
non-GAAP earnings’ consistency and comparability. They find that management 
generated non-GAAP earnings are more comparable than their GAAP counterparts. My 
study is differentiated from their paper in the following three points. First, while they 
focus on management generated non-GAAP earnings, my study uses street earnings to 
proxy for generic non-GAAP earnings. Second, my study is based on a more 
comprehensive sample, whereas the sample of Black et al. (2017b) is limited due to 
hand collection. My sample includes all US public firms during the period of 2003 
through 2015, leading to a sample of 19,686 firm-years. In contrast, Black et al. (2017b) 
is limited to S&P 500 firms from 2009 to 2014, having only 2,746 firm-year 
observations in their tests. One advantage of having a more extensive sample is greater 
generalizability. While Black et al. (2017b) focus on the largest group of companies 
(i.e., S&P 500), the findings of my study can be potentially generalized to small and 
medium-sized companies. Third, my study attempts to pinpoint the source of 
comparability benefits of non-GAAP earnings. I also document evidence on the cross-
sectional variation in non-GAAP comparability benefits. Black et al. (2017b) are, 
however, silent on these two questions. 
The remainder of this section provides a general review on non-GAAP earnings 
literature. It focuses on the research that is closely related to my thesis. Section 4.2.1 
provides an overview on the increasing popularity of non-GAAP earnings. Section 4.2.2 
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reviews the prior findings about how non-GAAP earnings are constructed. Section 4.2.3 
presents the extant debate on reporting incentives behind non-GAAP reporting and 
reviews the main findings from both sides. While the content in this section means to 
be comprehensive, it is structured to only focus on those closely related work and thus 
is not inclusive of every single piece of work in the literature. 
 
4.2.1 Increasing Popularity of Non-GAAP Earnings 
The last two decades have seen a rise in non-GAAP reporting, which has 
resulted in the popularity of such non-standard earnings metrics as an important way to 
evaluate firm performance among managers, analysts, and investors. Accordingly, 
standard setting and regulatory attentions have been increasingly shifted to non-GAAP 
reporting as a result of the increasing popularity of these constructs (Rapoport 2016; 
Golden 2017). As non-GAAP reporting becomes increasingly common, questions have 
been raised about the reporting incentives for non-GAAP earnings. 
In the early days of non-GAAP reporting in the US (i.e., mid-1990s to early 
2000s), these metrics were less common and used exclusively in certain industries. The 
uncommonness and opaqueness of non-GAAP reporting warranted concerns by 
regulators questioning the motives behind non-GAAP disclosures. For example, the 
SEC issued warnings to financial statement users about the potential misleading risks 
associated with non-GAAP earnings (Dow Jones, 2001; SEC, 2001a; 2001b). The 
scepticism on non-GAAP earnings led to stricter regulation on these metrics. In 
response to the provision of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, the SEC enacted 
Regulation G (Reg G) in 2003 to tighten the regulation on non-GAAP reporting, 
whereby non-GAAP metrics are required to be reconciled to the most directly 
comparable GAAP-based metric. For example, the most recent regulation requires non-
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GAAP earnings numbers be reconciled to the GAAP-based net income. Many studies 
document evidence that Reg G has led to improvement in the transparency and overall 
quality of non-GAAP reporting (e.g., Kolev et al., 2008; Heflin and Hsu, 2008; Black 
et al., 2017c). Specifically, Heflin and Hsu (2008) document a decline in the magnitude 
of non-GAAP exclusions, as well as a reduced probability of non-GAAP earnings being 
used to meet strategic target (e.g., analyst consensus). Kolev et al. (2008) find that after 
Reg G the non-GAAP exclusions become more transitory, which indicates higher 
quality of non-GAAP earnings. Black et al. (2017c) suggest that managers’ non-GAAP 
exclusions become more cautious after Reg G, as evidenced by the lower likelihood of 
managers excluding recurring items incremental to those excluded by analysts. 
A decline in the frequency of non-GAAP reporting was observed in the wake of 
Reg G, whereas the incidence of non-GAAP earnings has resurged and increased 
consistently. The use of non-GAAP earnings has currently reached a peak as 
increasingly more firms embrace such reporting activity. For instance, Bentley et al. 
(2018) find that approximately 60% of all US firms have a non-GAAP EPS metric in 
2013, while Black et al (2017b) report that non-GAAP earnings are disclosed by 71% 
of S&P 500 firms in 2014. Moreover, Black et al. (2017a) find that the frequency of 
non-GAAP reporting has increased across all sectors during the period of 2009 through 
2014. 
The recent prominence of non-GAAP earnings has also ignited standard setters’ 
interest in the practice. In particular, the “Financial Performance Reporting” project 
undertaken by the FASB in 2014 is examining the implications of current proliferation 
of non-GAAP earnings for GAAP standard. The FASB’s initiative attempts to evaluate 
the need to better organize the income statement. One example is to include more 
disaggregated numbers which might help financial statement users with constructing 
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their own customized performance metrics (Siegel, 2014; Linsmeier, 2016; Golden, 
2017). A similar approach is also adapted in 1993 in the UK under FRS3, as well as its 
successor Financial Reporting Standard 102 (FRS 102). The SEC’s attempt is echoed 
by their international counterpart, with the IASB’s Disclosure Initiative considering the 
implication of the increasing frequency of non-GAAP reporting for standard setting. In 
particular, the chairman of IASB acknowledges the potential value of non-GAAP 
reporting by noting that the IASB is “open to the idea of learning from the use of non-
GAAP measures” (Hoogervorst 2015, p.5).  
 
4.2.2 Practice of Constructing Non-GAAP Earnings 
Typically, discretionary exclusions are made for certain line items over GAAP 
earnings to construct non-GAAP earnings. The difference between GAAP earnings and 
non-GAAP earnings had been widened throughout the late 1980s and 1990s (Bradshaw 
and Sloan 2002). They also find that the increasing difference is largely driven by the 
exclusion of special items (also labelled as on-time, nonrecurring, or transitory items in 
the literature). Numerous studies further examine the nature of non-GAAP exclusions 
and find that one-time items (e.g., gains and losses on asset disposals, merger and 
acquisition costs, and extraordinary items) are often excluded as an attempt to 
emphasize sustainable earnings (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; 2004; Lougee and Marquardt 
2004; Entwistle et al. 2005; 2006, Nichols et al., 2005).  
However, as one-time items are largely expenses, their exclusion can result in 
greater non-GAAP earnings than GAAP earnings, which raises the concern about non-
GAAP exclusions being used to inflate reported performance (Lougee and Marquardt, 
2004, Johnson and Schwartz, 2005, Doyle et al. 2013). This concern is legitimate but 
can be alleviated by the empirical evidence that one-time gains are also excluded, which 
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lowers the non-GAAP performance metric (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Curtis et al., 2014, 
Baumker et al., 2014). For example, Curtis et al. (2014) find that approximately one-
half of firms with one-time gains exclude them when constructing their non-GAAP 
earnings, though inconsistency still exists in their exclusion decisions regarding one-
time expense and one-time gains. Overall, non-recurring items are found to account for 
the vast majority of non-GAAP adjustments, and these adjustments are frequently 
related to restructuring charges and acquisition related charges (Black et al. 2017b). 
In addition to adjusting for non-recurring items, managers and analysts also 
exclude recurring items (i.e., depreciation and amortization, stock-based compensation) 
in their non-GAAP calculation. In spite of the recurring nature of those items, they are 
claimed to be non-operating or non-cash which warrants the exclusion of them. 
Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) find that the exclusion of amortization serves as a driver 
for the growing rift between GAAP and non-GAAP earnings, while Bhattacharya et al. 
(2003) document a dramatic increase in the frequency of depreciation, amortization, 
and stock based compensation exclusions. Drawing on more recent data, Black and 
Christensen (2009), Whipple (2016), and Black et al. (2017b) find that recurring items 
remain a common type of non-GAAP exclusions, and that these adjustments are 
primarily associated with stock based compensation, amortization, and investment 
gains and losses. Excluding recurring items seems to have become a more commonplace 
practice than in earlier non-GAAP reporting periods. This increase in recurring item 
exclusions is likely attributable to the corresponding changes in accounting standards, 
such as SFAS 141 (related to accounting for business combination) and SFAS 123R 
(related to accounting for stock-based compensation) which mandated the inclusion of 
these items in GAAP-based numbers2 
                                                          
2 SFAS 141 requires firms to account for business combinations using the purchase method of accounting 
and to amortize certain acquired intangible assets. SFAS 123R requires firms to expense stock-based 
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Black et al. (2017a) find that firms are excluding more items from their non-
GAAP calculations across time, with an average of 3.6 items in 2014 versus 3.1 in 2009. 
They also document a time trend indicating that the magnitude of exclusions has 
increased substantially from $0.73 of expenses in 2009 to $1.03 of expenses in 2014. 
Moreover, they find that the increase in exclusion magnitude is due to nonrecurring 
exclusions, which has nearly doubled in size over the period of 2009 through 2014. 
 
4.2.3 Reporting Incentives of Non-GAAP Earnings 
The informativeness of non-GAAP earnings has been questioned since their 
early reporting period. Critics in the financial press expressed their scepticism about 
this new reporting practice, where discretionary adjustments are made on GAAP 
earnings and the discretion involved might be exploited to serve for opportunistic 
purposes (Derby, 2001; Dreman, 2001; Elstein, 2001). The regulators were also 
concerned about the fast-growing trend toward non-GAAP reporting. For example, the 
former SEC Chief Accountant, Lynn Turner, criticized non-GAAP earnings for being 
an opportunistic tool that allows managers to report “everything but bad stuff” (Dow 
Jones 2001). The survey implemented by Graham et al. (2005) also documents evidence 
on the potential abuse of non-GAAP reporting where non-GAAP earnings are 
emphasized when GAAP earnings present unprofitability. 
As a response to the questions and concerns from investors and regulators, a 
perspective is taken by Hirshleifer and Teoch (2003) who lay down the theoretical 
ground for examining the underlying motives for non-GAAP reporting. They assert that 
non-GAAP earnings are relevant as they can bias investors’ assessments of future cash 
flows upwards, and they also show the potential informativeness of non-GAAP 
                                                          
compensation, which some would argue is defensible (Christensen, 2012).   
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reporting in that it can better align stock prices with fundamental value. Bradshaw and 
Sloan (2002) provide evidence along these lines but from an empirical perspective. 
They find that the US investors respond more to street earnings than to GAAP earnings 
after 1992. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) extend this literature with the finding that 
investors view non-GAAP earnings as being more value relevant than GAAP operating 
earnings. Subsequent studies document consistent evidence which is in support of non-
GAAP information being more relevant to investors than GAAP-based numbers 
(Brown and Sivakumar 2003; Johnson and Schwartz 2005; Marques 2006; Wieland et 
al. 2013; Venter et al. 2014; Bradshaw et al. 2017).3 
There are two potential reporting incentives behind management prepared non-
GAAP reporting earnings. The first one is informativeness whereby non-GAAP 
earnings are reported to provide more relevant information to financial statement users, 
while the second one is opportunism which implies an attempt to misleading investors 
for self-serving purpose. The general finding of non-GAAP reporting being more 
informative suggests informativenss for non-GAAP reporting. In spite of the fact that 
non-GAAP measures deviate from the prescribed “standard” earnings number, prior 
studies document evidence that non-GAAP earnings are often more persistent than 
GAAP earnings (Bhattacharya et al. 2003) and more useful for valuation purpose 
(Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Brown and Sivakumar 2003). This evidence is consistent 
with the notion that non-GAAP earnings are motivated by an incentive to better inform 
investors about core operations. In particular, (1) systematic exclusion of non-recurring 
items, inclusive of one-time gains, in constructing non-GAAP earnings provides a more 
accurate reflection of core performance (Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Lougee and 
                                                          
3 Some researchers have offered alternative explanations for investors’ preference for non-GAAP relative 
to GAAP earnings such as measurement error (Bradshaw, 2003; Cohen et al., 2007) or extreme exclusion 
values (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2007).   
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Marquardt 2004; Curtis et al. 2014), (2) investors pay more attention to non-GAAP 
earnings than to GAAP earnings, indicating greater reliance on non-GAAP information 
(Bradshaw and Sloan 2002; Bhattacharya et al. 2003), and (3) non-GAAP reporting is 
not mean to mislead investors, particularly in the period after the Reg G (Johnson and 
Schwartz 2005; Zhang and Zheng 2011; Jennings and Marques 2011; Huang and Skantz 
2016; Whipple 2016). 
On the other hand, prior research finds numerous examples of potentially 
misleading non-GAAP reporting, which is indicative of an opportunism incentive. First, 
while excluding non-recurring items is largely believed to better reflect the underlying 
economics, the aggressive exclusion of recurring items is more susceptible to scepticism 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Black and Christensen, 2009, Barth et al., 2012). Drawing 
on the same logic, several studies assess the quality of non-GAAP exclusions according 
to their predictive power for firms’ future performance, and they find that recurring 
items exclusions are of the lowest quality and frequently lead to misleading perception 
of investors (Doyle et al. 2003; Landsman et al. 2007; Kolev et al. 2008; Bentley et al. 
2018; Black et al. 2017b). Second, non-GAAP exclusions are found to be used as a tool 
to achieve strategic earnings targets (e.g., profit; analyst consensus) which GAAP-based 
numbers are not capable of meeting (Bhattacharya et al. 2003; Graham et al. 2005; 
McVay 2006; Black and Christensen 2009; Marques 2010; Doyle et al. 2013; Isidro and 
Marques 2015; Lopez et al. 2016; Leung and Veenman 2016; Bradshaw et al. 2017). 
One important inference from these studies is the non-GAAP exclusions are motivated 
to bias investor perception upward by promoting a false image that an “adjusted” 
earnings number meets or beats a desired target. 
While the markets often question the reporting incentives behind non-GAAP 
earnings generated by managers, analysts’ non-GAAP exclusions are generally believed 
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to be more driven by informativeness. First, the survey by Brown et al. (2015) finds that 
analysts generally exclude non-recurring items from their earnings forecasts. Rather 
than systematically excluding all non-recurring items, analysts are found to use their 
expertise in deciding which non-recurring items are warranted to be excluded for 
constructing a more informative metric for valuation (Gu and Chen 2004; Chen 2010). 
Second, Heflin et al. (2015) find that analysts’ non-GAAP adjustments are informative 
in the sense that they reduce the conditional conservatism found in GAAP-based 
earnings. Third, by directly comparing managers’ and analysts’ non-GAAP exclusions, 
Bentley et al. (2018) find that analysts’ exclusions are of higher quality and less 
aggressive. However, Baik et al. (2009) document evidence of uninformativeness 
incentives for analysts’ exclusions. They find that analysts might be induced to report 
higher non-GAAP earnings in the situation where they have strong incentives to curry 
favour with managers. 
 
4.3 Predictions on Comparability Impact of Non-GAAP Earnings Adjustments 
There are several reasons why non-GAAP earnings may be more comparable 
than GAAP earnings. First, GAAP earnings contain non-recurring items, which 
negatively affect their comparability, whereas non-GAAP earnings typically adjust for 
such items. Non-recurring items are either infrequent in occurrence or unusual in nature, 
and usually not an integral part of firms’ normal operating activities. While FASB (1980) 
recognizes that “valid comparison is possible only if the measurements used—the 
quantities or ratios—reliably represent the characteristic that is the subject of 
comparison” (pg. 28), the transactions and events behind non-recurring items clearly do 
not meet such consideration. Therefore, including non-recurring items may cause 
GAAP earnings severely deviate from firm’s core and continuing operations. In contrast, 
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non-GAAP earnings inherently exclude non-recurring items. To the extent that the 
construction of non-GAAP earnings is not overly contaminated by managers’ 
opportunism, excluding non-recurring items results in non-GAAP earnings that are 
more likely to capture a firm’s underlying economics and thus facilitate meaningful 
comparison between firms and/or over time.  
Second, (conditional) conservatism also hinders the comparability of GAAP 
earnings, whereas non-GAAP adjustments could partially address the issue with 
conservatism and thus make non-GAAP earnings more comparable than GAAP 
earnings. Conditional conservatism typically results in understated GAAP earnings. 
Examples include lower of cost or market rules for inventory, impairment rules for long-
term assets (including property, plant, equipment, goodwill, and other intangible assets), 
and contingent liabilities. While they are intended to guard against management’s 
aggressive reporting, evidence exists that too conservative reporting is likely to cause 
GAAP earnings deviate from underlying economic performance (Basu 1997; Ball and 
Shivakumar 2006).Since a good reflection of underlying economics serves as a 
prerequisite for valid comparison, deviation from the economic underlying inevitably 
conceals the similarities/differences between firms’ performance, which in turn renders 
lower comparability. In contrast, non-GAAP earnings provided by analysts are shown 
to be less conservative (Heflin et al. 2015).Therefore, I expect non-GAAP earnings to 
render greater comparability as it mitigates the issue with conservatism.  
Third, even within the perimeter of GAAP, managers can still exert considerable 
discretion in applying rules, which leads to substantially inconsistent reporting between 
different firms. The inconsistency makes firms’ earnings less comparable. To the extent 
that non-GAAP adjustments undo, at least partially, managers’ discretion and thus 
mitigate the inconsistency, the resulting non-GAAP earnings is likely to be more 
50 
 
comparable. Non-GAAP adjustments mitigating inconsistency include capitalizing 
operating leases and converting LIFO to FIFO. 
Fourth, prior studies provide evidence that non-GAAP adjustments are made for 
improving cross-firm comparability (Kim et al. 2013). For example, credit rating 
analysts routinely adjust reported accounting numbers to facilitate comparisons across 
firms (Standard and Poor’s 2008; Moody’s 2010). Equity analysts also adjust current 
cash flows and earnings to better forecast sustainable future performance (Gu and Chen 
2004; Brown et al. 2015). 
However, several factors could counter the potential comparability benefit of 
non-GAAP earnings. First, there is no standardized concept of non-GAAP earnings. 
Lack of agreement on which items should be excluded from GAAP earnings leaves the 
decision on specific adjustments to preparers’ judgement. If preparers’ choices are 
driven by opportunistic incentives (Black and Christensen 2009; Barth et al. 2012; 
Brown et al. 2012; Doyle et al. 2013), then non-GAAP exclusions may further distort 
firm performance and compromise earnings comparability.  
Second, there is evidence that the frequency of special items has increased 
substantially over time, suggesting that items previously perceived as non-recurring 
may have become more persistent in nature (Riedl and Srinivasan 2010; Johnson et al. 
2011). This could be due to either that items previously considered as non-recurring 
gradually become an integral part of firms’ regular operations, or that recurring items 
are purposely misclassified by management as nonrecurring (McVay 2006; Fan et al. 
2010). In both scenarios, simply excluding such items from earnings would not 
necessarily guarantee an improvement in comparability. 
Finally, prior research finds that recurring items such as depreciation and 
amortization and stock-based compensation expenses are sometimes aggressively 
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excluded when management compute non-GAAP earnings (Gu and Chen 2004; Barth 
et al. 2012; Brown et al. 2015). Aggressive exclusion of recurring items could make 
non-GAAP earnings less representative of firms’ underlying performance, leading to 
lower earnings comparability. 
Given the competing arguments discussed above, the relative comparability of 
non-GAAP earnings to GAAP earnings remains an open empirical question. To shed 
light on the comparability impact of non-GAAP earnings adjustments, I examine three 
research questions. First, I test whether aggregate non-GAAP exclusions of the type 
routinely made by preparers and analysts improve earnings comparability over GAAP 
earnings. Second and conditional on the incremental comparability benefits of 
aggregate non-GAAP adjustments, I examine the source of the comparability 
improvement. Finally, I explore how the incremental comparability of street earnings 
varies cross-sectionally as a function of characteristics of firms’ information 
environments. 
 
4.4 Research Design, Sample, and Data 
4.4.1 Constructing Non-GAAP Earnings Metrics 
The empirical analyses use both GAAP earnings metrics and alternative earning 
metrics constructed on non-GAAP basis. The set of non-GAAP earnings includes IBES 
actual earnings and three self-constructed earnings metrics each of which excludes 
various earnings components. Two GAAP earnings constructs are used: earnings before 
extraordinary items (EB_X) and net income (NI). EB_X serves as a benchmark, against 
which the comparability of all other earnings metrics is evaluated.  
The first non-GAAP earnings is IBES actual earnings (per share), called as street 
earnings (SE). IBES states that it adjusts GAAP earnings to match analysts’ forecasts, 
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which are on non-GAAP basis and normally do not attempt to forecast extraordinary, 
nonrecurring and incidental items. To the extent that IBES is able to mimic the common 
practice by majority analysts following a firm, this earnings metric captures consensus 
adjustments made by analysts based on their contextual judgements about which items 
are recurring versus transitory and core versus noncore. Given the considerable 
variation in practice, a standardized definition of street earnings is unlikely to exist. 
Examining the comparability of SE allows me to draw an inference about the 
comparability effect of the overall non-GAAP adjustments. 
To further examine differential comparability effects of line items with different 
natures, I employ three self-constructed non-GAAP earnings metrics. They are 
constructed based on various incremental exclusions from EB_X, which provides me 
with a setting to trace the source of non-GAAP adjustments’ comparability effect. 
Earnings before nonrecurring items (EB_XNR) are defined as EB_X net of the following 
items traditionally viewed by practitioners and the academic literature as nonrecurring: 
merger and acquisition cost (M&A), restructuring charges (Restr), gains and losses on 
mark-to-market securities (G&L), litigation settlements (Legal), write-downs (WD), 
and impairment of goodwill (IMPM). These earnings components more likely result 
from peripheral and nonrecurring activities and therefore are not expected to bear clear 
and consistent associations with current and future revenue generation. I therefore test 
whether excluding these nonrecurring items improves the comparability of earnings. 
The second self-constructed non-GAAP earnings metric is designed to examine 
the comparability impact of excluding two recurring earnings components that often 
feature in non-GAAP constructs reported by management and analysts: stock 
compensation expense (SC) and depreciation and amortization (D&A). Earnings before 
recurring items (EB_XR) is defined as EB_X net of SC and D&A. Since SC and D&A 
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originate from recognizing and matching expenses associated with firms’ core operating 
activities, excluding such items could reduce comparability, to the extent that earnings 
no longer reflect underlying economic activity during the reporting period. Conversely, 
some commentators argue that these accruals could reduce comparability because they 
are arbitrary in nature or subject to significant management discretion (Aboody et al. 
2006). Accordingly, it is possible that excluding such items could enhance the 
comparability of earnings.    
The third self-constructed non-GAAP earnings metric is a combination of the 
previous two measures. I define earnings before recurring and nonrecurring items 
(EB_XR&NR) as EB_X net of M&A, Restr, G&L, Legal, WD, IMPM, SC and D&A. 
This metric approximates the non-GAAP earnings number that management often 
report as part of their earnings announcement (Bhattacharya et al. 2003). I evaluate the 
impact on comparability of excluding transitory and key recurring items.  
In addition to the earnings metrics described above, which are adjusted for a set 
of items, I also construct earnings metrics excluding individual nonrecurring items (i.e., 
M&A, Restr, G&L, Legal, WD, and IMPM), and recurring items (i.e., SC and D&A). 
They are named as EB_XM&A, EB_XRestr, EB_XG&L, EB_XLegal, EB_XWD, 
EB_XImpm, EB_XSC, and EB_XD&A, accordingly. These earnings metrics allow us to 
examine the incremental comparability effect of individual items. 
 
4.4.2 Evaluating Comparability of Earnings Metrics 
I apply the method in De Franco et al. (2011) to quantify the comparability of 
earnings metrics. The method seeks to measure accounting comparability based on the 
similarity of the mapping between earnings and stock returns. Despite potential 
drawbacks, the measure has been widely used in the literature since its introduction and 
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has been validated in many settings (Barth et al. 2012; Kim et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2016; 
Kim et al. 2016; Fang et al. 2016).  
For an earnings metric k (k  {EB_X, NI, SE, EB_XR, EB_XNR, EB_XNR&R}), 
I generate a set of firm-year comparability scores (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑘 ). Appendix 4.1 details 
the calculation of comparability scores. The corresponding statistics for the estimation 
of equation (1) is reported in Appendix 4.2. Panel A reports the fit statistics for GAAP 
earnings (EB_X), while Panel B reports the fit statistics for IBES earnings (SE). 
I always evaluate the comparability of an earnings metric relative to that of 
EB_X. Statistically, I conduct paired-sample t (signed rank) tests for the equality of 
mean (median) between 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑘  (k  EB_X) and 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝐸𝐵_𝑋, which allows us 
to draw inferences concerning the incremental comparability of an alternative earnings 
metric to EB_X.4 The feature of pairwise comparison in this research design effectively 
uses firms as their own control and helps to minimize endogeneity problems.  
 
4.4.3 Data and Sample 
Historical accounting data are from COMPUSTAT, stock prices and returns 
from CRSP, and IBES actual earnings from IBES. The sample includes all US publicly 
listed non-financial firms in the merged COMPUSTAT-CRSP-IBES database from 
2003 through 2015. The sample also satisfies the following selection criteria: (i) no 
holding firms, ADRs and limited partnerships; (ii) with valid stock prices, earnings and 
accrual data, and IBES actual earnings over preceding 16 quarters;5 (iii) with fiscal year 
                                                          





We then test whether mean (median) 𝐷𝑖𝑓_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑘,𝐸𝐵_𝑋 is significantly different from zero using t (signed 
rank) tests. 




ends of March, June, September or December; and (iv) an industry-year grouping with 
at least 10 firms. The above criteria lead to 20,564 firm-year observations, where 16 
corresponding quarters are then assigned to each firm-year observation. Specifically, I 
take the year end of each firm-year observation as the starting point, and then trace back 
for 16 quarters for each year end. This is because the De Franco et al.’s (2011) approach 
requires the previous 16 quarters data for estimating firms’ accounting system in 
equation (1). As a result, I construct an intermediate sample with 324,099 firm-quarter 
observations. This intermediate sample is only used for estimating firms’ accounting 
system as required in equation (1).  The construction process of comparability scores 
results in 20,564 firm-years with comparability scores of all earnings metrics considered 
in this study. They are then trimmed at 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles to minimize the impact 
of extreme observations on the analysis. The final sample contains 19,686 firm-year 
observations. Table 4.1 illustrates the sample selection process. 
[Insert Table 4.1 here] 
 
4.4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics of the inputs for the comparability score 
calculation. Panel A presents descriptive statistics the suite of GAAP and non-GAAP 
earnings metrics, which are scaled by lagged market capitalization. The mean value of 
NI is less than EB_X, consistent with the fact that NI including extraordinary items 
which are typically negative. While EB_X only excludes extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations, SE further excludes additional items (mostly expenses) related 
to merger and acquisition and restructuring. Accordingly, the mean value of SE is larger 
than that of EB_X. The mean values of the remaining three non-GAAP earnings 
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metrics—EB_XR, EB_XNR, and EB_XR&NR—are also larger than that of EB_X, 
because the exclusions are generally expenses.  
 [Insert Table 4.2 here] 
Table 4.2, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for individual items of 
exclusion (also scaled by lagged market capitalization). More than 97% (65%) of firm-
years have a non-zero value for D&A (SC). The high frequency of these items is 
consistent with their recurring nature. On average, D&A is 1.76% of firms’ market 
capitalization, representing one of the largest expenses; the average value of SC is also 
non-trivial at 0.28% of market capitalization. 
Individual non-recurring items occur less frequently, consistent with their more 
transitory nature. Missing values are set to zero to avoid removing otherwise valid 
observations. The most commonly occurring non-recurring item is restructuring charges 
(22% of the sample). Other non-recurring items occur less frequently: M&A (9%), G&L 
(5%), Legal (7%), WD (6%), and IMPM (2%). 
The key sample firm characteristics shown in Panel C are consistent with those 
of the COMPUSTAT (non-financial) universe. The negative mean ROA and ROE 
reflect the recent trend of more frequent losses under GAAP. Some users of financial 
statements may find this as undesirable because some importance applications of 
earnings, for example, valuing a firm using a P/E multiple, would be impossible. They 
thus are motivated to develop their own non-GAAP earnings. 
 
4.5 Main Empirical Results 
4.5.1 Comparability of GAAP and Non-GAAP Earnings 
This section discusses the empirical findings that aim to answer the first research 
question: are non-GAAP earnings more comparable than GAAP earnings? Table 4.3, 
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Panel A presents the summary statistics (columns 1-5) of the comparability scores of 
the GAAP and non-GAAP earnings metrics, where scores closer to zero suggest greater 
comparability. The last two columns formally test the equality of mean (median) 
comparability scores of an alternative metric and the GAAP-based earnings before 
extraordinary items (EB_X), where positive figures indicate an improvement in 
comparability. Because consistent inferences can be drawn from both mean and median 
comparability differences, the subsequent discussion focuses on the mean difference 
(column 6). 
The mean difference in comparability scores between NI and EB_X is -0.037 (p 
< 0.01), suggests that NI is less comparable than EB_X. The finding is consistent with 
the notion that extraordinary items and discontinued operations generally reduce 
earnings’ comparability, due to their non-recurring nature. 
[Insert Table 4.3 here] 
Most notably, street earnings (SE) are found to be more comparable than EB_X, 
with the mean comparability difference being 0.250 (p < 0.01), implying that the 
exclusion in street earnings does improve earnings comparability. Moreover, this 
magnitude is also economical significant, presenting a 38% reduction of the mean 
comparability score of EB_X. The improvement of comparability by SE can be 
attributed to analysts’ expertise and firm-specific judgement that are embedded in the 
construction of street earnings. This finding also addresses the controversy concerning 
the merit of street earnings: the lack of a standardized definition of street earnings street 
does not appear to materially impair its comparability.6  
                                                          
6 In order to isolate the financial crisis period, the comparability of GAAP earnings relative to IBES 
earnings is reported for each year in the sample period. The comparability of a series of adjusted earnings 
metrics is also reported for each sample year. Please refer to Appendix 4.3 for the details. 
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Among other non-GAAP earnings metrics, the mean difference between 
earnings excluding recurring items (EB_XR) and EB_X -0.048 (p < 0.01) suggests the 
former underperforms GAAP earnings, consistent with my expectation that excluding 
recurring items reduces comparability. In contrast, earnings excluding non-recurring 
items (EB_XNR) is more comparable than EB_X, based on the positive mean difference 
0.129 (p < 0.01). This finding is consistent with the belief that excluding non-recurring 
items can make earnings more in line with underlying economics, and in turn improves 
earnings comparability. Economically, the improvement of comparability by EB_XNR 
is merely 51.6% of that by SE, indicating the limitation of a formulaic approach of 
adjustment. One implication is that, given the complexity of business circumstances and 
corporate events, imposing standardized adjustments to earnings could lead to an 
outcome of uniformity, rather than comparability. EB_XR&NR, which excludes both 
recurring and non-recurring items, is found to be more comparable than EB_X (mean 
difference 0.061, p < 0.01). This result suggests that the undesirable effect of excluding 
recurring items is compensated for by excluding non-recurring items. 
In summary, I find evidence that street earnings and earnings excluding non-
recurring items are significantly more comparable than GAAP earnings. The findings 
demonstrate one benefit (i.e., enhanced comparability) of removing idiosyncratic, 
peripheral, and transient elements from earnings, especially when guided by financial 
analysts’ professional expertise and judgment. The resulting earnings become more 
reflective of core and continuing operations, which serves as an essential pre-requisite 
for achieving great comparability. In contrast, the results show that removing from 
earnings recurring expenses such as deprecation and stock-based compensation 




4.5.2 Comparability Effect of Individual Items 
Having examined the comparability effect of recurring and non-recurring items 
collectively, I next investigate how each individual item influences earnings 
comparability. Specifically, I construct six (non-GAAP) adjusted earnings by excluding 
one individual item from EB_X at a time, and then calculate their comparability scores 
as detailed in Appendix 4.1. Table 4.3 Panel B reports summary statistics of 
comparability scores of the eight adjusted earnings in the first four columns, and tests 
the pairwise mean/median difference in comparability scores between an individual-
item-adjusted earnings and EB_X in the last two columns.  
Among the recurring items, the exclusion of depreciation and amortization 
expense (D&A) leads to less comparability, evident by the significantly positive mean 
difference 0.054 (p < 0.01). The finding is sensible because D&A, despite being non-
cash based, approximates a key activity of a firm’s operation, i.e., deploying long-term 
fiscal and intangible assets. An earnings metric not capturing such activities clearly does 
not properly reflect the firm’s underlying economics and therefore are unlikely to help 
users identify differences and similarities across firms (or over time). 
By contrary, the exclusion of the second recurring item, stock-based 
compensation (SC), leads to an improvement of comparability (mean difference 0.009; 
p < 0.01). A potential explanation is that stock compensation expense, despite being 
recurring, contains too much measurement errors. Admittedly, the options pricing 
models commonly used for estimating stock option values are relatively crude and allow 
great discretion from firms in setting up parameters (Aboody et al. 2006; Bartov et al. 
2007). The noise introduced by stock-based compensation expense could outweigh its 
decisional useful information, and in particular, hinders the ability of earnings reflecting 
underlying economics; its removal addresses this problem. Another possible 
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explanation relates to how stock markets react to stock-based compensation information. 
There is some evidence that some users exclude stock-based compensation expense, 
suggesting the information not being embedded into stock prices (Barth et al. 2012). 
Therefore, the removal of SC actually helps to improve the mapping between (adjusted) 
earnings and stock returns, which is manifested as greater comparability scores. 
Among non-recurring items, the exclusion of restructuring charges (Restr) and 
gains and losses on mark-to-market securities (G&L) improves comparability scores 
significantly from EB_X (mean difference 0.020 and 0.003, respectively; both p < 0.01). 
Comparability improvement is much more limited due to excluding M&A-related 
charges (M&A) and litigation expense (Legal): the mean differences are 0.001 and 0.002, 
and p < 0.1 and 0.05, respectively (no improvement in terms of median difference). 
Restructuring charges are incurred during infrequent events of restructuring, while 
gains and losses on mark-to-market securities arise from holding market securities, 
which for most firms are non-core, peripheral activities.  Removing these items restores 
earnings’ ability to reflect a firm’s core, and continuing activities, which leads to better 
comparability. The lack of strong evidence concerning M&A and Legal is surprising, 
considering that they are commonly treated as non-recurring, just like Restr and G&L. 
According to Panel C of Table 4.2, M&A and Legal are considerably smaller than the 
other two non-recurring items, which could make it more difficult to detect their impact 
on comparability empirically. Moreover, excluding write-downs (WD) improves the 
earnings comparability by 0.034 (p<0.01), while the largest comparability improvement 
comes from excluding impairment of goodwill (IMPM). Specifically, adjusting GAAP 
earnings for impairment of good will improves comparability by 0.082 (p<0.01). 
Although the frequency of impairment stays low (2%), it seems to have substantial 
impact on earnings comparability when incurred. 
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In summary, this analysis provides additional evidence concerning the 
comparability of non-GAAP earnings by examining individual items’ impact. The 
results show that the comparability of earnings can be most effectively enhanced when 
the adjustments involve material non-recurring items and/or recurring items with large 
measurement errors. These findings thus complement the earlier ones based on earnings 
metrics, which reflect the combined effect of many items.  
 
4.5.3 Additional Evidence on the Effect of Excluding Non-Recurring Items 
This section presents additional supporting results for comparability benefits 
being associated with excluding non-recurring items. The results in Table 4.4 suggest 
that excluding non-recurring items brings comparability benefits, and the magnitude of 
comparability benefits is positively correlated with the magnitude of non-recurring 
items excluded. For example, if a firm has substantially larger non-recurring items in 
its GAAP earnings, then there is expected to be an accordingly larger non-GAAP 
exclusion of non-recurring items (Gu and Chen 2004). As a results, the exclusion of 
larger non-recurring items leads to greater comparability benefits, as evidenced by the 
greater positive difference in comparability scores between street earnings and GAAP 
earnings shown in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4.4 here] 
In Table 4.4, all the firm-years in my sample are classified into different groups 
according to the magnitude of non-recurring items in their GAAP earnings. First, the 
sample is partitioned into 5 quintiles based on the magnitude of special items and a more 
refined group of non-recurring items (i.e., NR), respectively. The first two columns of 
Table 4.4 show the mean comparability scores of SE, as well as the mean differences in 
comparable scores between SE and EB_X. As shown in the second column, the mean 
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difference of comparability scores between SE and EB_X becomes larger for those firm-
years with larger special items that are potentially excluded from SE. The mean score 
difference in quintile 5 is almost three times as large as that of quintile 1, which suggests 
that greater comparability benefits are associated with larger non-recurring exclusions. 
The forth column demonstrates the same results for the partitioning based on 
NR. Specifically, the mean comparability score differences between SE and EB_X 
experience a substantial increase for the firm-years where larger non-recurring items in 
GAAP earnings are excluded from street earnings. Specifically, the mean comparability 
score difference in quintile 5 is more than twice as large as that of quintile 1. The 
increase in comparability benefits here out of NR exclusion is more modest than that 
out of special items exclusion. And this modesty is driven by the fact that NR represents 
a more refined group than the category of special items does. NR only consists of four 
non-recurring items that are most frequently excluded from non-GAAP earnings (i.e., 
M&A, Restr, G&L and Legal), while the category of special items covers more 
extensive items. The F-test on the bottom of the table rejects the null hypothesis that the 
mean differences are all equal across the quintiles.7 
In the rest part of Table 4.4, I do the similar analyses for three individual non-
recurring items. The sample is partitioned into (1) below-median group and (2) above-
median group based on the magnitude of M&A, Restr and G&L, respectively.8 As 
demonstrated in column 6, the mean difference in comparability between SE and EB_X 
is 0.339 for the firm-years with above-median M&A charges, while it is merely 0.262 
                                                          
7 In the untabulated results, t-test is conduct for the difference in (1) the mean comparability of SE and 
(2) the mean comparability difference between SE and EB_X, between highest and lowest quintiles. The 
corresponding t-values suggest that the differences between highest and lowest quintiles are all 
statistically significant at conventional levels. 
8 Rather than using quintiles, here we classify the sample into two groups: above-median group and 
below-median group. This is because there are a substantial number of zero values for each of three 
individual partitioning variables (i.e., M&A, Restr, and G&L). The binary classification based on median 
allows the sample to be sorted into more balanced groups, while quintile classification would produce 
one oversized group with all zero values and other 4 groups with substantially less firm-years.  
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for those firm-years with below-median M&A charges. This evidence indicates greater 
comparability benefits being associated with larger non-GAAP exclusion of M&A 
charges. The larger M&A charges presented in firms’ GAAP earnings are effectively 
excluded from their non-GAAP earnings. As a result, the corresponding non-GAAP 
exclusion leads to greater comparability benefits. The similar results also hold for the 
non-GAAP exclusion of Restr and G&L as shown in column 8 and column 10, 
respectively. Collectively, the results in Table 4.4 suggest that the exclusion of non-
recurring items acts as the source of comparability benefits from non-GAAP earnings. 
This finding reinforces my main results.  
 
4.6 Comparability Benefit of Street Earnings and Information Environment 
This section investigates the association between the comparability benefit of 
street earnings and firm information environment/firms’ idiosyncratic featuresThe 
preceding section finds strong evidence that street earnings have an advantage to GAAP 
earnings in terms of comparability, which I attribute to the inputs by analysts. It then 
follows naturally that this advantage of street earnings is likely to be more pronounced 
in information environments where analysts’ expertise and judgements are particularly 
beneficial. 
Relying on extant literature, I identify several key measures of firms’ 
information environment. First, firm size is widely used to proxy for firms’ information 
environment, with larger firms being considered to have more informative 
environments (Collins et al. 1987; Lang and Lundholm 1996; Richardson 2000; 
Bushman et al. 2004). The production of information for large firms is more prolific, 
via channels such as more disclosure by firms themselves, better media coverage, and 
more analysts following. Analysts are able to access and process richer information, 
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which can help them make more informed non-GAAP exclusions when constructing 
the street earnings. Thus, I predict the incremental comparability of street earnings over 
GAAP earnings is greater for larger firms than for smaller firms. 
Second, analyst following has long been viewed as a proxy for resources 
devoted to information collection (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Hong et al. 2000) and 
more analysts following a firm generally results in a richer information environment.  
Prior studies indicate that better analyst coverage increases analysts’ collective ability 
to uncover information with respect to firms’ operations (Bowen et al. 2008) and also 
allow them to monitor firms more effectively (Cheng and Subramanyam 2008; Yu 
2008). I expect the incremental comparability of street earnings over GAAP earnings is 
greater when firms are followed by more analysts. 
Third, stock return volatility is commonly used to indicate a firm’s level of 
uncertainty. GAAP earnings are likely to be uninformative under high uncertainty and 
analysts’ information acquisition can mitigate it (Zhang 2006). Moreover, Frankel et al. 
(2006) argue that return volatility is positively related to the demand for analyst services 
and find evidence that analyst research is more informative for firms with high stock 
return volatility. Under either scenario, the involvement of analysts is more beneficial 
and such benefit manifests itself in terms of higher comparability of street earnings.  
To test my predictions, I annually sort the sample into quintiles based on market 
capitalization, the number of analysts following, and stock return volatility. I then report 
mean comparability scores of EB_X and SE, as well as mean differences between SE 
and EB_X by quintiles in Table 4.5.9  
The first two columns of Table 4.5 show mean comparability scores of SE, as 
well as mean differences in comparable scores between SE and EB_X. It is apparent that 
                                                          
9 Using median comparability scores yields qualitatively similar results. 
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SE’s comparability improves with firm size for SE: the mean comparability score of SE 
in quintile 5 is only 22.4% of that in quintile 1. More importantly, the mean difference 
of comparability scores between SE and EB_X follows the same pattern of improvement. 
The mean score difference in quintile 5 is more than twice that of quintile 1, which 
suggests that non-GAAP exclusions bring greater comparability benefits for firms with 
larger size. The F-test on the bottom of the table rejects the null hypothesis that the 
mean differences are all equal across the size quintiles. I also conduct t-test for the 
corresponding differences between quintile 1 and quintile 5. The corresponding t-values 
suggest that all the differences between two extreme quintiles are statistically significant 
at conventional levels. 
[Insert Table 4.5 here] 
The next two columns in Table 4.5 show means (mean differences) of 
comparability scores by quintiles based on analyst following. While SE becomes more 
comparable with more analysts following, unlike size, the mean difference of 
comparability scores between SE and EB_X does not monotonically increase. Instead, 
the incremental comparability of SE peaks in quintile 3 (even though it is still more 
comparable in quintile 5 than in quintile 1). Unreported results show that the 
comparability of EB_X also improves with analyst following, likely due to the spill-
over benefit of analyst information production and/or monitoring on the quality of 
GAAP earnings. Consequently, the incremental comparability of street earnings to 
GAAP earnings demonstrates an inverted U shape. 
The last two columns in Table 4.5 show the sorting by return volatility. The 
comparability of SE declines with the sorting variable, which appears to contradict my 
prediction earlier. However, the mean difference in comparability scores between SE 
and EB_X indeed increase with return volatility, consistent with the prediction that 
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analysts’ expertise is most beneficial when uncertainty is high. Economically, the 
comparability improvement in quintile 5 is more than twice of that in quintile 1.  
Moreover, I test how non-GAAP comparability benefits relate to firms’ own 
idiosyncratic features. I expect firms that are subject to more idiosyncratic economic 
shocks to have less comparable GAAP earnings, which allows for more room for 
improvement in comparability. Accordingly, non-GAAP adjustments, as driven by 
professional judgements and contextual expertise, are thus likely to bring greater 
incremental comparability benefits over GAAP earnings. To empirically capture the 
idiosyncrasy of firms, I use two proxies. The first one is idiosyncratic risk (ID_RISK) 
developed based on firms’ stock returns. The second one draws on market-to-book ratio 
(MTB) to reflect firms’ growth opportunity. Then the uniqueness of a firm’s growth 
opportunity is measured relative to its peer firms in the same SIC-2 industry. I use the 
deviation of MTB from industrial peers (MB_DEV) as the second proxy for firms’ 
idiosyncrasy. The corresponding results are reported in Panel B of Table 4.5.  
The first two columns in Panel B report the results for idiosyncratic risk 
(ID_RISK). The sample is first ranked based on the level of ID_RISK to form 5 quintiles. 
Then for each quintile, I report mean comparability scores of SE, as well as mean 
differences in comparable scores between SE and EB_X. It is shown that SE’s 
comparability decreases with the level of idiosyncratic risk. For example, the mean 
comparability score of SE in the quintile of  highest idiosyncratic risk (quintile 5) is 
only 21.2% of that in the quintile of lowest idiosyncratic risk (quintile 1). More 
importantly, the mean difference of comparability scores between SE and EB_X follows 
the same pattern of improvement. That is, the mean score difference in quintile 5 is 27% 
higher than that of quintile 1. It suggests that non-GAAP exclusions bring greater 
comparability benefits for firms with higher idiosyncratic risk. The F-test on the bottom 
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of the table rejects the null hypothesis that the mean differences are all equal across the 
idiosyncratic risk quintiles. I also conduct t-test for the corresponding differences 
between quintile 1 and quintile 5. The corresponding t-values suggest that all the 
differences between two extreme idiosyncratic risk quintiles are statistically significant 
at conventional levels. 
  
The last two columns in Panel B show the sorting by the firms’ uniqueness of 
growth opportunity (MB_DEV). The comparability of SE declines as the uniqueness of 
firms’ growth opportunity increases. This pattern is consistent with the notion that firms’ 
uniqueness makes their earnings less comparable to their peers. As for the mean 
difference in comparability scores between SE and EB_X, I find that the difference in 
the highest uniqueness quintile (quintile 5) is 57.4% larger than that in the lowest 
uniqueness quintile (quintile 1). This finding suggests that higher idiosyncrasy of firms, 
as reflected by their uniqueness of growth opportunity, creates a circumstance where 
non-GAAP adjustments can add more value by making earnings more comparable. 
However, when this pattern is observed across all five quintiles, it demonstrates an 
inverted U shape, and this may warrant further examinations.  
In summary, these findings indicate that the superior comparability of street 
earnings over GAAP earnings is more pronounced when firms are larger, followed by 
more analysts, and surrounded with more uncertainty. Moreover, non-GAAP 
adjustments are found to render greater comparability benefits when firms are subject 
to more idiosyncratic economic shocks. Under these circumstances analysts’ expertise 
and professional judgment are most beneficial and their inputs are more effective in 





This paper seeks to fill the gap in the literature concerning the comparability of 
non-GAAP earnings. Although prior research has examined the comparability of GAAP 
earnings, no study has investigated whether non-GAAP exclusions lead to greater 
comparability. Meanwhile, whereas prior studies document extensive evidence on non-
GAAP earnings being more value relevant, they remain silent on the comparability of 
non-GAAP earnings, a key characteristic of decisional useful accounting information.  
I find that street earnings, which benefit from non-GAAP adjustments by 
analysts, are significantly more comparable than GAAP earnings. The self-constructed 
non-GAAP earnings excluding nonrecurring items is also found to be statistically more 
comparable than GAAP earnings, but to a much lesser extent than in the case of street 
earnings. The more substantial improvement of street earnings is likely due to analysts’ 
expertise and professional judgment which are embedded in street earnings adjustments. 
Excluding recurring items or both non-recurring and recurring items from GAAP 
earnings, however, results in less comparable earnings, casting doubt on the claimed 
benefit of such a practice. Moreover, I find that the exclusion of material non-recurring 
items (i.e., restructuring charges and gains and losses on mark-to-market securities), or 
recurring items with considerable measurement errors (e.g., stock-based compensation 
cost) is most effective in improving earnings’ comparability.  
In the supplementary analysis, I find that street earnings bring greater 
comparability improvement for firms that are larger, followed by more analysts, and 
have more volatile stock returns. These are circumstances where analysts’ judgement 




Focusing on the comparability of non-GAAP earnings, this study makes 
contributions to both the literature and standard setting. It fills the gap in the literature 
concerning the comparability of non-GAAP earnings, which has so far received limited 
attention. Furthermore, the paper is relevant to the ongoing debate over the increasing 
popularity of non-GAAP earnings. The evidence of the superior comparability of street 
earnings to GAAP earnings suggests that the widespread use of street earnings could 
meet users’ demand for more comparable accounting information. Finally, the findings 
that unstandardized street earnings are more comparable than GAAP earnings raises an 
interesting question to securities regulators and accounting standard setters—how 
accounting standards and disclosure regulation facilitate financial statements users to 
reconstruct earnings measures that are most suitable for their specific purposes. 
Future research opportunities include examining the implications of more 
comparable non-GAAP earnings. Prior research suggests that high quality non-GAAP 
adjustments mainly comprise non-recurring items which are not expected to predict 
future performance. A potential research question here is whether the comparability 
benefits of non-GAAP adjustments can simultaneously improve the quality of 
themselves. Another research question worth further exploration is the market reaction 
to more comparable non-GAAP earnings. Prior research finds non-GAAP earnings 
being more value relevant (i.e., higher ERC), and comparability is perceived to enhance 
relevance of financial information. I would, therefore, expect an association between 
comparability benefits of non-GAAP earnings and stronger market reactions. The third 
potential research question is whether the comparability benefits attenuate investors 
discounting of non-GAAP earnings. Investors are found to discount the pricing message 
from non-GAAP earnings when the reporting of non-GAAP earnings is susceptible to 
opportunistic incentives. To the extent that the improved comparability of non-GAAP 
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earnings alleviates the concern about opportunism, the investors are expected to be more 
confident with non-GAAP adjustments that make earnings more comparable. As a 
result, the investors may apply less discounting to non-GAAP earnings which are 
























Appendix 4.1: Measuring Earnings’ Comparability 
I use the De Franco et al. (2011) method to estimate firm-year comparability scores 
for a certain earnings metric. The De Franco et al. (2011) approach measures the 
similarity with which firms’ accounting functions map the same underlying economic 
events into earnings. The principle underlying the approach is that given a similar set 
of economic transactions, as reflected in stock returns, firm j’s earnings should be 
similar to firm’s when the two firms’ accounting systems are comparable. 
The operation of De Franco et al. (2011) method involves the following four steps. 
In the first step, an earnings metric is regressed on contemporaneous stock returns, 
where stock returns capture economic events and the earnings metric is the output of an 
accounting system. Specifically, for each firm-year I estimate the following equation 
using the 16 previous quarters of data (minimum 14 quarters): 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 ,                              (1) 
where Earnings is a quarterly earnings metric, Return is the quarterly stock returns. 
Coefficients 𝛼?̂? and 𝛽?̂? reflect how economic events are captured by the earnings metric 
and therefore represent a summary of the accounting system. The accounting function 
of firm j (𝛼?̂? and 𝛽?̂?), which is in the same 2-digit-SIC industry, is estimated similarly. 
In the second step, the similarity of the accounting system for firms i and j is 
estimated. Following De Franco et al. (2011), I predict firm i’s and j’s earnings based 
on the accounting function of each firm and firm i’s stock return (Returnit):  
𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡) = ?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡                               (2) 
𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡) = ?̂?𝑗 + ?̂?𝑗𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑡 ,                              (3) 
where E(Earningsiit) is the expected earnings of firm i given firm i’s accounting function 
and firm i’s return. E(Earningsijt) is the expected earnings of firm j given firm j’s 
72 
 
accounting function and also firm i’s return. Firm i’s return is used in both predictions 
so that economic events are held constant for both firms.  
 In the third step, the pair-year comparability score between firms i and j 
(CompAcctijt) is defined as the negative value of the average absolute difference 
between the predicted earnings for both firms shown in (2) and (3): 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 = −1/16 × ∑ |𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡) − 𝐸(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡)|
𝑡
𝑡−15  ,     (4) 
averaged over the preceding 16 quarters. A less negative pair-year comparability score 
indicates greater accounting comparability between the two firms in a year. 
In the last step, I generate a firm-year comparability score, as opposed to the pair-
year comparability score in equation (4). For firm i in time t, I average the four least 
negative pair-year comparability scores between firm i and firm js (in the same industry): 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 1/4 × ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑗∈{4 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑠}  .           (5) 
Alternatively, I compute the firm-year comparability score as the median pair-year 
comparability score over all i-j pairs within a 2-digit SIC industry in a year. Results are 













Appendix 4.2: Descriptive Statistics from Estimation of Equation (1) 
Panel A. Estimation of Equation (1) for GAAP earnings (EB_X) 
Variables N Mean STD P10 Median P90 
Intercepts (ai) 20564 0.002 0.035 -0.035 0.010 0.022 
βi coefficient 20564 0.015 0.076 -0.034 0.008 0.067 
Regression R2 (%) 20564 12.02 13.70 0.250 6.850 31.59 
 
Panel B. Estimation of Equation (1) for IBES earnings (SE) 
Variables N Mean STD P10 Median P90 
Intercepts (ai) 20564 0.002 0.027 -0.029 0.011 0.020 
βi coefficient 20564 0.007 0.042 -0.021 0.006 0.031 
Regression R2 (%) 20564 13.21 0.144 0.300 8.058 34.27 
This table provides descriptive statistics of the intercept, beta coefficient, and the R2 
from firm‐year‐specific regressions specified in equation (1). Panel A reports the 
statistics for using GAAP earnings (EB_X), while Panel B reports the statistics for using 

















Appendix 4.3: Comparability of Multiple Earnings Metrics by Years 
YEAR 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
GAAP        
EB_X -0.739 -0.653 -0.617 -0.518 -0.462 -0.698 -0.802 
NI -0.831 -0.732 -0.695 -0.563 -0.495 -0.720 -0.819 
Non-GAAP        
SE -0.451 -0.422 -0.387 -0.352 -0.327 -0.465 -0.481 
EB_XR -0.814 -0.712 -0.666 -0.567 -0.501 -0.722 -0.841 
EB_XNR -0.698 -0.616 -0.574 -0.498 -0.446 -0.673 -0.765 
EB_XR&NR -0.789 -0.689 -0.645 -0.555 -0.492 -0.711 -0.811 
        
YEAR 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
GAAP       
EB_X -0.801 -0.773 -0.707 -0.524 -0.502 -0.632 
NI -0.820 -0.790 -0.726 -0.534 -0.515 -0.634 
Non-GAAP       
SE -0.455 -0.431 -0.425 -0.315 -0.301 -0.330 
EB_XR -0.838 -0.808 -0.748 -0.588 -0.570 -0.676 
EB_XNR -0.756 -0.738 -0.680 -0.517 -0.493 -0.626 
EB_XR&NR -0.808 -0.791 -0.740 -0.578 -0.563 -0.671 
This table reports the comparability of GAAP and non-GAAP earnings metrics for each 
year in our sample period. The main results hold for each sample year, even during the 
international financial crisis period (i.e., 2008, 2009). The above results suggest that 
IBES earnings (SE) are consistently more comparable than GAAP earnings (EB_X) 
throughout the sample period (2003 – 2015). During the financial crisis period, although 
GAAP earnings become less comparable due to the fluctuating economics, non-GAAP 
adjustments by IBES earnings still enhance the earnings comparability, even to a greater 
extent given that there is potentially more room for improvement when GAAP earnings 
comparability is contaminated by economic shocks. Other inferences about the 









Appendix 4.4: Variable Definitions 
Variables Abbreviation Calculation 
Bottom line 
earnings 








EB_X Quarterly earnings before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations 




SE Street earnings (Actual EPS*SHROUT) 





EB_XR EB_X excluding depreciation and 
amortization (D&A) and stock-based 






EB_XNR EB_X excluding merger and acquisition 
fees (M&A), restructuring charges 
(Restr), gains and losses (G&L), and 







EB_XR&NR EB_X excluding both recurring and non-
recurring items listed above, scaled by 
beginning-of-period market 
capitalization. 





Restr RCPQ from COMPUSTAT, scaled by 
beginning-of-period market 
capitalization. 








Legal SETQ from COMPUSTAT, scaled by 
beginning-of-period market 
capitalization. 





IMPM GDWLIPQ from COMPUSTAT, scaled 










SC STKCOQ from COMPUSTAT, scaled by 
beginning-of-period market 
capitalization. 
Stock returns Return Return is the stock returns during the 
quarter, measured by compounding the 





MKTC It is computed as beginning-of-period 
closing stock price (PRC) times the 
corresponding number of outstanding 
common shares (SHROUT) from CRSP. 
Analyst 
following 
ANALYST It is computed as the average number of 
analysts providing earnings forecasts for 
a firm in IBES during the last four years. 
Stock returns 
volatility 
VOLA It is computed as the standard deviation 
of the quarterly stock returns during the 
last four years. 
Idiosyncratic 
risks 
ID_RISK ID_RISK is constructed following Chun 
et al. 2008. Specifically, we regress 
firms’ quarterly stock return on the 
corresponding industry return and market 
return for 16 quarters. The residual from 
the regression is taken to measure the 






MB_DEV MB_DEV is constructed as the absolute 
difference between firms’ MTB and the 
corresponding industry average MTB. 
Both firms’ MTB and industry MTB are 






k It measures the comparability of kth 
earnings metric between firm i and j in 
year t. It is calculated for firm i and each 





k It measures the comparability of kth 
earnings metric for firm i in year t, by 
averaging CompAcctijt
k among the closed 
4 peers. 
This appendix demonstrates how variables are defined and measured. All financial 
data are from COMPUSTAT and IBES, while stock data are from CRSP. Note that 




















Sample Selection Process and Change of Sample Size 
Sample selection process Firm-years 
1. Construct the initial sample  
Matched COMPUSTAT-CRSP, with fiscal year ends in March, 
June, Sept. or Dec. 
92,675 
Less:  
Not matched with IBES (12,884) 
No SIC codes (1,589) 
Financial firms (17,573) 
Holding firms, ADRs and limited partnerships     (5,598) 
Initial sample 55,031 
2. Intermediate sample for calculating the comparability measure  
Less:  
Don't have required data for earnings/accruals  (6,329) 
Don't have required data for IBES actual earnings (5,374) 
Don't have required data for returns/prices (2,719) 
Don't have data for all lagged 16 quarters (17,996) 
Industry groups with fewer than 10 peer firms   (2,049) 
Intermediate sample 20,564 
(corresponding to 324,099 firm-quarters, including lagged 16 
quarters) 
 
3. Final Sample (Trimmed at 0.5 and 99.5 percentile) 19,686 
This table presents the sample selection process to construct the final sample. The 
screening criteria follow De Franco et al. (2011). Comparability scores of all earnings 






Descriptive Statistics: Quarterly Sample of 324,099 Observations 
Panel A. Summary statistics of GAAP and non-GAAP earnings 
 Mean STD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
GAAP        
EB_X -0.001 0.067 -1.838 -0.004 0.010 0.018 0.882 
NI -0.002 0.071 -2.759 -0.005 0.010 0.018 0.990 
Non-GAAP        
SE 0.002 0.044 -1.426 0.001 0.011 0.017 0.269 
EB_XR 0.018 0.070 -1.535 0.008 0.020 0.034 1.294 
EB_XNR 0.007 0.073 -1.823 -0.002 0.013 0.026 1.128 
EB_XR&NR 0.029 0.088 -1.245 0.012 0.031 0.044 1.453 
 
Panel B. Items for exclusion 




 Mean STD Min Q1 Med Q3 Max 
Recurring         
D&A 97.62% 0.018 0.034 -0.848 0.004 0.009 0.019 1.726 
SC 65.60% 0.003 0.005 -0.124 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.467 
Non-
recurring 
        
M&A 9.190% -0.002 0.017 -0.304 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 1.150 
Restr 21.83% -0.007 0.025 -1.271 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 0.140 
G&L 5.360% 0.009 0.039 -0.388 0.000 0.001 0.005 1.131 
Legal 6.830% -0.000 0.030 -0.593 -0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.688 
WD 6.262% -0.018 0.060 -1.521 -0.011 -0.003 -0.001 0.199 
IMPM 2.220% -0.099 0.185 -1.507 -0.108 -0.022 -0.003 0.093 
 
Panel C. Key firm characteristics 
 Mean STD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Market cap 
($ mil.) 
4,912 14,439 8.650 215.5 739.6 2,896 168,315 
ROA -0.011 0.188 -1.345 -0.019 0.037 0.078 0.326 
ROE -0.004 0.478 -4.691 -0.036 0.084 0.156 3.767 
P/E 13.76 59.14 -489.5 -2.780 15.01 24.28 619.0 
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This table presents descriptive statistics of the intermediate sample with quarterly 
observations. Panel A presents statistics for measures of GAAP and non-GAAP 
earnings. EB_X is earnings before extraordinary items, NI is net earnings, SE is street 
earnings (IBES actual earnings), EB_XR is EB_X excluding recurring items, EB_XNR 
is EB_X excluding non-recurring items, and EB_XR&NR is EB_X excluding both 
recurring and non-recurring items. All earnings metrics are scaled by lagged market 
capitalization. Panel B presents statistics for individual items for non-GAAP exclusion. 
There are two recurring items: D&A represents depreciation and amortization, and SC 
is stock based compensation expenses. There are four non-recurring items: M&A is 
merger and acquisition cost, Restr is restructuring charges, G&L is gains and losses, 
and Legal is litigation settlement. The second column reports the percentage of non-
zero observations for each individual item. All items are scaled by lagged market 
capitalization. The statistics for individual items are reported based on non-zero 
observations. Panel C presents statistics for key firm characteristics. All variables are 




Comparability of Measures of Earnings: Annual Sample of 19,686 Observations 
Panel A. Comparability of GAAP and non-GAAP earnings 
       Pairwise difference 
 Distributional properties  against EB_X 
Earning 
metrics Mean STD Q1 Med. Q3 
 
Mean  Median 
GAAP         
EB_X -0.650 1.133 -0.643 -0.260 -0.122    
NI -0.687 1.185 -0.680 -0.274 -0.128  -0.037*** -0.001*** 
Non-GAAP         
SE -0.400 0.713 -0.389 -0.167 -0.081  0.250*** 0.044*** 
EB_XR -0.698 1.170 -0.708 -0.314 -0.154  -0.048*** -0.022*** 
EB_XNR -0.521 0.924 -0.502 -0.219 -0.107  0.129*** 0.011*** 
EB_XR&NR -0.589 1.004 -0.594 -0.231 -0.136  0.061*** 0.007*** 
 
Panel B. Comparability of non-GAAP earnings after the exclusion of individual 
items 
       Pairwise difference 
 Distributional properties  against EB_X 
 Mean STD Q1 Median Q3  Mean  Median 
Recurring         
EB_XD&A -0.704 1.176 -0.709 -0.317 -0.156  -0.054*** -0.023*** 
EB_XSC -0.642 1.125 -0.637 -0.256 -0.122  0.009*** 0.002*** 
Non-
recurring 
        
EB_XM&A -0.649 1.135 -0.642 -0.259 -0.121  0.001* 0.000 
EB_XRestr -0.630 1.095 -0.627 -0.256 -0.121  0.020*** 0.001*** 
EB_XG&L -0.647 1.130 -0.637 -0.258 -0.121  0.003*** 0.000*** 
EB_XLegal -0.648 1.134 -0.636 -0.258 -0.122  0.002** 0.000 
EB_XWD -0.616 1.078 -0.613 -0.247 -0.115  0.034*** 0.006** 
EB_XImpm -0.568 1.013 -0.545 -0.232 -0.112  0.082*** 0.014** 
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This table presents the averaged comparability scores of earnings measures. Panel A 
presents the summary statistics of the comparability scores of the GAAP and non-
GAAP earnings metrics. The first (fourth) column shows mean (median) comparability 
scores. The last two columns formally test the equality of mean (median) comparability 
scores of an alternative metric and the GAAP-based earnings before extraordinary items 
(EB_X). Comparability scores are constructed so that scores closer to zero suggest 
greater comparability. Positive comparability differences suggest the earnings metrics 
are more comparable than EB_X, while negative differences indicate the earnings 
metrics are less comparable than EB_X. Panel B presents the summary statistics of 
comparability scores of the six self-constructed non-GAAP earnings metrics. They are 
constructed by adjusting EB_X for six individual recurring or non-recurring items, 
respectively. Being similar to Panel A, the last two columns report and test the pairwise 
mean/median difference in comparability scores between a self-constructed non-GAAP 
earnings metric and EB_X. *, **, *** indicate being significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 




Additional Evidence on the Comparability Effect of Excluding Non-recurring 
Items: Analyses Based on Partitioning 
Panel A. Comparability Effect of Overall Non-Recurring Items 
 
Panel B. Comparability Effect of Individual Non-Recurring Items 
  







Sorting on Gains & 
Losses 




  SE 
Dif. vs. 
EB_X 





-0.427 0.262***  -0.39 0.214***  -0.41 0.238*** 
  







-0.307 0.339***  -0.408 0.355***  -0.371 0.380*** 
  
F Tests of equality of mean differences vs. EB_X across groups 
F 
statistics 
 80.93***    20.09***    9.89*** 
In this table, I classify the sample into different groups based on the magnitude of non-
recurring item(s). In Panel A, the sample is sorted into quintiles based on their 
magnitude of (1) special items and (2) a refined group of non-recurring items (NR), 
respectively. NR includes four non-recurring items that are most frequently excluded 
from non-GAAP earnings (i.e., M&A, Restr, G&L and Legal). For each firm-year, the 
magnitude of the partitioning variable is calculated as its absolute value divided by the 
absolute value of the corresponding GAAP earnings. I calculate the magnitudes for the 
last four years and take the average of them. As such, I make the measurement window 
consistent with that of comparability scores (i.e., 16 quarters). For each category, I 
 Quintiles based on Special items  Quintiles based on NR 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
Quintile SE Dif. vs. EB_X   SE Dif. vs. EB_X 
1 (Low) -0.389 0.158***  -0.394 0.152*** 
2 -0.391 0.333***  -0.376 0.287*** 
3 -0.347 0.259***  -0.388 0.271*** 
4 -0.407 0.292**  -0.435 0.309*** 
5 (High) -0.459 0.447***  -0.399 0.392*** 
F Tests of equality of mean differences vs. EB_X across quintiles 
F statistics  50.03***    29.58*** 
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report mean comparability scores of street earnings (SE), as well as the mean differences 
between SE and EB_X by quintiles. The first two columns show the comparability 
results based on the magnitude of overall special items, where quintile 1 represents the 
firm-years with lowest special items and quintile 5 represents the ones with the largest 
special items. The next two columns report the comparability results based on the 
magnitude of NR. Quintile 1 represents the firm-years with the lowest amount of NR, 
while quintile 5 represents the group of firm-years with the largest amount of NR. In 
Panel B I do the similar analyses for three individual non-recurring items (i.e., M&A, 
Restr, G&L). The sample is partitioned into two groups based on the magnitude of each 
of three items, respectively. Below-median group includes the firm-years with below-
median amounts of the corresponding partitioning variables, while above-median group 
includes the firm-years with above-median amounts. Column 1, 3 and 5 demonstrate 
the mean comparability scores of SE for both groups based on M&A, Restr and G&L 
partitioning, respectively. And their adjacent column 2, 4 and 6 present the 
corresponding mean differences between SE and EB_X for both groups. F-tests are 
made to compare the comparability differences across quintiles/groups. The F statistics 
are reported in the last row. *, **, *** indicate being significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 




Comparability of Street Earnings and Firm Characteristics: Levels and 
Differences Relative to EB_X 
Panel A. Comparability of Street Earnings and Information Environment 
  Capital ization  Analysts following  Return  volatility 
















-0.781 0.153***  -0.693 0.176***  -0.138 0.148*** 
2 -0.470 0.244***  -0.498 0.265***  -0.208 0.193*** 
3 -0.341 0.262***  -0.377 0.305***  -0.321 0.228*** 
4 -0.230 0.249***  -0.266 0.263***  -0.493 0.300*** 
5 
(High) 
-0.175 0.347***  -0.179 0.234***  -0.846 0.380*** 
F Tests of equality of means (mean differences vs. EB_X) across quintiles 




-34.84*** -8.51***  -30.9*** -3.06***  -38.46*** -9.78*** 
Panel B. Comparability of Street Earnings and Firms’ Idiosyncrasy 
 
 Idiosyncratic Risks  B/M Dev.  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
Quintile SE Dif. vs. EB_X  SE Dif. vs. EB_X  
1 (Low) -0.125 0.163***  -0.280 0.141***  
2 -0.190 0.205***  -0.291 0.193***  
3 -0.265 0.207***  -0.348 0.245***  
4 -0.348 0.214***  -0.315 0.223***  
5 (High) -0.589 0.227***  -0.357 0.222***  
F Tests of equality of means (mean differences vs. EB_X) 
F Value 334.41*** 16.83***  221.93*** 10.55***  
t Value (Low 
VS. High) 
26.07*** -1.67*  5.02*** -3.31***  
In this table, I sort the sample into quintiles based on their (1) market capitalization, (2) 
the number of analyst following, and (3) stock return volatility, respectively. For each 
firm-year, firm characteristics are measured for the last four years so as to make the 
measurement window consistent with that of comparability scores (i.e., 16 quarters). 
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For each category, I report mean comparability scores of street earnings (SE), as well 
as the mean differences between SE and EB_X by quintiles. The first two columns show 
the results based on firm size (MKTC), where quintile 1 represents the smallest firms 
and quintile 5 represents the largest ones. The next two columns report the results based 
on analyst following (ANALYST). Quintile 1 represents the firms with the weakest 
analyst coverage, while quintile 5 represents the group of firms with the strongest 
analyst coverage. For each firm-year, the analyst following is measured by the average 
number of analysts covering the firm during the last four years. The last two columns 
present the results based on return volatility (VOLA). Quintile 1 represents the firms 
with the least volatility, while quintile 5 represents the firms having the most volatile 
stock returns. F-tests are made to compare the differences in comparability levels and 
comparability differences across the five quintiles. The F statistics are reported at the 
bottom of each column. *, **, *** indicate being significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 





















Chapter 5 Earnings Comparability and Accrual Process 
5.1 Introduction 
This paper investigates the relation between the comparability of earnings and 
the properties of accruals. The importance of comparability is well established among 
practitioners, accounting standard setters, and academics. Important economic 
decisions requiring the evaluation of alternative opportunities and comparable financial 
information include: investors choosing among possible investments, lenders making 
lending decisions, and corporations evaluating potential acquisition targets. 
Accordingly, the demand for comparable accounting information has been credited as 
one of the principal motives for accounting regulation (SFAC 2, p. 40). Reflecting the 
practical importance of comparability, a fast-growing body of literature examines and 
documents the benefits of more comparable accounting information to financial 
statement users such as equity investors (e.g., Bhojraj and Lee 2002; Bradshaw et al. 
2009; De Franco et al. 2011; Young and Zeng, 2015), debt investors (Kim et al. 2013; 
Fang et al. 2016), and M&A acquirers (Chen et al.2016).  
Despite the expanding body of literature concerning the economic consequences 
of accounting comparability, there is limited research on the underlying mechanism that 
produces comparable (or incomparable) earnings. This lack of knowledge could hinder 
users’ ability to assess the comparability of accounting information that they receive, 
and may also hamper accounting standard setters’ effort to improve comparability 
through better rule setting. This study seeks to close this research gap by examining 
how accruals, the key component of earnings, affect the comparability of the resulting 
earnings measures. Since earnings are the outcome of the accrual process which adjusts 
cash flows for accruals, the properties of accruals ought to manifest through the property 
of earnings. Therefore, an important unanswered question concerns how properties of 
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accruals are associated with earnings comparability. As the starting point, I draw on an 
important insight from the Conceptual Framework for Financial Reporting that 
accounting information with high relevance is likely to be more comparable. 
Specifically, the FASB asserts that “[s]ome degree of comparability is likely to be 
attained by satisfying the fundamental qualitative characteristics” (SFAC No. 8), 
implying that accruals that enhance (or diminish) the relevance of earnings would in 
turn improve (reduce) earnings comparability. 
Accruals that originate from a company’s core operations (“core accruals”) are 
likely to be most relevant to decision marking, because they reveal the company’s key 
business activities. As a result, adjusting operating cash flow for core accruals is 
expected to lead to earnings which better reflects the company’s underlying 
performance, and which in turn facilitates a more meaningful performance comparison. 
In many important uses of earnings such as forecasting and valuation, users are 
primarily interested in core operations because they represent the recurring part of 
business and the principal source of value creation. Accruals originating from core 
operations precisely serve the purpose of transforming cash flows into core earnings 
and allow users to meaningfully evaluate and compare core operations based on such 
earnings measures. As a result, inclusion of accruals that are close to core operations 
enables users to correctly identify key similarities and differences in firms’ reported 
performance, thereby enhancing cross-sectional comparability. The definition of core 
earnings shares the similar spirit of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) “Core Earnings”. Since 
its introduction in 2002, S&P’s “Core Earnings” has been broadly used for equity 
valuation and debt rating activities. S&P’s definition emphasizes the link between line 
items and a company’s primary businesses, which forms the conceptual ground for the 
definition of core earnings in this study. 
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By contrast, accruals originating from non-core and/or peripheral business 
activities are less relevant and the inclusion of these non-core accruals is not expected 
to lead to more comparable earnings. Specifically, these non-core accruals are less 
likely to reasonably reflect the link between earnings numbers and underlying economic 
performance, and may distort this link in certain cases where the non-core accruals are 
perceived to be extraordinary. For example, impairment of goodwill is primarily driven 
by mark-to-market accounting and are not directly related to the revenue generating 
process. Therefore, impairments may not be as relevant as core accruals, such as 
accounts receivable. Then adjusting for such non-core accruals is not expected to reflect 
the link with the underlying economics to an equal extent to core accruals. Moreover, 
adjusting for non-core accruals of extraordinary nature, such as gain (loss) from sale of 
long-term assets, can largely distort earnings by causing a deviation from the underlying 
economics. And this deviation from underlying economics can conceal similarities and 
differences in firms’ reported performance, which consequently reduces cross-sectional 
comparability.  Collectively, I expect the adjustment of core (non-core) accruals to 
facilitate (handicap) the cross-sectional comparisons of firms’ performance. This leads 
to my main prediction: the comparability of earnings is positively associated with the 
proximity of transactions and hence accruals to core operations. 
Operationally, I classify common accruals according to their proximity to core 
operations. Examples of core accruals include changes in working capital and 
depreciation, while examples of non-core accruals are impairment changes, gain (loss) 
of selling long-term assets, etc. The accruals which are classified neither as “core” nor 
“non-core” are deemed as “intermediate”. To corroborate this classification, we 
examine the correlations between accruals with sales, and find patterns which are 
consistent with this classification. Next, I construct a series of alternative earnings 
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measures by adjusting operating cash flows for different categorize of accruals (e.g., 
core, intermediate, and non-core accruals). I measure the comparability of an earnings 
measure by the comparability score based on De Franco et al (2011). The comparability 
score is defined to capture the extent of similarity between two firms’ accounting 
systems, which map firms’ underlying economics to their earnings. To demonstrate the 
robustness of our findings and overcome the drawbacks of the comparability score, I 
also measure comparability by the co-movement between two firms’ earnings measures 
(De Franco et al. 2011).  
I conduct three sets of empirical analysis to test the relation between earnings 
comparability and accruals’ proximity to core operations in a US sample of 19,842 firm-
year observations. First, as univariate analyses, I sort firms into quintiles based on the 
proportion of core (non-core) accruals in net earnings, and compare incremental 
comparability of net earnings beyond OCF across quintiles. I find that the comparability 
improvement of net earnings increases (declines) with the proportion of core (non-core) 
accruals in net earnings. The finding is consistent with my prediction, Moreover, I 
construct measures of earnings by progressively adjusting OCF with accruals whose 
relations with core operations become increasingly distant (i.e., in the order of core, 
intermediate, and non-core accruals). Comparing the comparability scores of various 
earnings measures confirms the sorting results: while core accruals improves the 
comparability of the resulting earnings measures, non-core accruals reduces it.  
Second, as multivariate analysis, I regress the comparability scores on different 
categories of accruals and find that both core and intermediate accruals are positively 
associated with comparability, while non-core accruals are negatively related. The 
findings are consistent with my prediction for differential roles of accruals in enhancing 
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the comparability of earnings. These results are robust to the inclusion of a wide range 
of control variables, and to alternative comparability scores. 
Third, I examine the implications of accrual properties to the usefulness of 
comparability. While prior studies find the evidence of earnings comparability 
improving the quality of analysts forecast (De Franco et al. 2011), I document evidence 
on a cross-sectional variation in the improvement of analyst forecast performance due 
to greater earnings comparability. The benefit of greater comparability is more 
pronounced to analysts when earnings comprise of less core accruals (or more non-core 
accruals). In contrast, when earnings are made up of more core accruals (or less non-
core accruals), the benefit of comparability, in terms of analyst forecast quality, is 
significantly reduced. These findings reveal an important, moderating role of accruals 
in the benefit of accounting comparability, and they are consistent with prior evidence 
on earnings comparability being more beneficial in the event of high information 
asymmetries (Chen et al. 2016; Fang et al. 2016). 
 My paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, I directly link the 
comparability of earnings to the relevance of accruals and thus shed light on the 
underlying accounting process that determines comparability. While a growing body of 
research examines the economic consequences of comparability, there is relatively little 
research on the mechanism that leads to comparable (or incomparable) earnings. The 
latter knowledge is particularly relevant as standard setters strive to provide guidance 
on the recognition of relevant information. As indicated by the conceptual framework, 
relevance not only acts as a primary qualitative characteristic facilitating information 
usefulness, but also delivers benefits by enhancing secondary characteristics, such as 
comparability. My research highlights the crucial association between relevance and 
comparability. It suggests that allowing less relevant information into accounting 
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numbers can reduce earnings comparability, while recognizing relevant accruals can 
improve comparability which in turn enhances the usefulness of earnings. 
Second, my findings about the association between comparability and accrual 
components have implications for prior studies examining the consequences of earnings 
comparability. Research finds evidence that greater comparability is beneficial and its 
benefits include improving analyst forecast performance, enhancing merger and 
acquisition performance, and reducing investor perceived stock crash risks. My 
evidence contributes to this literature by shedding more light on how the benefit of 
comparability works. Particularly, in the supplementary analyses I find the effect of 
comparability on analysts’ performance is more pronounced for firms with less core 
accruals and more non-core accruals. This finding suggests that greater comparability 
is more beneficial to analysts when they are covering a firm whose earnings are difficult 
to predict. In contrast, the perceived benefit of comparability is substantially less 
pronounced for firms whose earnings are relatively easy to predict. My findings provide 
further evidence on the benefit of comparability and have the potential to enrich the 
literature that finds evidence regarding beneficial consequences of accounting 
comparability to financial statement users, such as improving analyst forecast 
performance, enhancing merger and acquisition performance, reducing cost of capital 
in debt market, and reducing investor perceived stock crash risks (Bhojraj and Lee 2002; 
Bradshaw et al. 2009; De Franco et al. 2011; Young and Zeng, 2015; Kim et al. 2013; 
Fang et al. 2016; Chen et al.2016; Kim et al. 2016). 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the 
prior literature and develop the main prediction. Section 5.3 discusses the categorization 
of accruals. Section 5.4 describes the research design, while Section 5.5 discusses the 
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sample and data. Section 5.6 presents the main empirical results, and Section 5.7 
examines the implications of my main results on prior literature. Section 5.8 concludes. 
 
5.2 Prior Literature and Prediction 
5.2.1 Prior Literature 
The principal role of reported earnings is to measure firms’ periodic financial 
performance (SFAC No. 1, pg. 43) and comparability “enables users to identify and 
understand similarities in, and differences among, items” (SFAC No. 8, QC21). I 
therefore operationalize the comparability of earnings as a quality that allows users to 
reliably compare financial performances across firms (or over time) based on their 
reported earnings. Comparable earnings allow users to determine the financial 
performance of several enterprises (SFAC No. 1, pg. 43; SFAC No. 8, pg. 19).  
Prior research and standard setting suggests that earnings quality is a function 
of relevance (Dechow et al. 2010, Schipper 2003) and that comparability is an important 
dimension of earnings quality (FASB 1980, 2010). Since earnings result from adjusting 
operating cash flows with accruals, accruals ought to play an essential role in 
determining the comparability of earnings. My starting point is the “Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting” (Statement of Accounting Concepts No.8, FASB 
2010; CF hereafter), which asserts that “[s]ome degree of comparability is likely to be 
attained by satisfying the fundamental qualitative characteristics”. Therefore, it is 
natural to anticipate that accruals that are relevant will improve earnings comparability, 
whereas accruals that lack this fundamental characteristic will lower earnings’ 
comparability.  
Essentially, comparability is the ability of an accounting system to accurately 
capture the economic effect of events and transactions in the period in which they occur. 
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The accuracy and timeliness with which events and transactions are reflected in 
earnings is a function of the accrual process. Accrual accounting adjusts cash flows with 
the aim of making the resulting earnings reflect underlying economic transactions and 
events during the reporting period (Dechow 1994). Earnings comparability is enhanced 
by accruals that are relevant in the sense that they make the resulting earnings number 
a legitimate proxy for underlying economic performance.10 In the following discussion 
I argue that the relevance of accruals is manifested by their relation to core operations. 
 
5.2.2 Development of Predictions 
I argue that the relevance of accruals is manifested by their proximity to core 
operations because core operations are considered particularly relevant in the principal 
uses of earnings. Prior research reveals the difference between accrual components in 
reflecting core operations (e.g., Barth et al. 2001 and Bushman et al. 2016) and 
emphasizes the central importance to financial statement users of core earnings (e.g., 
Beaver 1981; Revsine et al. 1999; Jonas and Blanchet 2000). Core operations are 
defined as “ongoing major and central” activities, in contrast to non-core operations that 
reflect “incidental and peripheral” activities (Statement of Accounting Concepts No.5, 
FASB 1984, para. 36). While the latter information can be useful in specific 
circumstances, core earnings are considered particularly relevant for the two principal 
earnings objectives of prediction and confirmation (Statement of Financial Accounting 
Concepts No.8, FASB 2010). 
With respect to their predictive role, earnings from core operations are more 
useful for predicting future financial performance because the underlying activities are 
                                                          
10 The quality of accruals is also related to their reliability (Richardson et al. 2005). FASB (2010) propose 
that higher measurement error is expected to reduce earnings comparability, while lower measurement 
error is expected to enhance earnings comparability. However, this study focuses on the comparability 
effect of accruals relevance. 
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recurring and strategically important (Ohlson 1999; Brown and Sivakumar 2003). 
Conversely, users such as financial analysts do not normally attempt to predict non-core 
operations due to their transient, unpredictable, and auxiliary nature (Gu and Chen 2004; 
Doyle et al. 2013). The confirmation role of earnings (e.g., performance evaluation) 
also emphasises core operations because performance is usually evaluated against a 
target defined in terms of core operations (Kasznik and McNichols 2002; Matsumoto 
2002; Burgstahler and Eames 2006; Rapoport 2013). Accordingly, adjusting periodic 
cash flow by core accruals is predicted to make earnings more reflective of core 
economic activities, whereas inclusion of non-core accruals is expected to cause 
earnings to deviate from economic fundamentals.  
Accruals with close proximity to core operations originates from recognizing 
revenues and matching direct expenses with revenues. They precisely serve the purpose 
of transforming cash flows into core earnings and allow users to meaningfully evaluate 
and compare core operations based on such earnings measures. Example of accruals 
close to core operations include change in accounts receivable, change in accounts 
payable, change in inventory, and depreciation and amortization. Adjusting operating 
cash flows for accruals that are close to core operations enables users to correctly 
identify key similarities and differences of two firms and therefore by definition leads 
to an earnings metric with higher cross-sectional comparability. In contrast, there are 
accruals with distant proximity to core operations.  These accruals do not bear clear and 
reasonable relations with the revenue generating process and therefore appear to be 
more detached from core operations. They are more likely to be driven by mark-to-
market accounting and other events that are not directly related to operating cash flows. 
When adjusted upon cash flows, these accruals are likely to cause the resulting earnings 
metric deviate from the underlying performance. The deviation from underlying 
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economics may consequently conceal underlying economic similarities or differences 
and therefore make the resulting earnings metric less comparable. This study aims to 
investigate the association between accruals’ proximity to core operations and cross-
sectional earnings comparability. I predict that core accruals are more likely to improve 
cross-sectional earnings comparability relative to non-core accruals. 
Prediction: Ceteris paribus, adjusting for accruals with close (distant) 
proximity to core operations leads to an earnings metric with higher (lower) cross-
sectional comparability. 
 
5.3 Accruals Categorization 
To operationalize the prediction in the preceding section, I first classify all 
accruals that reconcile net earnings and operating cash flows. The classification is 
according to accruals’ proximity to core operations. I categorize accruals into three 
discrete groups. The proximity to core operations is characterized by a continuous 
spectrum ranging from “close” to far “distant”. As a result, my ability to rank all 
individual accruals in order is inevitably limited. I therefore adapt a discrete 
classification approach for the feature based on a three-way classification: close, 
ambiguous and distant. Accruals that are close to core operations are believed to be 
more relevant for information usefulness, and thus are termed as core accruals, while 
accruals that are distant from core operations are deemed to be less relevant, and thus 
are termed as non-core accruals. The remaining accruals are termed as intermediate 
accruals due to their ambiguous relations to companies’ core operations. Note that the 
above classification is based the relevance of a group of accruals relative to another 
group. Specifically, accruals are classified as non-core only because they are perceived 
to be less relevant than those classified as core, but not because they are believed to be 
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not relevant at all. Even within the non-core group, certain accruals (e.g., restructuring 
costs) are significantly more relevant than others (e.g., extraordinary items), but they 
are still classified as non-core because they are not as relevant as the accruals in the core 
group (e.g., accounts receivable). My predictions focus primarily on core and non-core 
accruals, although for completeness I also consider accruals in the intermediate 
categories.  
 
5.3.1 Accruals Categorization: Conceptualization 
The categorization of accruals is based on their proximity to core operations. I 
consider three groups of accruals: (1) accruals with close proximity to core operations, 
(2) accruals with remote proximity to core operations, and (3) accruals with 
intermediate/ambiguous relation to core operations. This classification corresponds to 
prior research grouping line items in financial statements by their roles in recognizing 
revenues and matching expenses (Richardson et al. 2005). Prior literature suggests that 
there is variation in accruals according to their ability to make earnings more reflective 
of firm performance (Dechow 1994; Barth et al. 2001). Cheng and Hollie (2008) 
distinguish core and non-core cash flows by their different proximities to operating 
activities. Similarly, Bushman et al. (2016) argue that while some accruals originate 
from core operations and serve to offset random fluctuations in cash flows, other 
accruals stem from events and estimates that are not directly related to core operations.  
The group of accruals with close proximity to core operations originates from 
recognizing revenues and matching direct expenses with revenues. In this group I 
include (1) change in accounts receivable; (2) change in accounts payable; (3) change 
in inventory; (4) depreciation and amortization. The combination of accruals in this 
group corresponds to the definition of working capital accruals and is believed to be 
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closely related to core operations (Healy 1985; Barth et al. 2001). For example, accounts 
receivable is employed to recognize earned and realizable revenue without cash receipt, 
whereas the accrual “deferred revenue” allows for the postponing of recognizing a cash 
inflow as revenue should it is deemed as unearned. The centrality of revenue generating 
in any firm means that these accruals are closely related to core operations and therefore 
their inclusion in earnings is predicted to improve earnings’ relevance by enhancing 
comparability. Similarly, change in inventory is included because it arises from matched 
expenses associated with cost of goods sold, and therefore directly relates to core 
operations. These accruals are expected to result in more comparable earnings because 
matching reduces the negative autocorrelation in cash flows and hence volatility in 
earnings (Dechow et al. 1998). I also include depreciation and amortization because this 
accrual is believed to be an expense arising from the periodic consumption of assets and 
thus has strong predictive value (Barth et al. 2001; Barker 2004). 
At the other extreme are accruals that do not bear clear and reasonable relations 
with the revenue generating process and therefore appear to be more detached from core 
operations. Rather than offsetting random fluctuations in cash flows, these accruals are 
more likely to be driven by mark-to-market accounting and other events that are not 
directly related to operating cash flows (Bushman et al. 2016). As such, the 
development of these accruals is beyond management control, and thus unlikely 
constitutes a key strategy. Such accruals usually take the form of one-time items and 
non-operating items. One example is the impairment of long-term assets (including 
goodwill). These accruals are recorded not because of their role in generating revenue 
but because of the need to recognize the loss of future economic benefits from these 
assets. For example, goodwill impairment charges are excluded from S&P’s core 
earnings because ‘the amortization of goodwill is not considered a period cost expended 
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in the creation of revenues, the inclusion of goodwill impairment charges would distort 
the company’s operating performance’ (Standard & Poor’s 2008 p.10). They are 
infrequent, idiosyncratic, and inherently difficult to predict. Causes of impairments 
include changing market conditions and past erroneous decisions that often do not 
pertain to financial performance in the period when impairment is charged (Riedl 2004; 
Beatty and Weber 2006). Gu and Lev (2011) find that goodwill write-offs could be 
driven by the overpricing of acquirers’ stocks. As a result, asset impairments are clearly 
not directly relevant for predicting future performance (Barker 2004). Moreover, when 
determining impairment amounts, firms often accelerate loss recognition and deviate 
further from matching. 
Another example of an accrual with low relevance to core operations is 
unrealized gains and losses on marketable securities. Most firms do not rely on changes 
in asset/liability values as the basis for their business models. Dhaliwal et al. (1999) 
find that marketable securities adjustment is of relevance only for financial sector firms. 
These accruals do not form an integral part of firms’ operating strategy because 
unrealized gains and losses are driven by market-wide factors over which managers 
have no control (Chambers et al. 2007). Accordingly, I also include gain (loss) from 
sale of long-term assets and restructuring charges in the group of accruals with weak 
link to core operations. 
Finally, the intermediate accrual category comprises those accrual adjustments 
whose relation to core operations is ambiguous. The ambiguity is caused mainly by two 
reasons. The first reason is certain accruals possess mixed nature as to their relevance. 
That is, although these accruals are not directly derived from core operations, some of 
their characteristics could still be viewed as relevant. One example is tax-related items 
(e.g., deferred tax expense and changes in tax assets/liabilities). On the one hand, they 
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are perceived as non-core because rather than being driven by operating activities, taxes 
are determined primarily by policies and strategies that are unrelated to firms’ core 
operations (Cheng and Hollie 2008).  On the other hand, although tax-related items 
cannot be directly matched to revenue generating activities, they ultimately represent a 
recurring periodic financial obligation. The second reason is there are certain line items 
that are only provided in an aggregated manner by COMPUSTAT, and these aggregated 
line items include multiple accruals with conflicting nature of relevance.  For example, 
the line item ‘other assets and liabilities’ (AOLOCH) includes write-downs and deferred 
revenue. While write-downs is expected to be less relevant, deferred revenue is deemed 
to be more relevant. Given this, ‘other assets and liabilities’ is classified as intermediate 
due to the fact that it includes two accruals where one accrual’s relevance can hardly be 
aligned to other’s.  
 
5.3.2 Accruals Categorization: Operationalization 
I obtain accruals directly from the statement of cash flows and follow a 
comprehensive definition of accruals. Some prior studies use an indirect balance sheet 
approach to calculate accruals and focus on working capital components. For example, 
Healy (1985) and Sloan (1996) define accruals as the change in non-cash working 
capital less depreciation expense. However, subsequent research suggests that this 
definition of accruals omits many accruals and deferrals relating to non-current 
operating assets, non-current operating liabilities, non-cash financial assets and 
financial liabilities (Richardson et al. 2005). In light of this, I use a comprehensive 
definition of accruals covering both working capital accruals and other accruals beyond 
working capital. I take accruals directly from the cash flow statements to avoid 
measures being biased by non-operating activities (Hribar and Collins 2002). 
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I focus on quarterly accrual items available in COMPUSTAT. These accrual 
items collectively account for the difference between COMPUSTAT operating cash 
flows (OCF) and income before extraordinary items (IBCQ). Next I categorize these 
accruals are categorized into three groups based on their proximity to core operations. 
The detailed categorization is summarized in Appendix 5.1. I mainly follow 
COMPUSTAT’s approach where some specific accruals are aggregated into one single 
item. For example, funds from operations – other (FOPOQ) include impairment of 
goodwill, impairment of strategic investment, provision for bad debts and restructuring 
charges. Similarly, assets and liabilities – other (AOLOCHQ) contain unrealized gains 
and losses of investment, write-down of assets, customer deposits and deferred revenues. 
Given the aggregated nature of accrual items in COMPUSTAT, I do not specifically 
classify disaggregated individual accrual items; instead I based my classification on the 
aggregated items that are readily available in COMPUSTAT.  
As reported in Appendix 5.1, all accruals are first categorized into three groups 
based on their proximity to core operations. The first group includes accruals considered 
to be close to core operations. Accruals in this group include depreciation and 
amortization (DPCQ), changes in accounts receivable (RECCHQ), changes in accounts 
payable (APALCHQ) and changes in inventories (INVCHQ). They relate to sales, cost 
of goods sold and other operating activities. Accruals in the second group are those 
distant from firms’ core operations. They include extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations (XIDOCQ), sale of PPE and investment (SPPIVQ). The distant group also 
includes other funds from operations (FOPOQ) which comprise items such as 
restructuring cost and impairment of goodwill. These accruals result from peripheral or 
incidental activities and thus do not have clear and reasonable relations with revenue 
generating. Beyond these accruals with a relatively clear relation (either close or distant) 
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to core operations, other accruals exist whose relation to core operations is more 
ambiguous. I include these ambiguous accruals in the third group which includes 
deferred taxes (TXDCQ), equity in net loss / earnings (ESUBCQ), and accrued income 
taxes (TXACHQ). The ambiguous group also includes changes in other assets and 
liabilities (AOLOCHQ) which are composed of accruals such as write-downs and 
changes in deferred revenue. Given the ambiguity as to their relation to core operations, 
the accruals in this group are labelled as Intermediate. 
 
5.4 Research Design 
5.4.1 Construction of Earnings Measures 
I construct alternative earnings measures by adjusting quarterly operating cash 
flow for each group of accruals. Specifically, I gradually adjust operating cash flows 
for one (or multiple) groups of accruals, which results in a series of earnings measures. 
I take operating cash flows (OCF) as the starting point and then adjust for accruals (1) 
close to, (2) intermediate to and (3) distant from core operations.  
First, I adjust OCF by accruals that are closely related to core operations to 
produce an intermediate earnings construct (IE_Core), designed to reflect core 
operations. As I argued earlier, these accruals are intended to better reveal core 
operations and thus improve earnings’ comparability. Second, I take IE_Core and 
further adjust it for intermediate accruals whose relation to core operations is unclear, 
termed as IE_Core_Inter. Given the ambiguity of their relation to core operations, the 
net effect of these accruals on comparability is difficult to predict ex ante. Third, I adjust 
IE_Core_Inter for non-core accruals which are clearly unrelated with core operations. 
The above adjustments collectively bridge the gap between cash flow and net income, 
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and the resulting number is effectively GAAP net income (NI). The detailed process of 
construction is reported in Appendix 5.1. 
 
5.4.2 Measurement of Comparability 
Following the prior research using output-based comparability measures (De 
Franco et al. 2011; Barth et al. 2012), I use two approaches to measure accounting 
comparability. The first approach measures comparability based on how underlying 
economic events map into accounting numbers. This approach generates cross-sectional 
comparability scores at both firm-pair-year level and firm-year level. Despite potential 
drawbacks, the approach has been widely used in the literature since its introduction 
and has been validated in many settings (Barth et al. 2012; Kim et al. 2013; Chen et al. 
2016; Kim et al. 2016; Fang et al. 2016). 
Two comparability scores are computed following the first approach. 
CompAcctInd is computed at firm-year level and CompAcct is computed at firm-pair-
year level. They are used as the prime comparability scores in this chapter. CMV_Ind 
and CMV_ERN are constructed following the second approach whereby earnings 
comparability is measured based on the degree to which firms’ earnings co-vary over 
time (Barth et al. 2012; De Franco et al. 2011). CMV_Ind is computed at firm-year level, 
and CMV_ERN is computed at firm-pair-year level. Please refer to Section 3.3 for 
detailed procedures of constructing the comparability scores. 
 
5.4.3 Empirical Tests 
I conduct three sets of empirical tests to examine the association between 
earnings comparability and accruals’ proximity to core operations. The first set of test 
includes three univariate analyses examining the comparability effect of different 
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accrual components. First, I partition the full sample into quintiles based on 
comparability scores (e.g., CompAcctIndit) of NI, and I compare the proportion of core, 
intermediate and non-core accruals (Core, Inter, NCore) across quintiles. The 
proportion of accruals are defined as the absolute value of an accrual category divided 
by the sum of absolute values of three accrual categories. For example, the proportion 
of core accruals Core is computed as the absolute value of core accruals divided by the 
sum of absolute values of core accruals, intermediate accrual and non-core accruals. 
Since I predict a positive association between earnings comparability and accruals’ 
proximity to core operations, I expect the quintiles with higher comparability scores 
presents earnings with higher (lower) proportion of core (non-core) accruals. Second, I 
partition the sample into quintiles according to the difference in comparability scores 
between OCF and NI, and I compare the proportion of different accruals across quintiles. 
To the extent that core (non-core) accruals bring more (less) incremental comparability 
beyond OCF, I expect that the quintiles with higher difference in comparability scores 
present earnings with higher (lower) proportion of core (non-core) accruals. Third, I 
partition the sample into quintiles based on the proportion of core, intermediate and 
non-core accruals, respectively. For each quintile, I report the comparability score of NI 
and the difference in comparability score between NI and OCF. I expect the quintiles 
with higher proportion of core accruals have higher comparability scores of NI and 
present higher difference in comparability score between NI and OCF. Collectively, the 
univariate analyses manifest the association between comparability and accrual 
components. 
Second, I conduct a further analysis to confirm the results in univariate analyses. 
The above univariate analyses merely examine the aggregated effect of accruals and 
have limitations in clearly distinguishing the effect of one accrual group from another. 
 105 
 
This analysis allows me to pinpoint the specific comparability effect of each accrual 
category. Specifically, I calculate the prime firm-year comparability score 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝑘  for each earnings metric k (i.e., OCF, IE_Core, IE_Core_Inter, NI). 
Then I conduct pairwise tests of alternative earnings metrics for the same firm. I conduct 
paired-sample t (signed rank) tests for the equality of mean (median) between all 
pairwise calculations of earnings metrics (e.g., 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝐼𝐸_𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒 VS.𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡
𝑂𝐶𝐹). 
This allows me to draw inferences about the comparability effect of each accrual 
group.11  
For example, OCF and IE_Core are paired for firm i in time t and the difference 
in CompAcctIndit between OCF and IE_Core is indicative of the comparability effect 
of core accruals (i.e., the difference between OCF and IE_Core). As predicted, I expect 
the difference in CompAcctIndit to be positive, which means adjusting for core accruals 
improves earnings comparability.  Similarly, the pairwise test for IE_Core and 
IE_Core_Inter suggests the comparability effect of intermediate accruals, while the test 
for IE_Core_Inter and NI suggests the comparability effect of non-core accruals. I 
expect the adjustment for non-core accruals reduces earnings comparability, and this is 
reflected by a negative difference in comparability score between IE_Core_Inter and 
NI.  The feature of pairwise comparison in this research design effectively uses firms as 
their own control and helps minimize endogeneity problems.  
Third, as multivariate analysis, I estimate a regression that controls for the 
underlying economic similarity. As discussed in Section 3.2, there are criticism that the 
comparability scores used here may wrongly capture the economic similarity. Therefore, 
                                                          





We then test whether mean (median) 𝐷𝑖𝑓_𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝐼𝐸_𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒,𝑂𝐶𝐹  is significantly different from zero using t 
(signed rank) tests. 
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it is crucial to separate earnings comparability from similarity in underlying economics. 
The regression analysis follows the specification suggested by Francis et al. (2014), 
modified slightly to accommodate my specific research questions. Specifically, I 
estimate the following model on a firm-pair-year basis: 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1 × 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡,     (3) 
where the dependent variable Comparability is the prime firm-pair-year comparability 
score CompAcctijt. The variable of interest is Accrual_Ratio which captures the relative 
proportion of core accruals (Core_Pair), intermediate accruals (Inter_Pair), and non-
core accruals (NCore_Pair), respectively. I predict a positive association between core 
accruals and earnings comparability. Therefore, the coefficient on core accruals 
proportion (Core_Pair) is expected to be positive. In contrast, I predict a negative 
association between non-core accruals and earnings comparability and thus expect a 
negative coefficient on non-core accruals proportion (NCore_Pair).  Due to the 
ambiguous nature of intermediate accruals, I do not have an ex ante prediction for the 
sign of the coefficient on intermediate accruals proportion (Inter_Pair). Instead, I take 
it as an empirical question. 
To control for underlying economic similarity, my analyses are conducted 
annually on firm-pairs within the same SCI 2-digit industry. This allows me to control 
for common economic fundamentals and shocks within the same industry. Moreover, I 
control for contemporaneous stock return co-movement (RET_CMV), which is 
measured analogously to ERN_CMV. Specifically, RET_CMV is created in an identical 
manner to ERN_CMV except that in Equation (2) I replace Earnings with monthly stock 
returns. Stock returns will reflect all economic shocks and serve as a further control for 
the effect of underlying economic fundamentals on earnings.  
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I also control for a series of variables concerning firms’ fundamental 
characteristics. First, I include control variables for size and market-to-book on the basis 
that these variables are widely used to capture many unobservable firm-specific 
characteristics. I also control for a wider range of other variables identified in the 
literature that could results in the earnings between two firms being similar due to either 
economic fundamental (e.g., volatility of operations) or the propensity to manage 
earnings (e.g., market-to-book ratio or leverage). The full set of control variables are: 
size, leverage, market-to-book, cash flows from operations, losses, standard deviation 
of sales, standard deviation of cash flows, and sales growth. 
Following prior research that has used pairs of firms, I control for both the levels 
and differences in firm-pair characteristics (Francis et al. 2014; De Franco et al. 2011). 
Specifically, I control for levels by entering the average value in each year t for the 
paired control variables for firm i and j. The differences are measured as the absolute 
values of yearly differences in the control values for firm i and j. The dependent variable 
in the model is constructed using the data across 16 consecutive quarters. I therefore 
estimate the average of each control variable across the corresponding 16 quarters. I use 
the averages of each firm (firm-pair) to construct the levels metrics, and differences in 
these averaged values are used to construct differences metrics. Due to the absence of 
theory, I make no predictions as to what the signs of the coefficients on the control 
variables. Overall, regression model (3) examines how different accrual categories 
affect earnings comparability. I also include firm-pair and year fixed effect. The models 
are estimated with the standard errors clustered on each firm and year.  
 
5.5 Sample and Data 
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I construct the sample by including only US non-financial firms. The sample 
period is from 2003 to 2015. As De Franco et al.’s (2011) approaches require the 
previous 16-quarter data (at least previous 14 quarters) when computing comparability 
scores for firm i at time t, quarterly data is taken for the period of January 2000 through 
December 2015. Table 5.1 illustrates the sample selection procedure. The sample 
includes all US publicly listed non-financial firms in the merged COMPUSTAT-CRSP-
IBES database from 2003 through 2015. As demonstrated in Panel A, the data selection 
starts with all firm-year observations in the universe of COMPUSTAT, CRSP and IBES. 
Following De Franco et al. (2011), I retain only those observations with a fiscal year-
end month in March, June, September or December. Observations with missing SIC 
codes are removed. Financial firms (SIC 60-69) are also excluded from the sample. I 
also exclude holding companies, ADRs and limited partnerships. These criteria result 
in an initial sample with 57,511 firm-year observations. 
[Insert Table 5.1 here] 
I continue to further select the data so that my main sample also satisfies the 
following selection criteria: (i) with valid stock prices, earnings and accrual data over 
preceding 16 quarters;12 (ii) with an SIC 2-digit industry-year grouping with at least 10 
firms. All the quarterly earnings metrics considered in this study and stock returns are 
trimmed at 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles to minimize the impact of extreme observations on 
the analysis. The final main sample contains 19,842 firm-year observations.13  The 
comparability scores for these 19,482 firm-year observations are constructed based on 
                                                          
12 The observations with no more than two missing values over lagged quarters in the key variables are 
retained.  
13  In the final main sample, I winsorize the firm-year comparability scores of all earnings metrics 
considered in this study at 1 and 99 percentiles. The main sample comprises 19,482 firm-year 
observations, while the sample size varies slightly for different sets of analyses. We have a variation in 
sample size because some analyses require more control variables and thus further reduce the 
corresponding sample size. 
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a richer sample corresponding to 314,531 firm-quarters, including the lagged 16 
quarters for each fiscal year end. 
Table 5.2 provides descriptive statistics for 314,531 firm-quarter observations 
which are the input for constructing comparability scores. 14  The table presents 
descriptive statistics for classified accrual groups and a series of earnings metrics, which 
are scaled by lagged market capitalization. The mean value of core accruals (0.017) is 
higher than non-core accruals (0.008). While both core and non-core accruals carry a 
significant value, the magnitude of intermediate accruals does not materialize. 
Accordingly, my predictions focus on core and non-core accruals but take the effect of 
intermediate accruals as an empirical question. The mean values for operating cash flow 
and net income are reported at the top and bottom of the table. The value of net income 
is less than that of operating cash flow, which is consistent with the fact that accruals 
are composed primarily of expenses. 
[Insert Table 5.2 here] 
The last two columns in Table 5.2 report correlations between each 
accrual/earnings measure and revenue and their persistence. The correlation between 
core accruals and revenue is -0.447, while the same number is only -0.306 for non-core 
accruals. This is consistent with the notion that core accruals are more closed to firms’ 
core operations and thus more correlated with revenue, whereas non-core accruals are 
distant from core operations and thus less correlated with revenue. Also, core accruals 
are found to be more persistent (0.125) than non-core accruals (0.086). Collectively, the 
evidence in Table 5.2 supports my classification method based on accruals’ proximity 
to core operations.  
 
                                                          
14 Data for non-recurring items are collected to construct alternative earnings metric. Considering their 
infrequency and unusualness, missing values for non-recurring items are regarded as 0 in my analysis.  
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5.6 Main Empirical Results 
The section presents result of analyses examining the association between 
earnings comparability and different accrual components. I first show the results of the 
univariate analyses which conceptually manifest how different accrual components 
could affect earnings comparability. Then I present the results of a more refined analysis 
where I compare the comparability scores of various constructed earnings metrics. This 
refined analysis is designed so that I can pinpoint the comparability effect of different 
accruals more clearly. Third, I report the results of the regression-based analyses. A 
wide range of control variables are included in the regressions in purpose of further 
controlling for the underlying economic similarities. As a result, the regression analyses 
provide a setting where I can better isolate accounting comparability from economic 
similarities. The overall results are consistent with my predictions, indicating that the 
presence of core accruals improve earnings comparability whereas the inclusion of non-
core accruals reduce earnings comparability. 
 
5.6.1 Results of Univariate Analyses 
Table 5.3 presents results for univariate analyses on the potential effect of 
different accruals on earnings comparability. In Panel A I report the results based on 
the prime firm-year comparability score (i.e., CompAcctIndit). The sample of 19,842 
observations is classified into quintiles according to the proportion of core, intermediate 
and non-core accruals, respectively (Core, Inter, NCore). The partitioning on accruals 
allows me to examine the association between different accruals categories and earnings 
comparability. For each quintile of accrual proportion, I report (1) comparability score 
of NI and (2) the difference in comparability score between NI and OCF. Specifically, 
columns 1 and 2 present results for the partitioning on the proportion of core accruals 
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in earnings (Core), where quintile 1 represents firm-years with the lowest ratio of core 
accruals, while quintile 5 includes those with the highest ratio of core accruals. The first 
column reports the comparability scores of NI for each quintile, and the comparability 
scores are found to be increasing from the lowest core accrual quintile (i.e., -3.042) to 
the highest core accrual quintile (i.e., -1.905). The second column reports the 
incremental comparability of net earnings beyond cash flow. I find that the 
comparability benefits associated with accruals increase with the ratio of core accruals. 
Findings suggest that adjusting for accruals (i.e., the difference between net income and 
operating cash flow) reduce earnings comparability score by 0.301 for those firm-years 
with the lowest proportion of core accruals, whereas the adjustment of accruals 
improves comparability score by 1.331 for firm-years with the highest proportion of 
core accruals. 
[Insert Table 5.3 here] 
The last two columns of Table 5.3 present results based on a sorting of non-core 
accruals (NCore), where quintile 1 includes firm-years with the lowest proportion of 
non-core accruals and quintile 5 represents those with the highest proportion of non-
core accruals. Column 5 demonstrates that the comparability of NI is decreasing with 
the proportion of non-core accruals, with the comparability score being the highest (i.e., 
-1.799) for the lowest non-core accrual quintile, and lowest (i.e., -3.527) for the highest 
non-core accrual quintile. In addition, column 6 reports the association between non-
core accruals and the incremental comparability of NI over OCF. That is, the 
comparability benefits associated with accruals decrease with the proportion of non-
core accruals. While the adjustment of accruals improves earnings comparability by 
1.229 when the proportion of non-core accruals is at the lowest level, the corresponding 
benefits become negative (i.e., -0.561) when the proportion of non-core accruals is at 
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the highest level. The F-test in the final row of Table 5.3 rejects the null hypothesis that 
the mean differences are all equal across different accrual quintiles. Collectively, the 
above findings indicate that earnings comparability is positively correlated with core 
accruals and negatively correlated with non-core accruals. By contrast, results for 
intermediate accruals do not manifest consistent patterns. While the comparability 
scores of net income seem to increase with the magnitude of intermediate accruals, the 
results for comparability benefits of net income relative to OCF fail to present a 
consistent pattern. As a result, the comparability effect of intermediate accruals remains 
ambiguous. For robustness check, I conduct the same analyses but using an alternative 
firm-year comparability score based on earnings co-movement (i.e., CMV_Indit). The 
results are presented in Panel B and remain consistent. 
As suggested in Table 5.2, accrual categories are correlated. For a firm-year, 
when the proportion of core accruals is higher, the corresponding proportion of non-
core accruals is by construction lower. Therefore, the results presented above need to 
be interpreted with carefulness. The patterns of comparability scores might be driven 
by the joint effect of core and non-core accruals, as opposed to the independent effect 
of them. For example, the quintiles of high core accruals present high comparability 
scores not only because the quintiles benefit from high proportion of core accruals, but 
also because the quintiles are by construction impacted by lower non-core accruals.  
[Insert Table 5.4 here] 
Table 5.4 reports the results for an additional univariate analysis where the 
sample is partitioned into 5 quintiles based on (1) the comparability scores of net income 
or (2) the comparability improvement of net income over cash flow. The comparability 
is measured by the prime firm-year comparability score, CompAcctIndit. For each 
quintile of comparability score, I report the proportion of different accruals (i.e., Core, 
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Inter, NCore). Rather than independently examining each accrual category as 
demonstrated in Table 5.3, the analysis in Table 5.4 allows for a more comprehensive 
view where I can observe how the presence of three different accrual categories is 
associated with earnings comparability.  In Panel A, the sample is partitioned based on 
comparability scores of net income into 5 quintiles, for each of which I report the accrual 
structure. I find that firms with low comparability scores have a higher proportion of 
non-core accruals and a lower proportion of core accruals in their earnings. For example, 
the overall accruals for the firm-years with the least comparable net income include 
46.08% core accruals and 31.64% non-core accruals. In contrast, cases in the highest 
comparability portfolio are associated with 56.96% core accruals and only 19.11% non-
core accruals. The F-test in the final row of panel A rejects the null hypothesis that the 
mean differences in accrual proportions are all equal across different comparability 
quintiles. Given the ambiguous nature of intermediate accruals, I find no clear pattern 
for their comparability effect.  
Panel B of Table 5.4 presents results after partitioning according to the 
comparability improvement of net income over cash flow (Diff_Comp). Diff_Comp is 
computed as the difference in comparability score CompAcctIndit between NI and OCF. 
And it represents the comparability benefits associated with total accruals. The sample 
is partitioned into 5 quintiles based on Diff_Comp, and I report accrual structures for 
each quintile. Specifically, the portfolio with the lowest comparability increase for net 
income over OCF is associated with 45.65% core accruals and 31.55% non-core 
accruals. In contrast, the portfolio with the highest comparability increase for net 
income over OCF are associated with 57.69% core accruals and 19.85% non-core 
accruals. The findings suggest that greater comparability benefits are associated with 
higher core accruals and lower non-core accruals. The F-test in the final row of Panel 
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B rejects the null hypothesis that the mean differences in accrual proportions are all 
equal across different comparability quintiles. I do not find a clear pattern for 
intermediate accruals due to their ambiguous nature. To check the robustness of the 
above results, I run the same analyses but with an alternative firm-year comparability 
score (i.e., CMV_Indit). I find similar results which are presented in Table 5.5. 
Specifically, the portfolio with the highest comparability is associated with 52.21% core 
accruals and 17.40% non-core accruals, while the portfolio with the lowest 
comparability is associated with 48.89% core accruals and 20.88% non-core accruals. 
The comparability increase for net income over OCF presents similar patterns. The 
portfolio with the highest (lowest) comparability benefits are associated with 51.48% 
(50.86%) core accruals and 18.03% (19.33%) non-core accruals. 
[Insert Table 5.5 here] 
 
5.6.2 Further Analysis 
Table 5.6, Panel A presents summary statistics of CompAcctIndit for the 
operating cash flow (OCF) and a series of intermediate earnings measures, where scores 
closer to zero suggest greater comparability. The intermediate earnings measures are 
constructed by gradually adjusting OCF for core, intermediate and non-core accruals. 
Specifically, IE_Core represents OCF adjusted for core accruals, and IE_Core_Inter 
represents IE_Core adjusted for intermediate accruals. I further adjust IE_Core_Inter 
for non-core accruals to reach net income (NI). The construction of intermediate 
earnings measures is detailed in panel C of Appendix 5.1. I compare the comparability 
scores between adjacent intermediate earnings measures, which allows me to draw 
inferences about the comparability effect of each accrual category. 
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The mean value of comparability score for OCF is -2.773, while the mean 
comparability score for NI (-2.419) is substantially greater. The comparability increase 
for net income over OCF suggests that accruals in aggregate enhance earnings 
comparability. I continue to examine the comparability effect of different accrual 
categories. First, adjusting OCF for core accruals leads to IE_Core. The mean 
comparability score for IE_Core (-2.327) is larger than that of OCF (-2.773), which 
suggests that adjusting for core accruals improve earnings comparability. Second, a 
further adjustment of intermediate accruals on IE_Core gives IE_Core_Inter. The 
comparability score for IE_Core_Inter (-2.047) is larger than that of IE_Core (-2.327). 
The finding indicates that intermediate accruals are associated with incremental 
comparability benefits, and adjusting for intermediate accruals improves comparability. 
Third, a final adjustment for non-core accruals on IE_Core_Inter reaches NI and NI (-
2.419) is found to be less comparable than IE_Core_Inter. However, NI remains to be 
more comparable than OCF due to the comparability benefits gained from core accruals. 
Since consistent inferences can be drawn from both mean and median comparability 
scores, the subsequent discussion focuses on the mean values. 
[Insert Table 5.6 here] 
I report the comparability differences across OCF and various earnings 
measures in Panel B of Table 5.6. I conduct pairwise tests of OCF and alternative 
earnings measures for the same firm. Specifically, paired-sample t (signed rank) tests 
are conducted for the equality of mean (median) comparability scores between all 
pairwise calculations of earnings metrics (e.g., 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝐼𝐸_𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒 
VS. 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡
𝑂𝐶𝐹 ). Compared with the analysis in section 5.6.1, this research 
design has the advantage of being able to pinpoint the individual effect of the three 
accrual categories on earnings comparability. It also has advantage compared with the 
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test in panel A of Table 5.6 in that this design provides a clearer image of the 
comparability of certain earnings measure relative to all the others. Positive differences 
suggest comparability improvement and negative differences indicate comparability 
reduction. 
The upper part of Panel B tests the differences in mean comparability scores. 
The difference in mean comparability score between IE_Core and OCF is 0.446, which 
suggests that adjusting for core accruals improves comparability. Using OCF as the 
benchmark, the adjustment for core accruals is associated with a 16.08% comparability 
improvement (i.e., |0.446/-2.773|). Further, the difference in mean comparability score 
between NI and IE_Core_Inter is -0.372, indicating that the inclusion of non-core 
accruals reduces comparability. This represents a 13.42% reduction in comparability 
relative to OCF (i.e., |-0.372/-2.773|). The above results are consistent with the notion 
that core accruals improve comparability while non-core accruals reduce comparability. 
Moreover, the difference in comparability score between IE_Core_Inter and IE_Core, 
(i.e., 0.280) suggests that the adjustment of intermediate accruals seems to improve 
comparability. It represents a 10.10% improvement in comparability over OCF (i.e., 
|0.28/-2.773|). The comparability differences across earnings measures are all 
statistically significant (p < 0.01).  
De Franco et al. (2011) argue that investors incline to focus on a group of most 
comparable peers rather than all peers in the sector when evaluating firm performance. 
Drawing on this logic, they propose an alternative comparability measure (i.e., 
CompAcctM4it) which is based on the target firm’s top 4 comparable peers in the sector, 
as opposed to all its peer firms. Using this alternative measure, I rerun the above 
analyses for comparability of various earnings metrics and report the results in Table 
5.7. The results remain consistent with those in Table 5.6. 
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[Insert Table 5.7 here] 
 
5.6.3 Regression Analyses 
The main results based on the regression model in Equation (3) are reported in 
Table 5.8. Following Francis et al. (2014), I regress comparability scores on the 
proportion of different accrual categories. The regressions are estimated using annual 
firm-fair observations. The dependent variable is the prime firm-pair-year 
comparability score AcctCompijt. The model is estimated with the proportion of core, 
intermediate and non-core accruals as independent variables. Variable Core_Pair is the 
proportion of core accruals, while NCore_Pair represents the proportion of non-core 
accruals. The proportion of intermediate accruals is proxied by Inter-Pair. I also control 
for a wide range of variables regarding firms’ economic similarity. I include firm-pair 
fixed effect and year fixed effect, with the standard errors being clustered at the firm-
pair level. 
I predict earnings comparability increases with the proportion of core accruals. 
Therefore, the coefficient on Core_Pair is expected to be positive. In contrast, I predict 
earnings comparability decreases with the proportion of non-core accruals and thus 
expect a negative coefficient on NCore_Pair. Given the ambiguous relation between 
intermediate accruals and firms’ core operations, I do not have a specific prediction for 
the sign of the coefficient on Inter_Pair. In the first three columns of Table 5.8, I report 
the regression results for Core_Pair, Inter_Pair, and NCore_Pair, respectively. 
Column 4 reports the model for both the proportion of core and non-core accruals. In 
column 1, the coefficient on the test variable Core_Pair is positive (i.e., 2.592) and 
statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level. This finding is consistent with earnings 
comparability being positively associated with the proportion of core accruals. 
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Specifically, an increase of one standard deviation in Core_Pair improves the 
comparability score by 0.253 which is equivalent for 8.15% of the mean firm-pair 
comparability score (i.e., -3.103).15 
Column 2 presents the model for intermediate accruals. The coefficient on test 
variable Inter_Pair is 1.320 which is also positive and statistically significant at p < 
0.01 level. It suggests that the presence intermediate accruals improve comparability. 
An increase of one standard deviation in Inter_Pair improves comparability by 0.108 
which translate into 3.47% of the mean comparability score. Column 3 reports the 
model for non-core accruals. The coefficient on test variable NCore_Pair is negative 
(i.e., -4.683) and statistically significant at p < 0.01 level. This finding supports my 
prediction that the inclusion of more non-core accruals reduces earnings comparability. 
An increase of one standard deviation in NCore_Pair reduces the comparability by 
0.412 which equals 13.29% of the mean firm-pair earnings comparability. The last 
column presents the model including both Core_Pair and NCore_Pair so that I can 
capture the joint effect of core and non-core accruals. The coefficient on Core_Pair 
(NCore_Pair) remains to be positive (negative) and statistically significant. However, 
the comparability effect is found to concentrate in non-core accruals, whereas the 
incremental effect of core accruals appears relatively marginal.16 
 [Insert Table 5.8 here] 
Signs of the coefficients on the control variables in Table 5.8 are largely 
consistent with prior studies. Specifically, firm-pair with more similar stock return 
covariation (RET_COV) have more comparable earnings, which is consistent with 
                                                          
15  The inference remains similar if depreciation and amortization are excluded from core accruals. 
However, the removal of depreciation nd amortization would result in a smaller coefficient on the test 
variable. 
16 Adding the test variables, Core_Pair and NCore_Pair, to Model (4) in Table 5.8 significantly increases 




earnings comparability being correlated underlying economics. The negative 
coefficients on Size_Diff, Cash_Diff, Lev_Diff, MB_Diff and LossProb_Diff are 
consistent with less earnings comparability when there is a greater difference in firms’ 
financial fundamentals. Finally, the negative coefficients on STD_Sales_Avg, 
STD_CFO_Avg and STD_Sales_Grth_Avg are consistent with a greater variation in 
sales (growth) and cash flows leading to less earnings comparability. 
Collectively, the results in Table 5.8 suggest that earnings comparability is 
positively associated with the proportion of core accruals, while it is negatively 
associated with the proportion of non-core accruals. My finding also supports 
intermediate accruals being positively associated with earnings comparability. Because 
this is the first study to examine the effect of accruals on comparability, I have no 
empirical evidence to inform my priors as to what the magnitudes should be. However, 
I believe the magnitudes for both core and non-core accruals are plausible and can be 
categorized as large enough to matter in an economic as well as statistical sense. 
[Insert Table 5.9 here] 
I also estimate the model in Equation (3) in a firm-year setting using the prime 
firm-year comparability score CompAcctIndit as the dependent variable. In the model I 
only include levels control variables at firm-year level. The sample includes 17,391 
firm-year observations which is slightly less than the sample size for early firm-year 
analyses in section 5.6.1 and section 5.6.2 (i.e., 19,842 firm-years). This is because 
regression-based analyses require more control variables which result in further 
restriction on data. The corresponding results are reported in Table 5.9 and they are 
consistent with the findings in Table 5.8. 
[Insert Table 5.10 here] 
To further check the robustness of my analyses, I rerun the same regression 
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using other two alternative comparability scores based on earnings co-movement (i.e., 
CMV_ERNijt and CMV_Indit). The new results based on alternative firm-pair-year score 
CMV_ERNijt are reported in Table 5.10, while the new results based on alternative firm-
year score CMV_Indit are presented in Table 5.11. The results in both tables remain 
similar with those from the aforementioned analyses where comparability measures 
based on earnings-return mapping (i.e., AcctCompijt and CompAcctIndit) are used. 
[Insert Table 5.11 here] 
 
5.7 Supplementary Test for Economic Implications 
Results in previous sections demonstrate how different accrual categories 
impact earnings comparability. Based on this finding, this section examines the 
moderating effect of different accrual categories on the association between earnings 
comparability and analyst forecasts. De Franco et al. (2011) find that greater earnings 
comparability improves the quality of analyst forecasts, which suggests benefits of 
accounting comparability to financial statement users.  Meanwhile, prior studies also 
document evidence that the benefit of accounting comparability become more 
pronounced when the difficulty of processing information (and thus overcome 
information asymmetry) is high (Fang et al. 2016; Chen et al. 2016). Therefore, I expect 
the benefit of comparability to be more pronounced to analysts under circumstances 
where firms’ earnings involve higher uncertainty and thus more difficult to forecast. In 
the context of forecasting earnings, analysts are found to have more difficulties and thus 
lower forecast quality when earnings involve more items unrelated to firms’ operating 
activities (Lee et al. 2013; Liang and Riedl 2013; Chen et al. 2015). Collectively, I 
predict that the benefit of accounting comparability is more (less) pronounced when the 
proportion of non-core (core) accruals is high. 
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Since analysts do not mechanically remove all transitory items (inclusive of non-
core accruals) when forecasting, they need to make contextual judgements on 
exclusions. Having higher proportion of non-core accruals would require substantially 
more efforts from analysts to make their judgements. In that case, greater accounting 
comparability is likely to bring more benefits in the sense that it can help analysts make 
more sensible forecasting judgement for a firm by referring to its peer firms. In order to 
examine the moderating effect of accrual components, I estimate the following model 
to see how different proportion of accrual components influence the association 
between accounting comparability and analysts’ forecast performance: 
𝐴𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡_𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡+1 = 𝛽1 × 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽3 × 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡+1,                             (4) 
where Analyst_Performance is either Accuracy or Dispersion. Accuracy is the absolute 
value of the forecast error deflated by lagged stock prices where forecast error equals 
the difference between analysts’ mean IBES forecast of firm i’s annual earnings for firm 
t and IBES actual earnings. For a given fiscal year (e.g., December of year t+1), I collect 
the earliest forecast available during the year (i.e., I use the earliest forecast from 
January to December of year t+1 for a December fiscal year end firm). As the absolute 
forecast error is multiplied by -100, higher values of Accuracy suggest more accurate 
forecasts. Dispersion is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the earliest individual 
analysts’ annual forecasts for a given firm, deflated by stock price and multiplied by 
100. Prior studies find that accuracy is increasing in comparability, and that dispersion 
is decreasing in comparability. 
Comparability represents the prime firm-year comparability score CompAcctInd. 
Accruals is an indicator variable which represents either Highcore or HighcoreLowncore, 
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measuring the fraction of core and no-core accruals in total accruals. Specifically, 
Highcore equals one if the proportion of core accruals is above the median, zero 
otherwise. HighcoreLowncore equals one if the firm has above median proportion of core 
accruals as well as below median proportion of non-core accruals, zero otherwise. Firms 
whose earnings comprise higher core accruals/lower non-core accruals are expected to 
be relatively easier to predict. The test variable is the interaction term between 
Comparability and Accruals. It captures the extent to which the effect of comparability 
is moderated by accrual components. 
Following De Franco et al. (2011), I control for a wide range of determinants of 
analysts forecast performance as previously documented in the literature. SUE is the 
absolute value of firm i’s unexpected earnings in year t scaled by the lagged stock price. 
Unexpected earnings are actual earnings minus the earnings from the prior year.  Firms 
whose earnings are more variable are more difficult to forecast, so forecast accuracy 
should be lower and forecast dispersion should be higher (Kross et al. 1990; Lang and 
Lundholm 1996). As evidenced by Heflin et al. (2003), earnings with more transitory 
components should also be more difficult to forecast. Accordingly, I include the 
following three control variables to control for the difficulty in forecasting earnings. 
Neg_UE equals 1 if firm i’s earnings are below the reported earnings a year ago, zero 
otherwise. Neg_SI equals the absolute value of the special items scaled by total assets 
if negative, zero otherwise. Days is the measure of the forecast horizon, computed as 
the logarithm of the number of days from the forecast date to firm i’s earnings 
announcement date. I control for forecast horizon because the literature documents that 
forecast horizon substantially affect forecast accuracy (Sinha et al. 1997; Clement 1999; 
Brown and Mohd 2003). I also control for Size as firm size is found to be associated 
with analysts’ forecast performances (Lang and Lundholm 1996). Last, I include 
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industry fixed effect. Also, I estimate the model as a panel and cluster the standard 
errors at the firm and year levels.  
[Insert Table 5.12 here] 
Model 1 and 2 in Table 5.12 present the regression results for analysts’ forecast 
accuracy. Model 1 is estimated for the full sample of 13,856 firm-years, while model 2 
is estimated for a more refined sample of 10,238 firm-years. As documented by prior 
studies, comparability is positively associated with forecast accuracy in both models. 
The variable of interest for model 1 is CompAcctInd×Highcore, and its coefficient is 
negative (-12.71) and statistically significant at p < 0.1 level. It suggests that the effect 
of comparability is substantially less pronounced for firms having higher core accruals. 
Specifically, the comparability benefits are 44.96% weaker (i.e., -12.71/28.27) for the 
analysts’ forecast accuracy for firm-years with above median core accruals. 
The variable of interest for model 2 is CompAcctInd×HighcoreLowncore. Model 2 
is estimated for a more refined sample including the firm-years having either (1) above 
median core accruals as well as below median non-core accruals, or (2) below median 
core accruals as well as above median non-core accruals. Accordingly, the test variable 
in model 2 reflects joint criteria of core and non-core accruals, as opposed to a single 
criterion of core accruals in model 1. Therefore, I expect a stronger moderating effect 
for model 2. Consistently, I find that the coefficient on CompAcctInd×HighcoreLowncore 
remains to be negative and statistically significant at p < 0.05 level. More importantly, 
I find the coefficient -16.98 indicates that the comparability effect is 63.60% weaker 
(i.e., -16.98/26.70) for firm-years having higher core accruals alongside with lower non-
core accruals. The finding is consistent with my expectation of a stronger moderating 
effect for the more refined sample in model 2. Collectively, the findings about forecast 
accuracy suggest that the benefits of comparability are more pronounced when firms’ 
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earnings include more non-core accruals/less core accruals and thus are more difficult 
to predict. In contrast, the benefits of comparability become substantially weaker when 
firms’ earnings comprise more core accruals/less non-core accruals and thus are 
relatively easy to predict. 
The results for forecast dispersion are presented in model 3 and 4 of Table 5.12. 
As documented by prior studies, comparability is negatively associated with forecast 
dispersion in both models. That is, greater comparability helps analyst to reduce forecast 
dispersion and thus improve analysts’ forecast performance. Model 3 is estimated for 
the full sample of 13,856 firm-years, and the test variable for model 3 is 
CompAcctInd×Highcore. The coefficient on test variable is positive (7.13) and 
statistically significant at p < 0.05 level. The sign on test variable is opposite to that on 
CompAcctInd, which suggests that the effect of comparability is substantially less 
pronounced for firms having higher core accruals. Specifically, the comparability 
benefits are 62.87% weaker (i.e., 7.13/-11.34) for the analysts’ forecast dispersion for 
firm-years with above median core accruals. 
The variable of interest for model 4 is CompAcctInd×HighcoreLowncore. Model 4 
is estimated for a more refined sample of 10,238 firm-years having either (1) above 
median core accruals as well as below median non-core accruals, or (2) below median 
core accruals as well as above median non-core accruals. Accordingly, the test variable 
in model 4 reflects joint criteria of core and non-core accruals, as opposed to a single 
criterion of core accruals in model 3. Therefore, I expect a stronger moderating effect 
for model 4. Consistently, I find that the coefficient on CompAcctInd×HighcoreLowncore 
remains to be positive and statistically significant at p < 0.05 level. More interestingly, 
I find the coefficient 10.70 indicates that the comparability effect is 87.35% weaker (i.e., 
10.70/-12.25) for firm-years having higher core accruals alongside with lower non-core 
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accruals. The finding is consistent with my expectation of a stronger moderating effect 
for the more refined sample in model 4. Collectively, the findings about forecast 
dispersion suggest that the benefits of comparability are more pronounced when firms’ 
earnings include more non-core accruals/less core accruals and thus are more difficult 
to predict. In contrast, the benefits of comparability become substantially weaker when 
firms’ earnings comprise more core accruals/less non-core accruals and thus are 
relatively easy to predict.  
Following the original model in De Franco et al. (2011), I also estimate the 
above models using an alternative firm-year level comparability score, CompAcctM4 
which is based on the target firm’s top 4 comparable peers in the same sector. Table 
5.13 reports the alternative results which are in agreement with those in Table 5.12. 
[Insert Table 5.13 here] 
The results extend our understanding of the moderating effect of accruals on 
comparability benefits to analysts. The finding is consistent with my prediction that 
accounting comparability is more beneficial to analysts under circumstances that the 
difficulty of forecasting firms’ earnings is high. Prior studies document evidence that 
accounting comparability improves the quality of analyst forecasts. Specifically, 
comparability is found to be positively related to forecast accuracy and negatively 
associated with forecast dispersion. My results present evidence in support of a cross-
sectional variation in comparability benefits to analysts. That is, the comparability 
benefits are more pronounced when firms’ earnings have less core accruals/more non-
core accruals, whereas the comparability benefits become substantially weaker when 
earnings comprise more core accrual/less non-core accruals. Though analysts generally 
benefit from the high quality information sets associated with greater comparability, the 
corresponding benefits concentrate in firms whose earnings are more complex and thus 
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more difficult to forecast. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
This paper establishes the association between earnings comparability and 
accrual components. It extends the literature on earnings comparability by linking 
comparability to accruals with different proximity to firms’ core operations. The main 
findings have important implications for prior studies on the benefits of greater 
comparability.  
I find that earnings comparability, which is an important enhancing 
characteristic of financial numbers, is affected by firms’ accrual components. 
Specifically, earnings comparability is positively associated with the relative magnitude 
of core accruals which represent the set of accruals that are closed to firms’ operating 
activities. In contrast, earnings comparability is found to be negatively related to the 
magnitude of non-core accruals which comprise the set of accruals that are distant from 
firms’ operating activities. I also find empirical evidence on intermediate accruals being 
positively related to comparability, though I do not have a specific prediction for 
intermediate accruals due to their ambiguous nature.  Thanks to the positive 
comparability benefits from total accruals, net income is found to be more comparable 
than cash flow. However, the inclusion of non-core accruals makes net income less 
comparable than those earnings metrics where cash flow is adjusted purely for 
comparability improving accruals (e.g., core accruals).  
In the supplementary analyses, I test the implication of my main finding for prior 
studies on benefits of greater comparability. While prior studies document evidence on 
greater earnings comparability being practically beneficial to analysts’ forecast 
performance, I find that the corresponding comparability benefits are asymmetric across 
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different firms. The comparability benefits are found to be more pronounced for firms 
having higher non-core accruals and/or lower core accruals, whereas the corresponding 
benefits become substantially weaker for firms with lower non-GAAP earnings and/or 
higher core accruals. These findings suggest cross-sectional difference in comparability 
benefits. They are consistent with the notion that greater comparability is perceived 
more beneficial when analysts are confronted with firms whose earnings include more 
complex accruals and thus more difficult to forecast. On the other hand, the incremental 
benefits of comparability on analysts’ forecasts become fairly limited when firms’ 
earnings contain less complex accruals and thus easier to forecast.  
Focusing the potential link between earnings comparability and accruals 
components, this study makes two contributions to the literature. First, I establish the 
empirical association between the comparability of earnings to the relevance of accruals. 
As such, I am able to shed further light on the underlying accounting process that 
determines comparability. As indicated by the conceptual framework, relevance not 
only secure information usefulness as a primary qualitative characteristic, but also 
deliver benefits by enhancing secondary characteristics, particularly comparability. My 
research highlights the crucial association between relevance and comparability and 
suggests that allowing less (more) relevant information into accounting numbers can 
reduce (improve) earnings comparability. Second, the established association between 
comparability and accrual components have important implications for prior studies on 
benefits of earnings comparability. While prior studies find greater earnings 
comparability having overall beneficial effects on analysts’ forecast performance, I find 
that the benefits of comparability largely concentrate in firms whose earnings are ex 
ante more difficult to forecast. The corresponding comparability effects become 
significantly weaker when it comes to firms whose earnings are ex ante easier to 
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forecast. My main finding contributes to this literature by shedding more light on how 
the benefit of comparability works. My findings suggest a cross-sectional difference in 
the comparability benefits, and therefore add to the literature on financial reporting, in 
particular earnings comparability. 
There are, however, at least two caveats in this study. First, the results are subject 
to endogeneity concerns as it is difficult to rule out the possibility that the results are 
driven by some omitted variables. Regarding the main results, firm innovation can cause 
both a reduced earnings comparability and higher level of irrelevant line items in 
financial statement. The supplementary results are also subject to firm innovation, as it 
causes both a reduced earnings comparability and a poorer information environment 
which may translate into weaker analyst forecast performance. Second, as opposed to 
firms’ financial reporting feature affecting analysts’ actions, as I imply in the 
supplementary analyses, a reverse causality is also possible in that analysts may exert 
influences on firms’ operation and/or their financial reporting behaviour. For example, 
equity analysts are found to be able to interfere with both accrual-based (Yu 2008) and 
real earnings management (Irani and Oesch 2016). Moreover, prior studies document 
evidence of firms’ operational decision-making being influenced by analysts (He and 




Appendix 5.1: Accruals and the Construction of Earnings Measures  
Panel A. Classification of accruals 




amortization      
 
DPCQ Close Depreciation and depletion are believed to be an expense arising from the 
periodic consumption of assets and thus closely relates to core operations. 
Changes in accounts 
receivable                          
RECCHQ Close Accounts receivable originates from recognizing revenues.  It is employed to 
recognize earned and realizable revenue without cash receipt. So it is closely 
related to core operations. 
 
Changes in 
inventories                    
INVCHQ Close Change in inventory arises from matched expenses associated with cost of 
goods sold, and therefore directly relates to core operations. 
 
Changes in accounts payable & 
accrued liabilities  
APALCHQ Close Accounts payables and accrued liabilities originate from recognizing expenses. 
They are employed to recognize incurred expenses that have not been paid in 




STKCOQ Close Share-based compensation is used to compensate employees for their services. 
It effectively represents an expense, either capital or operating, and thus is 
viewed as close to core operations. 
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Profit (loss) of associates under 
the equity method 
ESUBCQ   Intermediate For: It represents the firm's share of income from another firm (investee) where 
it has significant influence. Against: As the firm has no controlling stakes in the 
investee, it unlikely constitutes a core strategy. 
 
Deferred tax expense    TXDCQ Intermediate For: Although they cannot be directly matched to revenue generating, they 
effectively represent a recurring periodic financial obligation. Against: 
Deferred taxes are determined mostly by the difference between financial 
reporting and tax-reporting requirements which is beyond firm’s core 
operations. 
 
Changes in tax assets/liabilities. TXACHQ Intermediate For: Similar to accounts payable, accrued income taxes reflect the carrying 
value of the unpaid sum of amounts payable to satisfy tax obligations. Against: 
They cannot be directly matched to revenue generating. They are determined 
mostly by tax policies and a firm’s tax strategies which are beyond firm’s core 
operations. 
 
Changes in other assets and 
liabilities, net  
AOLOCH Intermediate Given that the items in this category is mixed (as explained in the following), 
the changes in other assets and liabilities are expected to have a mixed nature 
which fits in my definition of intermediate accruals. 
(1) Write-downs WDA 
 
A write-down occurs when the book value of an asset is overvalued compared 
to its market value. It is driven by mark-to-market accounting and thus does not 
constitute a core strategy of firms. 




In principle deferred revenue largely stems from firms’ operation and thus is 
considered to be directly related to firms’ operating activities.  
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Gain (loss) from sale of long-
term assets 
SPPIV Distant As firms are not expected to build their business upon disposing assets, sale of 
long-term assets unlikely constitutes firms' key strategy. Therefore, the 
resulting gain or loss is far from core operations. 
 
Other funds from operations                 FOPOQ Distant Other funds from operations are primarily composed of items that are not 
directly related to firms’ operating activities. Accordingly, they are classified as 
being distant from firms’ operating activities. 
(1) Restructuring cost RCAQ 
 
Restructuring costs are viewed as a short-term expense and firms are not 
expected to do restructuring frequently. The non-recurring nature of 
restructuring costs makes it far from core operations. 





Impairment of goodwill is incurred by factors that often do not pertain to 
financial performance in the period when impairment is charged (e.g., changing 
market conditions). It is thus far from core operations. 
Extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations 
XIDOC Distant Items in this category derive from activities that are either infrequent in 
occurrence or unusual in nature. As a result, they are perceived to be distant 





Panel B. Summary statistics of individual accruals (314,531 firm-quarters) 
 % non- 
missing 
  Among non-missing  
 Mean STD Q1 Median Q3 
DPC 98.50 0.018 0.033 0.005 0.010 0.020 
RECCH 87.97 -0.001 0.054 -0.010 -0.001 0.007 
INVCH 68.53 -0.0002 0.040 -0.006 -0.001 0.004 
APALCH 68.99 0.0003 0.046 -0.007 0.001 0.009 
TXDC 67.45 0.0004 0.021 -0.002 0.000 0.004 
TXACH 27.24 0.0002 0.019 -0.003 0.0002 0.003 
ESUBC   17.47 -0.0001 0.014 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 
AOLOCH 99.09 -0.0002 0.043 -0.007 -0.000 0.006 
SPPIV 41.16 -0.002 0.020 -0.000 -0.000 0.0001 
XIDOC 12.75 -0.0002 0.043 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 





Panel C. Construction of earnings measures 
Items Acronym 
Operating cash flows OCF 
Adjusted for core accruals, including  
Depreciation and amortization                         DPCQ 
Changes in accounts receivable       RECCHQ 
Changes in inventories  INVCH 
Changes in accounts payable & accrued liab.  APALCH 
Stock-based compensation expense STKCO 
Intermediate earnings 1  IE_Core 
Adjusted for intermediate accruals, including  
Profit (loss) of associates under the equity method ESUBC   
Deferred tax expense    TXDC 
Changes in tax assets/liab. TXACH 
Changes in other assets and liabilities, net AOLOCH 
(1) Write-downs  
(2) Deferred revenue  
Intermediate earnings 2  IE_Core_Inter 
Adjusted for non-core accruals, including  
Gain (loss) from sale of long-term assets SPPIV 
Extraordinary items and discontinued operations XIDOC 
Other funds from operations FOPOQ 
(1) Restructuring cost  
(2) Impairment of long-term assets (including goodwill)  
Net income before extraordinary items  NI 
Assets and Liabilities – Other is defined by COMPUSTAT to include (1) assets and 
liabilities reported as an entity, (2) changes in current deferred taxes, (3) other asset and 
liability accounts, (4) other balance sheet items reported in the operating activities 
which are combined. Examples in annual reports are unrealized gain and loss of 
investment, write-down of assets, customer deposit & deferred revenue, employee 
benefits & other liabilities. Funds from Operations – Other is defined to include (1) 
Amortization of negative intangibles, (2) minority interest, (3) special items, (4) 
amortization of goodwill on unconsolidated subsidiaries, (5) provision for losses on 
accounts receivable, (6) unrealized gain (loss) on sale of PPE. Examples include 
impairment of goodwill, impairment of strategic investment, provision for bad debts, 






Appendix 5.2: Variable Definitions 




OCF Quarterly operating cash flow (OCFQ) 
scaled by beginning-of-period market 
capitalization. 
Intermediated 
earnings metric 1 
IE_Core Quarterly operating cash flow adjusted 
for core accruals, scaled by beginning-
of-period market capitalization. 
Intermediate 
earnings metric 2  
IE_Core_Inter IE_Core adjusted for intermediate 
accruals, scaled by beginning-of-period 
market capitalization. 
Net Income NI IE_Core_Inter further adjusted for non-
core accruals, scaled by beginning-of-





CompAcctIndit It measures the comparability of k
th 
earnings metric for firm i in year t. It is 
calculated as the industry mean of all 
firm-pair measures for firm i and each 




CMV_Indit It measures the comparability of k
th 
earnings metric for firm i in year t It is 
calculated as the industry mean of all 
firm-pair earnings co-movement 
measures for firm i and each of its SIC 




CompAcctijt It measures the comparability of k
th 
earnings metric between firm i and j in 
year t. It is calculated based on the 
difference in accounting function 
between firm i and each of its SIC 2-




ERN_CMVijt It measures the comparability of k
th 
earnings metric between firm i and j in 
year t. It is calculated based on the 
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earnings co-movement between firm i 




Core/Inter/NCore The absolute value of different accrual 
groups (i.e., core, intermediate and non-
core accruals) deflated by the absolute 






The sum of absolute values of different 
accrual groups (i.e., core, intermediate 
and non-core accruals) for firm i and j, 
deflated by the sum of absolute values 
of total accruals for the firm-pair. 
Control Variables (Main Results) 
Size difference Size_Diff Absolute value of difference in size in 
firm-pair of firm i and firm j. Size 
equals natural logarithm of total assets. 
Average size Size_Avg Mean value of size in firm-pair of firm i 
and firm j. 
Leverage 
difference 
LEV_Diff Absolute value of the difference in 
leverage in firm-pair of firm i and firm j, 
where leverage is a debt-to-asset ratio of 
a company.  
Average leverage LEV_Avg Mean value of leverage in firm-pair of 
firm i and firm j. 
Market-to-book 
difference 
MB_Diff Absolute value of the difference in 
market-to-book ratio in firm-pair of firm 
i and firm j, where market-to-book 
ratios is calculated as market value of 
equity divided by book value of equity. 
Average market-
to-book ratio 
MB_Avg Mean value of market-to-book ratio in 
firm-pair of firm i and firm j. 
Difference in 
cash flows 
Cash_Diff Absolute value of the difference in cash 
flows from operations (scaled by lagged 






Cash_Avg Mean value of cash flows from 
operations in firm pair of firm i and firm 
j. 
Difference in loss 
probability 
LossProb_Diff Absolute value of the difference in loss 
probability in firm pair of firm i and 
firm j. Loss probability is the proportion 
of quarters for which the firm reports a 
negative quarterly income before 




LossProb_Avg Mean value of  loss probability in firm 
pair of firm i and firm j. 
Difference in 
sales volatility 
STD_Sales_Diff Absolute value of the difference in 
standard deviation of quarterly sales in 
firm pair of firm i and firm j. Standard 
deviation of sales is calculated over the 
preceding 16 quarters. 
Average sales 
volatility 
STD_Sales_Avg Mean value of standard deviation of 





STD_CFO_Diff Absolute value of the difference in 
standard deviation of quarterly operating 
cash flows in firm pair of firm i and firm 
j, where standard deviation of cash 




STD_CFO_Avg Mean value standard deviation of 
quarterly sales in firm pair of firm i and 





Absolute value of the difference in 
standard deviation of sales growth in 
firm pair of firm i and firm j, where 
standard deviation of sales growth is 
calculated over the preceding 16 
quarters. Sales growth equals sales in 
current year t minus sales in year t-1 







Mean value of standard deviation of 




RET_CMV Within-industry return co-movement 
across 16 consecutive quarters in firm-
pair of firm I and firm j, calculated as 
defined in Section IV. 
Variables in Supplementary Analyses 
Forecast accuracy Accuracy Absolute value of the forecast error 
multiplied by -100, scaled by the stock 
price at the end of the prior fiscal year, 
where the forecast error is the IBES 
analysts’ mean annual earnings forecast 




Dispersion Cross-sectional standard deviation of 
individual analysts’ annual forecasts, 
scaled by the stock price at the end of 
the prior fiscal year. 
Analyst coverage Coverage Logarithm of the number of analysts 
issuing a forecast for the firm. 
Indicator of high 
core accruals 
Highcore Indicator variable which equals one if 
the firm has above median core 
accruals, and zero otherwise. 
Indicator of high 
core accruals/low 
non-core accruals 
HighcoreLowncore Indicator variable which equals one if 
the firm has above median core accruals 
alongside with below median non-core 
accruals, and zero otherwise. 
Forecast horizon Days Logarithm of the number of days from 
the forecast date to the earnings 
announcement date. 
Loss indicator Loss Indicator variable that equals one if the 
current earnings are less than zero, zero 
otherwise. 
Special items  Neg_SI Absolute value of the special item 






Neg_UE Indicator variable that equals one if firm 
i’s earnings are below the reported 
earnings a year ago, zero otherwise. 
Earnings 
predictability 
Predictability R-squared value of a regression of 
annual earnings on prior-year annual 
earnings for the same firm. 
Firm size Size Logarithm of the market value of equity 
measured at the end of the year. 
SUE SUE Absolute value of unexpected earnings, 
scaled by the stock price at the end of 
the prior year, where unexpected 
earnings is actual earnings less the 
earnings reported in the prior year. 
Earnings 
volatility 




Vol_RET Standard deviation of 48 months of 
stock returns. 
This appendix demonstrates how variables are defined and measured. All financial 

















Sample Selection Process and Change of Sample Size 
Sample selection process Firm-years 
1. Construct the initial sample  
Matched COMPUSTAT-CRSP, with fiscal year ends in March, 
June, Sept. or Dec. between 2003-2015 
92,691 
Less:  
Financial firms (29,254) 
Holding firms, ADRs and limited partnerships (5,926) 
Initial sample 57,511 
2. Sample for calculating the Comparability Score  
Less:  
Don't have required data for earnings/accruals (8,832) 
Don't have required data for returns/prices (3,269) 
Don't have data for all lagged 16 quarters (19,649) 
Industry groups with fewer than 10 peer firms (1,977) 
Trim all earnings metrics by year at 0.5 and 99.5 percentiles (3942) 
Sample for calculation the Comparability Score 19,842 
(corresponding to 314,531 firm-quarters, including lagged 16 
quarters) 
 
This table presents the sample selection process to construct the final sample. The 
screening criteria follow De Franco et al. (2011) and Francis et al. (2014). 
Comparability scores of all earnings measures are required to be non-missing and are 





Descriptive Statistics of the Comparability Score Sample: Properties of Components of Earnings and Measures of Earnings (314,531 
Quarterly Observations) 
 
Mean STD Min Q1 Med. Q3 Max 
Corr. With 
revenue Persistence 
OCF 0.027 0.074 -0.708 0.003 0.020 0.041 2.370 0.720 1.037 
Accruals          
Core 0.017 0.065 -0.880 -0.002 0.008 0.026 1.897 -0.447 0.125 
Intermediate 0.000 0.046 -1.143 -0.007 0.000 0.008 1.709 -0.047 0.300 
Non-core 0.008 0.052 -1.446 0.000 0.002 0.006 2.091 -0.306 0.086 
Earnings measures          
IE_Core 0.010 0.063 -1.074 -0.004 0.012 0.025 2.446 0.616 1.246 
IE_Core_Inter 0.010 0.051 -1.117 0.002 0.013 0.022 2.088 0.754 1.254 
NI 0.002 0.065 -1.837 -0.001 0.011 0.018 1.474 0.707 1.017 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the intermediate sample with firm-quarter observations. The intermediate sample is used for constructing 
comparability scores for multiple earnings metrics. Since the data for accruals and earnings metrics are collected and constructed on quarterly basis, 
the corresponding descriptive statistics are reported based on the intermediate sample with quarterly observations. It presents statistics for cash 
flow, constructed intermediate earnings metrics and net income, along with the statistics for accruals in different categories. Core accruals include 
those accruals with closely related to firms’ operating activities, while Non-core accruals comprise those accruals without a direct link with firms’ 
operating activities. Intermediate accruals contain the remaining accruals whose relation with operating activities is ambiguous. IE_Core is an 
intermediate earnings metric constructed by adjusting OCF for Core accruals. IE_Core_Inter is another intermediate earnings metric which further 
adjusts IE_Core for Intermediate accruals. NI represent the earnings metric which eventually adjust IE_Core_Inter for Non-core accruals. All items 
are scaled by lagged market capitalization. The statistics for earnings metrics are reported with missing accrual items as zero. The second last 
column presents the spearman correlations between earnings metrics/accruals and revenue. All these correlations are statistically significant at 5% 
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level. The last column presents the persistence of each variable. Their persistence is measured as the persistence coefficient on each items in the 





Comparability Effect of Accruals and the Magnitude of Different Accruals 
Panel A. Results based on De Franco et al. (2011) measure (19,842 firm-years) 













Low -3.042 -0.301***  -2.924 0.470***  -1.799 1.229*** 
2 -2.705 -0.070**  -2.408 0.356***  -1.860 0.708*** 
3 -2.350 0.239***  -2.335 0.343***  -2.219 0.406*** 
4 -2.091 0.573**  -2.240 0.295***  -2.688 0.010 
High -1.905 1.331***  -2.186 0.309***  -3.527 -0.561*** 
F Tests of equality of means (mean differences vs. OCF) across quintiles 
F 
statistics 
99.48*** 215.15***  40.61*** 2.41*  246.68*** 248.43*** 
 
Panel B. Results based on earnings co-movement measure (18,596 firm-years) 













Low 0.069 0.014***  0.081 0.016***  0.086 0.022 *** 
2 0.072 0.014***  0.076 0.015***  0.080 0.015*** 
3 0.078 0.015***  0.074 0.015***  0.076 0.014*** 
4 0.079 0.015***  0.076 0.016***  0.071 0.015*** 
High 0.086 0.020***  0.077 0.016***  0.069 0.012*** 
F Tests of equality of means (mean differences vs. OCF) across quintiles 
F 
statistics 
49.44*** 5.99***  5.71*** 0.52  55.47*** 12.70*** 
In this table, I sort the sample into quintiles based on the proportion of (1) non-core 
accruals, (2) core accruals, and (3) intermediate accruals in total accruals, respectively. 
For example, the proportion of core accruals is calculated as the absolute value of core 
accruals divided by the sum of absolute values of core, intermediated and non-core 
accruals. For each firm-year, the proportion of different accruals is measured for the last 
four years in order to make the measurement window consistent with that of 
comparability scores (i.e., 16 quarters). That is, since the comparability scores of NI and 
OCF are computed based on the prior 16 quarters, the construction of corresponding 
sorting variables (e.g., proportion of different accruals) also need to be based on the 
same time window. Then the corresponding proportions are ranked into 5 quintiles. For 
each quintile, I report mean comparability scores of GAAP net income (NI), as well as 
the mean differences between NI and OCF by quintiles. The first two columns show the 
 143 
 
results based on the magnitude of non-core accruals, where quintile 1 represents the 
firms with smallest non-core accruals and quintile 5 represents the firms with largest 
ones. The next two columns report the results based on the magnitude of core accruals. 
Quintile 1 represents the firms with the smallest overall core accruals, while quintile 5 
represents the group of firms with the largest core accruals. The last two columns 
present the results based on intermediate accruals. Quintile 1 represents the firms with 
the smallest intermediate accruals, while quintile 5 represents the firms having the 
largest intermediate accruals. Panel A demonstrates the results based on De Franco et 
al (2011) firm-year comparability scores (CompAcctInd), while Panel B presents the 
results based on firm-year earnings co-movement comparability scores (CMV_Ind). F-
tests are made to compare the differences in comparability levels and comparability 
differences across the five quintiles. The F statistics are reported at the bottom of each 
column. *, **, *** indicate being significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
























Comparability Effect of Accruals and the Magnitude of Different Accruals 
(19,842 firm-years based on De Franco et al. measure) 
Panel A. Comparability scores and proportion of different accruals  
Comparability  
Quintiles 
Core Accruals  Intermediate Accruals  Non-Core Accruals 
Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Low 46.08% 45.55%  22.28% 19.88%  31.64% 30.19% 
2 50.44% 50.86%  23.67% 21.09%  25.89% 23.99% 
3 49.81% 50.15%  24.27% 22.18%  25.92% 23.29% 
4 51.79% 52.78%  24.65% 22.66%  23.55% 20.95% 
High 56.96% 58.64%  23.93% 21.35%  19.11% 16.19% 
F Tests for equality of mean accrual ratios across quintiles 
F statistics 194.64***  18.83***  338.97*** 
 




Core Accruals  Intermediate Accruals  Non-Core Accruals 
Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Low 45.65% 45.14%  22.80% 20.67%  31.55% 30.14% 
2 48.22% 48.20%  25.00% 22.96%  26.78% 24.73% 
3 49.22% 49.71%  24.97% 22.93%  25.82% 22.90% 
4 54.31% 55.92%  23.57% 20.85%  22.12% 19.33% 
High 57.69% 59.52%  22.45% 19.79%  19.85% 16.65% 
F Tests for equality of mean accrual ratios across quintiles 
F statistics 305.39***  32.33***  334.42*** 
In Panel A, I sort the sample into quintiles based on their comparability scores. The 
comparability scores are measured as De Franco et al (2011) firm-year comparability 
scores (CompAcctInd). Quintile 1 represents the firm-year observations with smallest 
comparability scores, while quintile 5 represents the firm-year observations with 
greatest comparability scores. For each quintile of comparability scores, I report the 
mean/median proportions of (1) Core, (2) Intermediary, and (3) Non-core accruals. For 
each firm-year, the magnitude of accruals is measured for the last four years in order to 
make the measurement window consistent with that of comparability scores (i.e., 16 
quarters). In Panel B, I sort the sample into quintiles based on the comparability 
improvement of net income over operating cash flow. The corresponding comparability 
improvement is calculated as the comparability differences between net income (NI) 
and operating cash flow (OCF). Quintile 1 represents the firm-year observations with 
smallest comparability improvement, while quintile 5 represents the firm-year 
observations with greatest comparability improvement. For each quintile of 
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comparability improvement, I report the mean/median proportions of (1) Core, (2) 
Intermediary, and (3) Non-core accruals. For each firm-year, the magnitude of accruals 
is measured for the last four years in order to make the measurement window consistent 
with that of comparability scores (i.e., 16 quarters). F-tests are made to compare the 
differences in comparability scores and comparability improvement across the five 
quintiles in both Panel A and Panel B. The F statistics are reported at the bottom of each 
column. *, **, *** indicate being significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 



























Comparability Effect of Accruals and the Magnitude of Different Accruals 
(18,596 firm-years based on earnings co-movement measure) 
Panel A. Comparability scores and proportion of different accruals  
Comparability  
Quintiles 
Core Accruals  Intermediate Accruals  Non-Core Accruals 
Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Low 48.89% 49.01%  30.23% 29.43%  20.88% 18.97% 
2 49.09% 49.22%  30.72% 30.17%  20.19% 18.24% 
3 50.12% 50.33%  30.49% 29.85%  19.39% 17.35% 
4 50.08% 50.07%  30.50% 29.72%  19.42% 17.37% 
High 52.21% 52.44%  30.39% 29.25%  17.40% 15.30% 
F Tests for equality of mean accrual ratios across quintiles 
F statistics 34.42***  0.89  43.86*** 
 




Core Accruals  Intermediate Accruals  Non-Core Accruals 
Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Low 50.86% 50.86%  29.81% 28.72%  19.33% 17.25% 
2 49.15% 49.25%  30.36% 29.86%  20.49% 18.57% 
3 49.05% 49.33%  30.90% 30.11%  20.05% 18.05% 
4 49.84% 49.94%  30.78% 30.02%  19.38% 17.33% 
High 51.48% 51.58%  30.48% 29.56%  18.03% 15.90% 
F Tests for equality of mean accrual ratios across quintiles 
F statistics 22.53***  5.12***  22.25*** 
In Panel A, I sort the sample into quintiles based on their comparability scores. The 
comparability scores are measured as De Franco et al (2011) firm-year comparability 
scores (ERN_CMV). Quintile 1 represents the firm-year observations with smallest 
comparability scores, while quintile 5 represents the firm-year observations with 
greatest comparability scores. For each quintile of comparability scores, I report the 
mean/median proportions of (1) Core, (2) Intermediary, and (3) Non-core accruals. For 
each firm-year, the magnitude of accruals is measured for the last four years in order to 
make the measurement window consistent with that of comparability scores (i.e., 16 
quarters). In Panel B, I sort the sample into quintiles based on the comparability 
improvement of net income over operating cash flow. The corresponding comparability 
improvement is calculated as the comparability differences between net income (NI) 
and operating cash flow (OCF). Quintile 1 represents the firm-year observations with 
smallest comparability improvement, while quintile 5 represents the firm-year 
observations with greatest comparability improvement. For each quintile of 
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comparability improvement, I report the mean/median proportions of (1) Core, (2) 
Intermediary, and (3) Non-core accruals. For each firm-year, the magnitude of accruals 
is measured for the last four years in order to make the measurement window consistent 
with that of comparability scores (i.e., 16 quarters). F-tests are made to compare the 
differences in comparability scores and comparability improvement across the five 
quintiles in both Panel A and Panel B. The F statistics are reported at the bottom of each 
column. *, **, *** indicate being significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 




























Prime Comparability Scores of Different Earnings Measures (19,842 firm-years 
based on CompAcctIndit) 
Panel A. Comparability Scores of earnings measures 
Earnings measures Mean STD P1 Q1 Median Q3 P99 
OCF -2.773 3.736 -15.500 -2.958 -1.875 -1.310 -0.696 
IE_Core -2.327 2.848 -12.969 -2.461 -1.499 -1.052 -0.539 
IE_Core_Inter -2.047 2.802 -12.364 -2.093 -1.241 -0.851 -0.404 
NI -2.419 2.932 -14.583 -2.597 -1.450 -0.942 -0.377 
 
Panel B. Difference in comparability scores between earnings measures 
 
Pairwise difference (column - row) 
(Upper: mean; lower: median) 
Earnings measures OCF IE_Core IE_Core_Inter NI 
OCF  0.446*** 0.726*** 0.354*** 
IE_Core 0.268***  0.280*** -0.092*** 
IE_Core_Inter 0.466*** 0.181***  -0.372*** 
NI 0.310*** 0.039*** -0.140***  
This table presents the comparability scores of earnings measures. I use the firm-year 
level comparability score CompAcctIndit which is based on the earnings-return mapping. 
Please refer to section 3.3 for a more detailed discussion of CompAcctIndit. Panel A 
presents comparability scores of cash flow, intermediate earnings and net income. The 
first (fifth) column shows mean (median) comparability scores. Comparability scores 
are constructed so that scores closer to zero suggest greater comparability. Panel B 
presents the differences in the comparability scores across earnings metrics. Positive 
comparability differences suggest the earnings metrics are more comparable, while 
negative differences indicate the earnings metrics are less comparable. *, **, *** 
indicate being significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, from two-sided 









Alternative Comparability Scores of Different Earnings Measures (19,842 firm-
years based on CompAcctM4it) 
Panel A. Comparability Scores of earnings measures 
Earnings measures Mean STD P1 Q1 Median Q3 P99 
OCF -0.851 1.759 -9.073 -0.771 -0.368 -0.185 -0.052 
IE_Core -0.731 1.403 -7.776 -0.690 -0.302 -0.153 -0.045 
IE_Core_Inter -0.613 1.294 -7.107 -0.542 -0.233 -0.113 -0.033 
NI -0.744 1.479 -8.365 -0.646 -0.266 -0.117 -0.032 
 
Panel B. Difference in comparability scores between earnings measures 
 
Pairwise difference (column - row) 
(Upper: mean; lower: median) 
Earnings measures OCF IE_Core IE_Core_Inter NI 
OCF  0.120*** 0.239*** 0.107*** 
IE_Core 0.036***  0.118*** -0.013* 
IE_Core_Inter 0.087*** 0.046***  -0.131*** 
NI 0.065*** 0.028*** -0.016***  
This table presents the comparability scores of earnings measures. I use an alternative 
firm-year level comparability score CompAcctM4it which is based on the earnings-
return mapping. Please refer to section 3.3 for a more detailed discussion of 
CompAcctM4it. Panel A presents comparability scores of cash flow, intermediate 
earnings and net income. The first (fifth) column shows mean (median) comparability 
scores. Comparability scores are constructed so that scores closer to zero suggest greater 
comparability. Panel B presents the differences in the comparability scores across 
earnings metrics. Positive comparability differences suggest the earnings metrics are 
more comparable, while negative differences indicate the earnings metrics are less 
comparable. *, **, *** indicate being significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 









Earnings Comparability and the Magnitude of Different Accruals: Results Based 
on De Franco et al. (2011)’s Firm-Pair-year Comparability Scores AcctCompijt 
 Dep. Var. = AcctCompijt 
Variable Pred. (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
Core_Pair + 2.592***     0.378*** 
  (41.27)     (5.29) 
Inter_Pair +   1.320***    
    (19.75)    
NCore_pair -    -4.682***  -4.438*** 
     (-62.97)  (-51.90) 
RET_COV + 0.221***  0.247*** 0.177***  0.177*** 
  (6.12)  (6.83) (4.93)  (4.91) 
Size_Diff - 0.032***  0.040*** 0.042***  0.041*** 
  (3.09)  (3.8) (3.97)  (3.89) 
Cash_Diff - -20.59***  -20.70*** -20.25***  -20.25*** 
  (-63.03)  (-63.56) (-62.21)  (-62.21) 
Lev_Diff - -0.114**  -0.113** -0.162***  -0.161*** 
  (-1.98)  (-1.97) (-2.83)  (-2.81) 
MB_Diff - -0.145***  -0.139*** -0.141***  -0.142*** 
  (-43.63)  (-42.03) (-42.73)  (-42.81) 
LossProb_Diff - -3.049***  -3.035*** -3.072***  -3.073*** 
  (-106.65)  (-107.72) (-109.75)  (-109.78) 
STD_Sales_Diff + 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 
  (3.03)  (3.57) (3.49)  (3.44) 
STD_CFO_Diff - 0.357  1.472*** 0.996**  0.891** 
  (0.88)  (3.62) (2.46)  (2.20) 
STD_Sales_Grth_Diff - 0.169***  0.193*** 0.173***  0.171*** 
  (5.54)  (6.33) (5.70)  (5.64) 
Size_Avg + -0.086***  -0.103*** -0.006  -0.007 
  (-4.27)  (-5.09) (-0.30)  (-0.36) 
CFO_Avg + 7.439***  6.315*** 9.166***  9.198*** 
  (13.06)  (11.08) (16.09)  (16.14) 
Lev_Avg + -3.434***  -3.299*** -3.174***  -3.192*** 
  (-33.43)  (-32.02) (-31.11)  (-31.26) 
MB_Avg + 0.347***  0.332*** 0.344***  0.345*** 
  (53.43)  (51.56) (53.21)  (53.24) 
LossProb_Avg - -3.074***  -3.150*** -2.670***  -2.705*** 
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  (-62.47)  (-63.64) (-54.34)  (-54.45) 
STD_Sales_Avg + -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001*** 
  (-6.58)  (-7.53) (-7.63)  (-7.52) 
STD_CFO_Avg - -16.41***  -17.31*** -18.46***  -18.33*** 
  (-22.60)  (-23.76) (-25.49)  (-25.29) 
STD_Sales_Grth_Avg - -0.192***  -0.249*** -0.202***  -0.197*** 
  (3.18)  (-4.10) (-3.35)  (-3.27) 
        
Pair FE  YES  YES YES  YES 
Year FE  YES  YES YES  YES 
Adj. R2  84.96%  84.90% 85.06%  85.07% 
No. of Obs.  1,700,024  1,700,024 1,700,024  1,700,024 
This table reports an OLS regression that examines the impact of accruals structure on 
earnings comparability. The dependent variable is the firm-pair De Franco et al. (2011) 
comparability score AcctCompijt. The test variables are Core_Pair, Inter_Pair and 
NCore_Pair. For each firm-pair, the test variables are constructed as the average 
proportion of each accrual category of the total accruals. For example, Core_Pair is 
measured by averaging the absolute value of core accruals divided by the sum of 
absolute values of core accruals between firm i and firm j. For each firm-pair, the 
magnitude of accruals is measured for the last four years in order to make the 
measurement window consistent with that of comparability scores (i.e., 16 quarters). 
Consistently, all the control variables are constructed using a time window of the last 
four years. For each firm-pair, I include control variables on both difference and average 
basis. Column (1) to column (3) reports the comparability effects of core, intermediate, 
and non-core accruals, respectively. Panel 4 reports the corresponding comparability 
effects when multiple groups of accruals are considered all together. Since the three test 
variables (i.e., Core_Pair, Inter_Pair and NCore_Pair) always add up to 1, column (4) 
include only two of them (i.e., Core_Pair and NCore_Pair) to avoid potential 
collinearity. *, **, *** indicate being significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, from two-sided pair-sample tests of equality of mean. All t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm-pair level. There are 433,209 











Earnings Comparability and the Magnitude of Different Accruals: Results Based 
on De Franco et al. (2011)’s Firm-Year Comparability Scores CompAcctIndit 
 Dep. Var. = CompAcctIndit 
Variable Pred. (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
Core + 1.128***     0.081 
  (5.07)     (0.32) 
Inter +   0.664***    
    (2.66)    
NCore -    -2.227***  -2.175*** 
     (-7.17)  (-6.05) 
RET_COV + -0.282  -0.255 -0.328  -0.328 
  (-0.72)  (-0.65) (-0.85)  (-0.85) 
Size + 0.175**  0.174** 0.204***  0.204*** 
  (2.25)  (2.24) (2.64)  (2.63) 
CFO + 4.641*  4.151* 5.548**  5.555** 
  (1.93)  (1.74) (2.32)  (2.32) 
Leverage + -1.557***  -1.460*** -1.415***  -1.420*** 
  (-3.79)  (-3.57) (-3.50)  (-3.51) 
MTB + 0.064***  0.059*** 0.064***  0.064*** 
  (4.93)  (4.68) (4.97)  (4.96) 
LossProb - -2.965***  -2.992*** -2.788***  -2.789*** 
  (-15.06)  (-14.92) (-13.94)  (-13.93) 
STD_Sales + 0.000**  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 
  (2.48)  (2.65) (2.79)  (2.78) 
STD_CFO - -6.660***  -6.693*** -7.524***  -7.512*** 
  (-2.70)  (-2.71) (-3.05)  (-3.04) 
STD_Sales_Grth - 0.084  0.068 0.089  0.089 
  (0.94)  (0.76) (0.99)  (0.99) 
        
Firm FE  YES  YES YES  YES 
Year FE  YES  YES YES  YES 
Adj. R2  77.38%  77.31% 77.57%  77.57% 
No. of Obs.  17,391  17,391 17,391  17,391 
This table reports an OLS regression that examines the impact of accruals structure on 
earnings comparability. The dependent variable is the firm-year De Franco et al (2011) 
comparability scores CompAcctIndit. The test variables are Core, Inter and NCore, and 
they are constructed as the proportion of each accrual category of the total accruals. For 
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example, Core is measured by taking the absolute value of core accruals divided by the 
sum of absolute values of core, intermediary and non-core accruals. For each firm-year, 
the magnitude of accruals is measured for the last four years in order to make the 
measurement window consistent with that of comparability scores (i.e., 16 quarters). 
Consistently, all the control variables are constructed by taking their average during the 
last four years. Column (1) to column (3) reports the comparability effects of core, 
intermediate, and non-core accruals, respectively. Panel 4 reports the corresponding 
comparability effects when multiple groups of accruals are considered all together. 
Since the three test variables (i.e., Core_Pair, Inter_Pair and NCore_Pair) always add 
up to 1, column (4) include only two of them (i.e., Core_Pair and NCore_Pair) to avoid 
potential collinearity. *, **, *** indicate being significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively, from two-sided pair-sample tests of equality of mean. All t-
statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. There are 2,483 






















Earnings Comparability and the Magnitude of Different Accruals: Results Based 
on Firm-Pair-year Earnings Co-movement Comparability Scores CMV_ERNijt 
 Dep. Var. = CMV_ERNijt 
Variable Pred. (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
Core_Pair + 0.053***     0.030*** 
  (13.57)     (6.51) 
Inter_Pair +   -0.004    
    (-0.86)    
NCore_pair -    -0.065***  -0.045*** 
     (-14.25)  (-8.28) 
RET_COV + 0.065***  0.065*** 0.064***  0.064*** 
  (23.52)  (23.72) (23.42)  (23.40) 
Size_Diff - -0.002***  -0.002*** -0.001***  -0.002*** 
  (-2.90)  (-2.75) (-2.61)  (-2.75) 
Cash_Diff - 0.014  0.011 0.018  0.018 
  (0.81)  (0.61) (1.04)  (1.02) 
Lev_Diff - -0.014***  -0.013*** -0.014***  -0.014*** 
  (-4.18)  (-4.12) (-4.39)  (-4.34) 
MB_Diff - -0.001***  -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.001*** 
  (-8.28)  (-7.85) (-7.89)  (-8.13) 
LossProb_Diff - -0.017***  -0.016*** -0.017***  -0.017*** 
  (-11.87)  (-11.60) (-12.04)  (-12.05) 
STD_Sales_Diff + -0.000***  -0.000*** -0.000***  -0.000*** 
  (-4.33)  (-4.28) (-4.25)  (-4.29) 
STD_CFO_Diff - -0.129***  -0.114*** -0.116***  -0.124*** 
  (-5.29)  (-4.68) (-4.75)  (-5.09) 
STD_Sales_Grth
_Diff 
- -0.016***  -0.016*** -0.016***  -0.016*** 
  (-6.65)  (-6.53) (-6.59)  (-6.64) 
Size_Avg + -0.009***  -0.009*** -0.007***  -0.008*** 
  (-7.98)  (-8.61) (-7.09)  (-7.20) 
CFO_Avg + -0.098***  -0.123*** -0.082**  0.081** 
  (-2.92)  (-3.66) (-2.45)  (-2.40) 
Lev_Avg + -0.013**  -0.012** -0.009  -0.010* 
  (-2.27)  (-2.15) (-1.56)  (-1.82) 
MB_Avg + 0.003***  0.003*** 0.002***  0.003*** 
  (8.41)  (7.77) (8.07)  (8.36) 
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LossProb_Avg - 0.023***  0.020*** 0.027***  0.026*** 
  (8.45)  (7.29) (9.98)  (9.79) 
STD_Sales_Avg + 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 
  (9.45)  (9.35) (9.25)  (9.34) 
STD_CFO_Avg - 1.081***  1.076*** 1.050***  1.061*** 
  (24.39)  (24.26) (23.70)  (23.95) 
STD_Sales_Grth
_Avg 
- 0.031***  0.030*** 0.030***  0.031*** 
  (6.39)  (6.24) (6.31)  (6.38) 
        
Pair FE  YES  YES YES  YES 
Year FE  YES  YES YES  YES 
Adj. R2  47.25%  47.33% 42.02%  47.35% 
No. of Obs.  1,869,300  1,869,300 1,869,300  1,869,300 
This table reports an OLS regression that examines the impact of accruals structure on 
earnings comparability. The dependent variable is the firm-pair earnings comovement 
based comparability score CMV_ERNijt. The test variables are Core_Pair, Inter_Pair 
and NCore_Pair. For each firm-pair, the test variables are constructed as the average 
proportion of each accrual category of the total accruals. For example, Core_Pair is 
measured by averaging the absolute value of core accruals divided by the sum of 
absolute values of core accruals between firm i and firm j. For each firm-pair, the 
magnitude of accruals is measured for the last four years in order to make the 
measurement window consistent with that of comparability scores (i.e., 16 quarters). 
Consistently, all the control variables are constructed using a time window of the last 
four years. For each firm-pair, I include control variables on both difference and average 
basis. Column (1) to column (3) reports the comparability effects of core, intermediate, 
and non-core accruals, respectively. Panel 4 reports the corresponding comparability 
effects when multiple groups of accruals are considered all together. Since the three test 
variables (i.e., Core_Pair, Inter_Pair and NCore_Pair) always add up to 1, column (4) 
include only two of them (i.e., Core_Pair and NCore_Pair) to avoid potential 
collinearity. *, **, *** indicate being significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively, from two-sided pair-sample tests of equality of mean. All t-statistics are 
based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm-pair level. There are 468,263 










Earnings Comparability and the Magnitude of Different Accruals: Results Based 
on Firm-Year Earnings Comovement Comparability Scores CMV_Indit 
 Dep. Var. = CMV_Indit 
Variable Pred. (1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
Core + 0.022***     0.009 
  (2.96)     (1.07) 
Inter +   0.0024    
    (0.29)    
NCore -    -0.033***  -0.026** 
     (-3.66)  (-2.51) 
RET_COV + 0.126***  0.127*** 0.125***  0.125*** 
  (7.64)  (7.66) (7.62)  (7.62) 
Size + -0.004**  -0.004** -0.004*  -0.004* 
  (-2.07)  (-2.13) (-1.87)  (-1.89) 
CFO + 0.038  0.027 0.048  0.049 
  (0.57)  (0.41) (0.73)  (0.74) 
Leverage + -0.008  -0.007 -0.006  -0.007 
  (-0.84)  (-0.74) (-0.60)  (-0.66) 
MTB + 0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 
  (-0.27)  (0.46) (0.31)  (0.26) 
LossProb - 0.002  0.001 0.005  0.005 
  (0.48)  (0.27) (0.94)  (0.91) 
STD_Sales + 0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 
  (3.83)  (3.81) (3.74)  (3.76) 
STD_CFO - 0.484***  0.487*** 0.473***  0.474*** 
  (5.99)  (6.00) (5.83)  (5.85) 
STD_Sales_Grth - -0.005**  -0.005** -0.005**  -0.005** 
  (-2.10)  (-2.19) (-2.10)  (-2.08) 
        
Firm FE  YES  YES YES  YES 
Year FE  YES  YES YES  YES 
Adj. R2  41.99%  41.93% 42.02%  42.03% 
No. of Obs.  18,192  18,192 18,192  18,192 
This table reports an OLS regression that examines the impact of accruals structure on 
earnings comparability. The dependent variable is the firm-year earnings co-movement 
based comparability scores CMV_Indit. The test variables are Core, Inter and NCore, 
and they are constructed as the proportion of each accrual category of the total accruals. 
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For example, Core is measured by taking the absolute value of core accruals divided by 
the sum of absolute values of core, intermediary and non-core accruals. For each firm-
year, the magnitude of accruals is measured for the last four years in order to make the 
measurement window consistent with that of comparability scores (i.e., 16 quarters). 
Consistently, all the control variables are constructed by taking their average during the 
last four years. Column (1) to column (3) reports the comparability effects of core, 
intermediate, and non-core accruals, respectively. Panel 4 reports the corresponding 
comparability effects when multiple groups of accruals are considered all together. 
Since the three test variables (i.e., Core_Pair, Inter_Pair and NCore_Pair) always add 
up to 1, column (4) include only two of them (i.e., Core_Pair and NCore_Pair) to avoid 
potential collinearity. *, **, *** indicate being significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively, from two-sided pair-sample tests of equality of mean. All t-
statistics are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. There are 2,605 




Accounting Comparability and Analysts' Performance: The Moderating Effect of Accrual Components (Results Based on 
CompAcctIndit) 
 
  Dep.Var. = Accuracy   Dep.Var. = Dispersion 
  Pred. 










CompAcctInd      + 28.27*** 26.70***   - -11.34*** -12.25**  
  (4.25) (3.22)    (-3.52) (-2.96)  
Hcore ? -0.42**    ? 0.26***   
  (-2.49)     (3.39)   
CompAcctInd×Hcore - -12.71*    + 7.13**   
  (-1.89)     (2.68)   
HcoreLncore ?  -0.58**   ?  0.38***  
   (-2.79)     (3.13)  
CompAcctInd×HcoreLncore -  -16.98**   +  10.70**  
   (-2.52)     (2.85)  
          
Coverage + 0.16 0.33**   - 0.17** 0.19**  
  (0.92) (2.20)    (2.45) (3.03)  
SUE - -4.77** -4.28**   ? 2.32*** 2.08***  
  (-3.01) (-2.34)    (4.86) (4.47)  
Neg UE - -0.24* -0.15   + 0.19*** 0.18***  
  (-1.91) (-1.09)    (3.99) (3.14)  
Loss - -1.09** -1.05**   + 0.88*** 0.77***  
  (-2.25) (-2.74)    (9.06) (11.42)  
Neg SI - 11.66*** 11.08***   + -6.30*** -5.75***  
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  (3.48) (3.05)    (-5.59) (-4.79)  
Days - -0.96** -0.89**   + 0.30* 0.25**  
  (-2.32) (-2.14)    (2.12) (2.39)  
Size + 0.29** 0.19*   - -0.27*** -0.26***  
  (2.32) (1.76)    (-5.45) (-5.99)  
Predictability + -0.63* -0.67*   - 0.07 0.06  
  (-1.81) (-1.95)    (0.58) (0.44)  
Vol_ERN - 1.94 0.09   + 0.75 0.89  
  (0.51) (0.02)    (0.45) (0.44)  
Vol_RET - -5.16 -7.06*   + 5.08** 5.87**  
  (-1.71) (-2.11)    (2.84) (2.49)  
         
Industry FE YES YES    YES YES  
Year FE YES YES    YES YES  
Adj. R-Squared 11.45% 11.39%    21.24% 21.24%  
No. of Obs. 13,856 10,238    13,172 9,728  
This table reports the regression that examines the cross-sectional variation in the benefits of earnings comparability. The dependent variable is analysts’ 
forecast metrics including Accuracy and Dispersion. The test variables CompAcctInd×Highcore and CompAcctInd×HighcoreLowncore are interaction terms 
between comparability measure (e.g., CompAcctInd) and indicator variables for accrual components. Highcore is an indicator variable which equals one if the 
magnitude of core accruals is above the median, zero otherwise. HighcoreLowncore is another indicator variable which equals one if the firms have both above 
median core accruals and below median non-core accruals, zero otherwise. Model 1 and 2 are for forecast accuracy, with model 1 being estimated for the full 
sample of 13,856 firm-years. Model 2 is estimated for a more refined sample of 10,238 firm-years, which includes only the observations having above-median 
core accruals alongside with below-median non-core accruals, or vice versa. The refined sample excludes the observations having above-median core accruals 
alongside with above-median non-core accruals, or vice versa.   Similarly, model 3 and 4 are for forecast dispersion, with model 3 being estimated for the full 
sample and model 4 being estimated for the refined sample. I follow De Franco et al. (2011) to control for a series of variables that are previously found to be 
determinants of analysts’ forecast performance. **, *** indicate being significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, from two-sided pair-sample 





Accounting Comparability and Analysts' Performance: The Moderating Effect of Accrual Components (Results Based on 
CompAcctM4it) 
 
  Dep.Var. = Accuracy   Dep.Var. = Dispersion 
  Pred. 










CompAcctM4      + 24.67*** 25.99**   - -13.61*** -15.79**  
  (3.52) (2.86)    (-3.10) (-2.93)  
Highcore ? -0.11    ? 0.10   
  (-1.06)     (1.66)   
CompAcctM4×Highcore - -7.26    + 7.72**   
  (-0.78)     (2.19)   
HighcoreLowncore ?  -0.20   ?  0.15*  
   (-1.56)     (1.88)  
CompAcctM4×HighcoreLowncore -  -18.02**   +  14.08***  
   (-2.23)     (3.21)  
          
Coverage + 0.23 0.39**   - 0.15** 0.17**  
  (1.31) (2.57)    (2.33) (2.93)  
SUE - -4.91** -4.39**   ? 2.34*** 2.09***  
  (-3.08) (-2.35)    (4.82) (4.39)  
Neg UE - -0.22 -0.13   + 0.19*** 0.17**  
  (-1.73) (-0.74)    (3.90) (3.01)  
Loss - -1.16** -1.11**   + 0.91*** 0.79***  
  (-2.39) (-2.90)    (8.83) (11.39)  
Neg SI - 11.59*** 10.97**   + -6.30*** -5.71***  
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  (3.42) (2.96)    (-5.50) (-4.69)  
Days - -0.92** -0.87*   + 0.29* 0.25**  
  (-2.21) (-1.90)    (2.04) (2.39)  
Size + 0.24* 0.15   - -0.26*** -0.26***  
  (1.91) (1.27)    (-5.45) (-6.10)  
Predictability + -0.65* -0.69*   - 0.08 0.08  
  (-1.85) (-1.97)    (0.66) (0.52)  
Vol_ERN - -0.36 -2.07   + 1.34 1.53  
  (0.10) (0.47)    (0.85) (0.80)  
Vol_RET - -6.61* -8.39**   + 5.46** 6.24**  
  (-2.10) (-2.44)    (2.96) (2.61)  
         
Industry FE YES YES    YES YES  
Year FE YES YES    YES YES  
Adj. R-Squared 11.10% 11.11%    21.04% 21.02%  
No. of Obs. 13,856 10,238    13,172 9,728  
This table reports the regression that examines the cross-sectional variation in the benefits of earnings comparability. The dependent variable is analysts’ 
forecast metrics including Accuracy and Dispersion. The test variables CompAcctM4×Highcore and CompAcctM4×HighcoreLowncore are interaction terms 
between comparability measure (e.g., CompAcctM4) and indicator variables for accrual components. Highcore is an indicator variable which equals one if the 
magnitude of core accruals is above the median, zero otherwise. HighcoreLowncore is another indicator variable which equals one if the firms have both above 
median core accruals and below median non-core accruals, zero otherwise. Model 1 and 2 are for forecast accuracy, with model 1 being estimated for the full 
sample of 13,856 firm-years. Model 2 is estimated for a more refined sample of 10,238 firm-years, which includes only the observations having above-median 
core accruals alongside with below-median non-core accruals, or vice versa. The refined sample excludes the observations having above-median core accruals 
alongside with above-median non-core accruals, or vice versa. Similarly, model 3 and 4 are for forecast dispersion, with model 3 being estimated for the full 
sample and model 4 being estimated for the refined sample. I follow De Franco et al. (2011) to control for a series of variables that are previously found to be 
determinants of analysts’ forecast performance. **, *** indicate being significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, from two-sided pair-sample 




Chapter 6 Conclusion 
6.1 Summary and Conclusion 
This thesis aims to fill the gap in the literature regarding the underlying 
mechanism that produces comparable (or incomparable) earnings. Chapter 2 provides a 
general review on the literature regarding accounting comparability. Chapter 3 
discusses alternative empirical measures of accounting comparability. Chapter 4 takes 
advantage of the setting of non-GAAP earnings so as to shed light on the effects of non-
GAAP adjustments on earnings comparability. Excluding non-recurring items is found 
to produce more comparable earnings, while the aggressive exclusion of recurring items 
produces incomparable earnings.  Overall non-GAAP adjustments are associated with 
incremental comparability benefits over GAAP earnings. Chapter 5 links earnings 
comparability to accrual process where cash flows are adjusted for accruals with 
different properties. The accrual process is found to be an underlying mechanism that 
drives earnings comparability. While the accrual items collectively improve 
comparability, I observe a significant distinction between different accruals.  
This thesis seeks new knowledge on the driving factors of earnings 
comparability. Chapter 4 and 5 attribute comparability to non-GAAP adjustments and 
accrual process, respectively. Each chapter contributes to the literature by answering 
relevant research questions. The findings in both chapters consistently suggest that 
earnings comparability is not solely driven by implementation of accounting standards. 
Rather, comparability is also related to earnings structure (non-recurring VS. recurring 
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items; core accruals VS. non-core accruals). The overall earnings comparability is 
jointly determined by the two factors. 
Chapter 4 attempts to fill the gap in the literature concerning the comparability 
of non-GAAP earnings. In spite of the fast-growing literature on earnings comparability, 
no study has investigated the comparability effects of non-GAAP adjustments. 
Meanwhile, although prior studies establish adequate evidence on non-GAAP earnings 
having higher value relevance, they have not directly spoken to the comparability of 
non-GAAP earnings, an important and independent dimension of accounting 
information usefulness. This study represents one of the first attempts to bridge the 
aforementioned research gap. Specifically, I find that non-GAAP adjustments by equity 
analysts bring comparability benefits, making street earnings significantly more 
comparable than GAAP earnings. Moreover, excluding material non-recurring items, 
or recurring items with substantial measurement errors leads to improvement in 
comparability. In contrast, aggressive exclusion of recurring items results in 
deterioration in comparability. The findings contribute to both the academic literature 
and practical standard setting. First, it closes the gap in the literature regarding the 
comparability of non-GAAP earnings. Second, it documents evidence which provides 
another viable explanation for the increasing popularity of non-GAAP earnings. Finally, 
the findings that unstandardized street earnings are more comparable than standardized 
GAAP earnings provide securities regulators and accounting standard setters with new 
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insight into how standards and regulations help financial statement users to construct 
earnings measures that are reflective of their contextualized needs. 
Chapter 5 examines the within-GAAP mechanism that produces comparable (or 
incomparable) earnings. Although I have seen a fast-growing body of research on the 
economic consequences of earnings comparability, very limited efforts have been put 
into exploring the underlying mechanism that drives earnings comparability. While 
attempts have been made to examine the effect of external monitors on earnings 
comparability (Francis et al. 2014), this study focuses on the factors inside of earnings 
reporting, in particular the accrual process. It first establishes evidence on the 
association between earnings comparability and different accrual components, and then 
highlights the implications of this evidence for prior studies on earnings comparability. 
I find that adjusting for core accruals improve earnings comparability, whereas the 
presence of non-core accruals reduces comparability. More interestingly, this finding 
has important implications for prior studies on how equity analysts benefit from greater 
comparability. While prior studies document evidence on analyst forecasts performing 
better for firms whose earnings are more comparable, this study suggests that the 
corresponding comparability benefits are not equally distributed across all firms. The 
comparability benefits for analysts concentrated in firms whose earnings possess less 
core accruals/more non-core accruals and thus are ex ante more difficult to predict. The 
comparability benefits become significantly less pronounced when it comes to firms 
whose earnings comprise more core accruals/less non-core accruals and therefore are 
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relatively easier to predict. This study contributes to the literature mainly in two ways. 
First, it sheds new light on the underlying mechanism that drives earnings comparability. 
Second, its implications for prior studies extend my understanding of how earnings 
comparability delivers benefits to financial statement users. 
 
6.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
There are two limitations in this thesis. First, while the De Franco et al. (2011)’s 
measurement aims to quantify the extent to which firms’ accounting systems are 
comparable, the empirical execution of the measure inevitably captures the effect of 
firms’ underlying economics. That is, the comparability scores produced by this 
approach are determined by not only the implementation of accounting standards (e.g., 
accounting choices/management discretion), which is the initial target of the measure, 
but also firms’ operations. In that sense, firms can achieve high comparability scores 
simply by, for example, having more similar operations with peers, but not necessarily 
having as similar accounting system. Although my analyses attempts in several ways to 
control for underlying economics and thus isolate the effect of accounting system, this 
caveat may still affect the interpretation of my findings. 
Second, the comparability measure I employ in this study implicitly assumes 
that the rate at which economic information is incorporated into stock prices is the same 
across firms. However, prior studies document evidence that stock prices can possibly 
incorporate firm-specific news before they are reported in earnings, that is, “prices lead 
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earnings” (Collins et al. 1994). If “prices lead earnings” is driven by factors beyond 
financial accounting (e.g., information environment), then two firms with equally 
timely accounting earnings could be shown as incomparable due to outside activities 
influencing stock return before my measurement of quarterly return. De Franco et al. 
(2011) propose an alternative measure to alleviate this concern, though it is not 
employed in this thesis. Moreover, the comparability measure in use does not account 
for the conditional conservatism which could also affect the rate at which economic 
information is mapped into earnings. 
An opportunity exists in Chapter 4 to examine the implication of more 
comparable non-GAAP earnings. First, prior studies evaluate the quality of non-GAAP 
adjustments by testing their predictive power for firms’ future performance. Ideally, 
high quality non-GAAP adjustments mainly comprise non-recurring items which 
should have very low predictive power for future performance. A potential research 
question here is whether the comparability benefits of non-GAAP adjustments can 
simultaneously improve the quality of themselves. 
The second research question worth further exploration is the market reaction to 
more comparable non-GAAP earnings. Prior research finds non-GAAP earnings being 
more value relevant (i.e., higher ERC), and comparability is perceived to enhance 
relevance of financial information. Future research could investigate whether the 
comparability benefits of non-GAAP earnings are associated with stronger market 
reaction. Another potential research question along these lines is whether the 
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comparability benefits attenuate investors discounting of non-GAAP earnings. 
Investors are found to discount the pricing message from non-GAAP earnings when the 
reporting of non-GAAP earnings is susceptible to opportunistic incentives. To the 
extent that the comparability benefits alleviate this concern, the investors are expected 
to be more confident with non-GAAP adjustments that make earnings more comparable. 
As a result, the investors would apply less discounting to non-GAAP earnings which 
are associated with incremental comparability benefits. 
Building on the association between earnings comparability and accrual process, 
Chapter 5 highlights the important implications of this finding for prior studies on how 
equity analysts benefit from greater comparability. In addition to this, the main finding 
in Chapter 5 also has the potential to extend my understanding of other two pieces of 
interesting evidence. First, Chen et al. (2016) find that when target firms have higher 
comparability scores, then the M&A deal will have better post-deal performance. 
Basically, the authors attribute the incremental post-deal benefits to target firms’ greater 
pre-deal comparability which can reduce the information processing costs for acquirers 
through referring to their peers. However, the pre-deal earnings structure may also play 
a role here. That is, those target firms whose earnings are mainly composed of core 
(non-core) accruals would be easier (more difficult) to be understood by the acquirers. 
If this is the case, then the finding in Chen et al. (2016) may have an issue of correlated 
omitted variable. That is, the variable of earnings structure (core accruals VS. non-core 
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accruals) is correlated with both dependent (post-deal performance) and independent 
variable (comparability), but is omitted in their analysis. 
The second study for which my finding can have an important implication is 
Kim et al. (2016) who find that expected stock crash risk decreases with financial 
statement comparability. In their paper, firm-specific stock price crash risk is attributed 
to sudden releases of bad news previously hoarded by managers. To the extent that the 
managers of more comparable firms have less incentive and ability to hoard bad news, 
the corresponding firm-specific expected crash risk is expected to be lower. That is, 
greater comparability leads to lower expected crash risk. However, rather than being 
affected by comparability, the expected crash risk might also be affected by firms’ 
earnings structure. Firms whose earnings are mainly made up of core (non-core) 
components tend to have more straight forward (more complex) operations. And firms 
with more straight forward (more complex) operations might be easier (harder) to be 
understood by investors, which makes it harder (easier) for managers to 
opportunistically withhold bad news. In this way, earnings structure may in its own right 
have a first order effect on expected crash risk. And this represents an interesting 
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